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INTRODUCTION
For better or ill, a cultural hallmark of our era is the truism that
almost any community's most visible and cherished asset is a local ma-
jor league professional sports franchise, such as a National Football
League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball As-
sociation (NBA), or National Hockey League (NHL) team. A central
paradox of this phenomenon is that even though relatively few citi-
zens regularly attend the home team's games in person,1 a major
league professional sports team provides a unique, highly valued form
of entertainment that attracts the support of thousands (and some-
times millions) of fans within its local metropolitan area. Most fans
follow their local teams and athletes through television, radio, or print
1. See Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Sports Leagues, in 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND
AMATEUR SPORTS, at 17-1 (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1995).
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media. A professional sports team often symbolizes its home commu-
nity and can become deeply ingrained in the local identity.2
By purchasing an array of tickets, concessions, souvenirs, and
merchandise bearing the team's name or logo, fans provide direct
economic support to local professional teams, which is essential to the
team's profitability and survival.' More important, millions of local
tax dollars are used to subsidize the construction and improvement of
stadiums and playing arenas for local teams.4 Taxpayer dollars also
fund the public infrastructure necessary to support these venues.'
2. Some commentators have suggested that professional sports and organized reli-
gion are America's most popular unrequired activities and that both involve similar rituals
that help people cope with life's struggles. See William Dean, Rituals Viefor the U.S. Spirit,
Soul, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 4, 1995, at El, available in 1995 WL 9412895.
3. See Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 1978) ("With-
out public support any professional sport would soon become unprofitable to the owners
and the participants."). Because most of a city's inner-city and blue-collar families cannot
afford to provide significant economic support for sports franchises, most teams derive
game-attendance-related revenues from white-collar families, businesses, and tourists or va-
cationers. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME: CITIES IN PuRsUrr OF
SPORTS FRANCHISES, EvENTs, STADIUMS, AND ARENAS 63 (1995).
4. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. Courts generally hold that the use of
public funds to construct or improve professional sports playing facilities is a legal expendi-
ture for a legitimate public purpose. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 333
P.2d 745, 751 (Cal. 1959) (in bank) (holding that the transfer of 300 acres of real property
by the Brooklyn Dodgers to the City of Los Angeles and the ball club's construction of
recreational facilities to be used by the city for 20 years were "obviously for proper public
purposes"); Alan v. County of Wayne, 200 N.W.2d 628, 682 (Mich. 1972) (holding that a
sports stadium could serve a public purpose if used exclusively for profit by a professional
sports team); Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 753-55
(Minn. 1978) (taking "judicial notice of the important part that professional sports plays in
our social life" and holding that the construction of a publicly owned sports facility for use
by professional sports teams has a public purpose for which public funds may be ex-
pended); Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 233 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ohio 1968) (concluding that "a
charter municipality may construct a stadium .. .and may rent that stadium to private
persons... even though such private persons will derive profits from providing... [ath-
letic and other] exhibitions [at the stadium]"); Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 606,
608 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930) (holding that a stadium is a "public building" that can be con-
structed and maintained by a municipality); Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894,
898-99 (Pa. 1966) (stating that a city's lease of a stadium "to one or two football clubs
having a major league franchise and to one or two professional baseball clubs having a
major league franchise would be legally and constitutionally permissible"); Libertarian
Party of Wis. v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 438 (Wis. 1996) (holding that bonds issued by a
local professional baseball park district are "obligations of... a revenue-producing enter-
prise that serves a public purpose"); cf., e.g., Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d
6, 12 (Fla. 1966) (distinguishing public purpose from "[t]he mere incidental advantage to
the public resulting from a public aid in the promotion of a private enterprise," but noting
also that the "incidental benefits or advantages gained by private enterprise from expendi-
tures made for a public purpose do not vitiate or diminish the public purpose"); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 559-61 (Mass. 1969) (holding that public funds
may be used for financing and constructing a stadium complex and other facilities "if
1997]
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Such extensive public subsidization significantly contributes to a
franchise's local revenue-generating capacity and, therefore, to its ulti-
mate profitability.
Wisely or not, state and local governments place a high value on
the potential benefits of hosting a professional sports franchise, as is
apparent by the extravagant offers of public funds to attract or retain
a franchise.6 The substantial out-of-pocket costs of public subsidiza-
tion spent on local sports franchises generally exceed the objectively
quantifiable economic benefits to the community, its taxpayers, and
area businesses.7 Therefore, the "benefit of the bargain" that the
community actually obtains in exchange for its multi-million dollar
public subsidy to a local sports franchise largely consists of intangible
benefits, such as enhanced national prestige, increased local pride
and unity from hosting a team, and an additional entertainment op-
tion for its citizens.'
A professional sports franchise is generally given an exclusive geo-
graphical territory in which to operate without competition from
other league teams.9 This practice, combined with public subsidiza-
tion of team playing facilities and strong home game attendance, sug-
gests that these franchises will be financially profitable and athletically
competitive in the host city, thereby obviating any economic reason to
relocate. Despite this apparent market reality, the recent trend most
resembles a game of musical chairs: In an effort to enhance the eco-
nomic value of their respective franchises, team owners whose
franchise values have skyrocketed casually engage in "franchise free
adequate principles, standards, and safeguards governing the execution of the project are
included in the enabling legislation to make the project one for a public purpose").
6. See infra notes 206-218 and accompanying text. The perceived benefits to cities
from hosting a franchise include enhanced reputation and prestige, additional employ-
ment, increased sales and use taxes, additional recreational opportunities, and enhanced
civic morale and youth interest in sports. See Benjamin A. Okner, Subsidies of Stadiums and
Arenas, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 325, 327-29 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974).
But see SHROPSHIRE, supra note 3, at 13-19 (noting that cities often receive only a "public
image" perception of economic improvements, without actual improvement in overall em-
ployment, revenues, etc.).
7. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 3, at 13-19 (summarizing economic impact studies re-
garding value of sports franchise to local community); see also generalyJohn L. Crompton,
Economic Impact Analysis of Sports Facilities and Events: Eleven Sources of Misapplication, 9 J.
SPORT MGMT. 14 (1995) (discussing misuse of economic impact studies to justify public
subsidization of playing facilities); Dennis Zimmerman, Tax-Exempt Bonds and the Economics
of Professional Sports Stadiums 22 (Cong. Res. Serv. rep. May 29, 1996) (concluding that the
economic benefits of stadiums to local communities do notjustify multi-million dollar state
and local subsidization of stadium construction and operating costs).
8. See Dean, supra note 2.
9. See Roger G. Noll, The U.S. Team Sports Industry: An Introduction, in GOVERNMENT
AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 1, 8-9 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974).
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agency" by moving, or threatening to move, their teams to cities that
do not have a league franchise. These owner tactics generate a na-
tionwide bidding war among cities that are forced to offer millions of
dollars in publicly financed subsidies to try to retain an existing pro-
fessional sports franchise or attract a new one. l ° This conduct has
created a sellers' market. By selecting the best available offer, a team
owner can enhance the franchise's profitability and value at taxpayer
expense.
This sellers' market exists primarily because each of the four ma-
jor professional sports leagues has monopoly power in its respective
sport, thereby enabling each league to fix the supply of franchises be-
low the existing demand for teams by cities."1 The law, as currently
interpreted by the judiciary, allows a league to tilt the supply-demand
relationship through its power to limit the total number of teams, but
restricts the same league's ability to prevent franchise relocation.1
Therefore, team owners inevitably possess an incentive to engage in
"opportunistic behavior," l" to the severe detriment of any team's host
city.
For example, Cleveland Browns owner Art Modell recently en-
tered into an agreement to relocate his franchise to Baltimore prior to
the expiration of his stadium lease, despite a fifty-year history of ex-
ceptional fan support and without considering Cleveland's offer of
$175 million in stadium improvements.1 4 Houston Oilers owner Bud
Adams decided to move his profitable franchise to Nashville after
Houston government officials rejected his take-it-or-leave-it demand
for a new $245 million, domed stadium. 5 He is leaving Harris County
taxpayers saddled with approximately $50 million of outstanding
bond indebtedness, incurred to finance 1987 stadium improvements
in an effort to prevent Adams from relocating his team to Jackson-
ville.16 Meanwhile, Seattle Seahawks owner Ken Behring expressed a
desire to relocate to Los Angeles to fill a market void created after the
10. See infra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
11. See generally Steven R. Rivkin, Sports Leagues and the Federal Antitrust Laws, in GoVERN-
MENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 387 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974) (discussing the application
of antitrust laws to professional sports leagues).
12. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
13. Professor Oliver Williamson, an economist, has described "opportunism" as involv-
ing "self-interest seeking with guile." OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 26
(1975).
14. See Peter King, Down... and Out, SPORTS ILLUS., Nov. 13, 1995, at 28, available in
1995 WL 12559615.
15. See infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
16. See Christopher Palmeri, Bottom-Line Bud, FORBES, Oct. 9, 1995, at 102, available in
1995 WL 8102356; John Williams, Q & A-Is This Bud For You? Questions and Answers on the
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former Oakland-Los Angeles Raiders relocated to Oakland, and the
former Cleveland-Los Angeles Rams moved to St. Louis, because the
former Chicago-St. Louis Cardinals had relocated to Phoenix. 17
The relocation efforts of the Browns, Oilers, and Seahawks have
spawned litigation between each of the team owners and their host
cities, states, or local governing bodies.18 These lawsuits reflect efforts
to keep the local team from moving before its stadium lease expires
and the home city has had an opportunity to retain the franchise.
Litigation has occurred because of the potential loss of economic ben-
efits to a city and its local businesses, unrecouped expenditure of tax-
payer funds, and the politically powerful issue of community pride to
a city that loses a professional sports franchise.19 Team owners gener-
ally assert a right to choose a home for their franchises based on eco-
nomic factors that will maximize the current profitability of their
investment in the team. Owners are willing to "buy out" existing sta-
dium lease obligations in order to relocate prematurely. 20
This Article discusses the nature and characteristics of the rela-
tionship between a professional sports franchise and its host city. It
then reviews the traditional reluctance of courts to interfere with com-
mercial contract relationships, to grant injunctive relief, or to require
specific performance. The Article considers the implications of this
reluctance for structuring the relationship between a host city and a
franchise. This discussion will establish the need for cities to thor-
oughly and accurately analyze the costs and benefits of hosting a pro-
fessional sports franchise and to maximize private ordering by
negotiating contractual provisions necessary to adequately protect
their constituents' interests.
The Article next examines how private law principles alone may
not sufficiently protect fan and taxpayer interests, as a professional
league's exclusive power to control supply creates a disparity of bar-
gaining power in favor of a franchise. This imbalance provides team
Latest Oilers'Stadium Controversy, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 20, 1995, at A20, available in 1995 WL
9422388.
17. See Vincent Hanna, Kind Hearts Fail Without Hard Arteries, GuARDIAN, Sept. 4, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 4042182.
18. See infra note 94; T.J. Simers, Allen has Option to buy Seahawks; Pro Football: Deal
Should Knock Out Behring and end Chances of Move to Southern California, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21,
1996, at Cl, available in 1996 WL 5262225.
19. See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
20. For example, Houston Oilers owner Bud Adams expressed an interest in buying
out the remaining two years of his lease to play football games in the Astrodome, so that
the Oilers might begin playing in Tennessee before the lease's 1997 expiration. SeeJohn
McClain, Don't Plan on Oilers Waiting for Expiration Date, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 15, 1995, at
B8, available in 1995 WL 9403957.
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owners with the ability to reject a city's proposed contract terms and
to engage in opportunistic behavior by threatening to relocate unless
the team owners' demands are met. The inadequacy of antitrust law
to prevent exploitation of a host city by a franchise and team reloca-
tion will also be addressed.
The Article's thesis is that free market principles generally should
govern the relationship between a host city and its professional sports
franchises and should determine the most efficient locations of
franchises. However, limited federal statutory remedies should be
available to protect a host city's benefit of the bargain and to prevent
taxpayer and fan exploitation. Congressional regulation is necessary
to protect taxpayers and fans by leveling the playing field between a
team owner and its current or prospective host city.
I. COMMON LAw PRINCIPLES
A. Symbiotic Relationships
If a local team plays in a publicly owned facility, the legal relation-
ship between a host community and a professional sports franchise is
that of a landlord and tenant. The team covenants to play its home
games in an arena or stadium for a designated number of years and to
pay rent to the facility owner or operator out of revenues derived from
that activity.21 Ancillary revenues generated from the sale of conces-
sions, parking, souvenirs, and other items are allocated between the
franchise and its lessor in agreed percentages.22 The specifics of the
parties' respective rights and obligations under the lease arrangement
are subject to negotiation and agreement like most other commercial
transactions.23
In fact, the nature of the relationship between a host community
and a professional team extends beyond the parameters of the ordi-
nary, commercial, landlord-tenant lease because a sports franchise
often receives a multi-million dollar subsidy from state and local tax-
payers. In recent years, local governments have spent, or have offered
to spend, millions of dollars to retain, or attract, sports franchises.24
21. See Okner, supra note 6, at 334-39.
22. See id.
23. See infra notes 48-94 and accompanying text.
24. See generally CHARLES C. EUCHNER, PLAYING THE FIELD 55 (1993) (exploring the "fe-
verish competition among North American cities to attract professional sports teams");
Dan McGraw, Playing the Stadium Game, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 3, 1996, at 46,
available in 1996 WL 7810802 (discussing public subsidy of sports facility construction or
renovation in most United States cities).
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In effect, taxpayers are investors in the local sports franchises, but they
do not share directly in team profits.
Most sports facilities are publicly owned, there customarily being
no incentive for wholly privately financed construction.2 5 This is par-
ticularly true because the costs of facility development and mainte-
nance usually exceed the revenues generated, and it is usually not
possible for team owners, or other private parties, to capture all of the
positive economic externalities that arise from maintaining a team in
the community.26 The vast public cost and its accelerating pace is
staggering. From 1975 to 1990, cities and states spent an aggregate
$1.2 billion in tax revenues to construct or improve arenas and stadi-
ums housing professional sports teams. 7 Since 1992, cities have spent
an additional $1 billion on professional sports facilities, with another
$5 billion to be spent within five years if all planned construction oc-
curs.2' Huge additional public subsidies in the form of government
financing of roads and other necessary infrastructure around a play-
ing facility are also expended. In 1988, two economists estimated that
a city's total financial contribution to a new stadium project can easily
exceed $100 million. 29 That figure is undoubtedly higher today."
What accounts for such extraordinary public investment?
Although other private businesses and public facilities, such as per-
forming arts theaters and museums, receive public subsidies, tax
abatements, or both, professional sports franchises are unique in en-
ergizing some core of tribalism in local residents through the teams'
ability to develop a bond with a community and to symbolize its iden-
tity and spirit.3 As former Missouri Senator John C. Danforth stated:
"[A] sports team is different from the normal business.... A sports
25. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 65-77.
26. See id.
27. See DEAN V. BAiM, THE SPORTS STADIUM AS A MUNICIPAL INVESTMENT 1-2 (1994).
28. See Outside the Lines: Brownout in Cleveland (ESPN cable television broadcast, Dec.
15, 1995) [hereinafter Brownout].
29. See Robert A- Baade & Richard F. Dye, Sports Stadiums and Area Development: A Criti-
cal Review, ECON. DEy. Q., Aug. 1988, at 268. However, the owners, and not the fans or
cities, are normally the primary beneficiaries of these subsidies. Cf Okner, supra note 6, at
345-47 (presenting data that most cities with publicly owned sports facilities operated them
at a net loss to local government during the 1970-71 season and asserting that "to the
extent that subsidized rentals are not passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices
or to players in the form of higher salaries, the prime beneficiaries of the local government
subsidies are the owners of sports teams-most of whom are extremely wealthy").
30. SeeJonathan R. Laing, Foul Play?, BARRONS, Aug. 19, 1996, at 23, available in 1996
WL-BARRONS 10421857 (stating cost of the new football stadium for the Baltimore Ravens
to be $200 million).
31. SeeJohn Beisner, Sports Franchise Relocation: Competitive Markets and Taxpayer Protec-
tion, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 429, 437-38 (1988).
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team carries with it the support of the community, the identity of the
community, and the spirit of the community."32 Professional team
sports provide a method by which cities can compare themselves to
each other, as measured by the success of their respective local teams.
A community that hosts a professional team views itself as superior to
those "bush-league," "backwater," or "second-tier" communities that
lack a professional sports franchise.33 The loss of a sports franchise by
relocation has adverse, intangible consequences to a community that
generally do not result from the loss of any other business.31 These
are epic themes better comprehended by Homeric poets or Freudian
analysts than by economists, but they are nonetheless real.
These intangibles create enormous bargaining leverage in favor
of owners.33 Teams are able to gain favorable lease terms and other
concessions because local governing officials want to avoid the loss of
community pride and esteem that occurs when a franchise relocates.3 6
Customarily, teams pay rents below competitive market rates.37 More-
over, heavy public subsidization of a franchise's playing facility signifi-
cantly contributes to the team's revenue-generating capacity, thereby
increasing its profitability.38
32. Daniel S. York, Note, The Professional Sports Community Protection Act: Congress' Best
Response to Raiders?, 38 HAS'rINGS L.J. 345, 355 (1987) (quoting Professional Sports Community
Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S. 287 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong. 84 (1985)). Robert Kraft, owner of the New Eng-
land Patriots, recently acknowledged the psychological benefits of an NFL team to its host
community: "[W]hen it does well, that cannot be duplicated anywhere else." The News
Hour withfim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 8, 1996). Baltimore Ravens owner Art
Modell has stated: "The pride and presence of a professional football team is far more
important than 30 libraries." Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 2, 1996, at 19.
33. Wisconsin Representative Marlin Schneider has stated: "Without the Milwaukee
Brewers, Bucks and Packers, [Wisconsin] ain't nothing but another Nebraska." Oscar
Dixon & Mike Dodd, Brewers' Stadium Bill Stirs Response, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1995, at C3,
available in 1995 WL 2951713. Patrick L.M. Williams, president and general manager of
the Orlando Magic NBA team, has stated: "You can have Disney World and every major
attraction, but if you don't have a team, in the eyes of the world you're not a big league
city." Maria E. Recio, Build an Arena Now, Get a Team Later-Maybe, Bus. WK., Apr. 20, 1987,
at 90, available in 1987 WL 2004694.
34. See BAM, supra note 27, at 12.
35. See infra notes 200-210 and accompanying text.
36. See Beisner, supra note 31, at 434 n.26.
37. See Noll, supra note 1, at 17-28; BALM, supra note 27, at 12; see also Glenn M. Wong,
Of Franchise Relocation, Expansion and Competition in Professional Team Sports: The Ultimate
Political Football?, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 7, 43-53 (1985) (discussing poor terms of lease
from government stadium owner's perspective).
38. See infra notes 209-211 and accompanying text.
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Thus, a professional sports franchise that plays its games in a pub-
licly owned facility has a symbiotic relationship 9 with its host city; the
franchise benefits from public funds spent in connection with the fa-
cility, and the team constitutes a unique form of community entertain-
ment that is irreplaceable if lost.4" It is appropriate to characterize a
city as a consumer and renter of a sports franchise, rather than view-
ing the team as merely a lessee of a publicly owned facility.4 ' This is a
particularly apt description because the primary community benefits
of hosting a franchise are intangible psychological values and the cor-
responding entertainment option the team provides.42 A city's loss of
a franchise is perceived as devastating to its image, and unlike love, it
may not be better to have had and lost a team than never to have had
one in the first place.43
B. Not a Joint Venture
Despite its symbiotic nature, the relationship between a profes-
sional sports franchise and its host city is not a legally recognized joint
venture. Courts have refused to hold that an agreement by a city to
lease its publicly owned athletic facilities to a private party creates an
implied joint venture between the parties. 4 If the parties' relation-
ship were ajoint venture, a city and a sports franchise would owe each
other a fiduciary duty, and a team owner would be subject to tort lia-
bility for engaging in opportunistic behavior.45 Generally, ajoint ven-
39. See John P. Morris, In the Wake of the Flood, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 88
(1973) (stating that a municipal corporation is a "major constituency" of the professional
sports industry because it provides stadiums and arenas to house teams). New England
Patriots owner Robert Kraft has characterized himself as the "custodian of a public asset."
The News Hour withjim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 8, 1996).
40. See Weinberg v. Chicago Blackhawk Hockey Team, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 1322, 1325 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1995).
41. See John Wunderli, Squeeze Play: The Game of Owners, Cities, Leagues and Congress, 5
MARQ. SPORTS LJ. 83, 86 (1994).
42. See Dean, supra note 2.
43. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Opportunistic Sports Franchise Relocations: Can Punitive
Damages in Actions Based upon Contract Strike a Balance?, 22 Loy. LA L. REv. 569, 585 n.127
(1989).
44. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Washington, 848 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)
(holding that a private high school was not vicariously liable for an injury to a spectator
caused by negligent maintenance of a city-owned stadium leased by the high school).
45. Courts have held that persons or entities engaged in a business joint venture have a
fiduciary relationship and must act in good faith, fairness, and honesty in their dealings
with each other. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that
coadventurers undertaking the conversion of a hotel to a retail and office complex were
"subject to fiduciary duties akin to those of partners"); Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256,
264-65 (Tex. 1951) (holding that parties to ajoint venture agreement regarding an oil and
gas lease owed the highest duty to one another to further their common interest).
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ture is created only if the parties have a community of interests in a
business endeavor, an equal right to direct and govern their undertak-
ing, and an agreement to share profits and losses.46 The franchise's
mere receipt of a significant public subsidy does not evidence the
existence of such an arrangement.47
C. Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship of Team and City
In determining the respective rights and obligations of a profes-
sional sports team and its host city, the nature of the parties' relation-
ship justifies treating it like other well-recognized business
relationships, whereby one party's financial investment in a commer-
cial endeavor inures to the benefit of the other. A city essentially
"rents" a league franchise by providing public subsidization, thereby
enabling its citizens to consume professional sports entertainment.4 "
The relationship between a professional team and its host city is com-
pellingly similar to a franchising arrangement; both extend beyond
the typical landlord-tenant relationship and involve a type of symbi-
otic commercial venture. 49 Therefore, common law principles gov-
erning the franchisor-franchisee relationship appear sufficiently
analogous to apply here. The team owner functions as a "franchisor"
in locating its team (subject to league approval) and the host city as a
"franchisee" in housing a team. However, such common law princi-
ples may be of limited value in governing the parties' relationship.
Absent applicable statutory provisions,50 the express terms of the
franchise agreement govern the franchisor-franchisee relationship.
Courts are reluctant to impose obligations on a franchisor inconsis-
tent with the express terms of the franchise agreement.5 Most courts
hold that a franchisor does not owe a general fiduciary duty to its
franchisee, because the relationship is viewed as the product of arm's
length commercial dealing, despite any disparity of bargaining power
46. See Wilson v. American Trans Air, Inc., 874 F.2d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 1989); 46 AM.
JUR. 2D (rev.) Joint Ventures § 9 (1994).
47. See 46 AM. JUR. 2D (rev.) Joint Ventures § 9.
48. Sce Wunderli, supra note 41, at 86.
49. See Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881-82 (8th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing
between nature and characteristics of landlord-tenant relationship and that of franchisor-
franchisee); see also supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
50. Most states have enacted statutes that govern the relationship between a franchisor
and its franchisees. See 2 GLADYS GLIcKMAN, FRANCHISING § 13.04 (1991).
51. See, e.g., Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 484-85 (5th
Cir. 1984) (refusing to construe a hotel franchise agreement provision that a franchisor
could "construct and operate" hotels of the chain at sites other than the one licensed as
proscribing acquisition of an existing hotel by the franchisor (emphasis added)).
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in the franchisor's favor.52 Thus, a professional sports franchise is le-
gally able to place its own economic interests above the public welfare
of its host community if it does so in a manner consistent with the
written agreements governing the parties' relationship.
Some courts have implied a contractual duty of good faith and
fair dealing in franchise agreements to prevent a franchisor from re-
ducing or destroying the franchisee's ability to receive the economic
benefits of the parties' business relationship.53 Whereas imposition of
a fiduciary duty "requires a party to place the interest of the other
party before his own," a duty of good faith and fair dealing "merely
requires the parties to 'deal fairly' with one another."54 It is appropri-
52. See, e.g., id. at 485 (applying Louisiana law and stating that "[e]xcept in cases of
franchise termination, in which courts have refused to give literal effect to the language of
the franchise agreement, courts have not imposed general fiduciary obligations upon
franchisors .... We also refuse to do so."); Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43,
48 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Missouri law and noting that the duty of "good faith and fair
dealing" inherent in every business relationship does not necessarily render the duties
owned by parties to a gasoline consignment agreement "fiduciary" in nature); Murphy v.
White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 354-56 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Wisconsin law and
declining to impose a fiduciary obligation upon a convenience store franchisor); Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 696 F. Supp. 57, 72-75 (D. Del. 1988) (finding no
fiduciary relationship between a soft drink company and bottlers of its product, despite the
company's characterization of the relationship as a "partnership"); Power Motive Corp. v.
Mannesmann Demag Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1048, 1051-52 (D. Colo. 1985) (applying Ohio
law and holding that a franchise relationship does not give rise to fiduciary duties between
the parties that would allow for recovery of punitive damages); Picture Lake Campground,
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Va. 1980) (holding that "it is not
appropriate for [the] [c]ourt to elevate the duty of fair dealing to a fiduciary duty nor to
create an additional cause of action for its breach" in a case involving a franchisor-fran-
chisee relationship between a recreational vehicle campground owner and its operator);
Newark Motor Inn Corp. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1143, 1151-53 (D.NJ. 1979)
(declining to "raise the duty of good faith and fair dealing which [a motel chain
franchisor] owed its franchisees to the level of a fiduciary duty"); Weight Watchers of Que-
bec Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l Inc., 398 F. Supp. 1047, 1053-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding
that a trademark license alone does not create a fiduciary relationship and that the rights
and duties of the franchisor and franchisee are governed by their underlying contract);
Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1992)
(refusing to impose a common law fiduciary duty upon franchisors in the termination of a
franchise agreement). But see Carter Equip. Co. v.John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 681 F.2d
386, 390 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that the power, authority, and bargaining position of the
franchisor and franchisee are critical in determining whether a fiduciary relationship
exists).
53. See, e.g., Piantes v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 929, 937-40 (D. Mass. 1995)
(holding that Massachusetts law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract, but concluding that a covenant was not breached when franchisor terminated a
baked goods consignment agreement under the terms of the agreement).
54. Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d at 594. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic
Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REv. 927, 992 (1990)
(advocating judicial application of the relational structure of franchising when interpret-
ing franchise contracts and resolving franchise disputes).
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ate to impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the owner of a
professional sports franchise in its business relationship with the
team's host city. As in the more typical franchise relationship, the
team owner's or franchisor's superior bargaining power enables it to
take unfair advantage of its host city or franchisee.5"
Imposing this implied duty may prevent a team owner from de-
priving a host city of its return on millions of dollars in playing facility-
related public subsidies. However, the post hocjudicial application of
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in this context will cre-
ate uncertainty, interfere with freedom of contract, and may result in
inconsistent obligations established by different state courts. Federal
legislation offers a uniform and predictable measure of protection to
host cities and would be a better and more effective alternative to a
common law duty, developed on a case-by-case basis.56
D. The Right to Breach a Contract
Apart from the limited potential for specific performance,5 7 a
party to a contract, including a franchisor or sports team owner, may
pursue its own interests by choosing to breach the agreement and pay
damages, rather than perform its obligations.5" The rationale for this
rule is that the non-breaching party is "made whole" by damages and
receives its bargained-for benefits under the contract.59 The law en-
courages certain intentional contract breaches on utilitarian grounds,
thereby promoting an efficient economy when the promisor's gains
from the breach exceed damages paid to cover the expected losses of
the promisee.6 °
Breach of contract normally exposes a party only to liability for
contract damages, rather than to a potentially larger measure of recov-
ery based on tort law. 61 Courts are reluctant to allow tort recovery for
noninsurance contract breaches.62 Even when courts have imposed
an obligation of implied good faith to perform a commercial contract,
55. See infra notes 206-213 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 512-516 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 73-94 and accompanying text.
58. See Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Mont. 1985).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 679-80 (Cal. 1995)
(adopting "a general rule precluding tort recovery for noninsurance contract breach, at
least in the absence of violation of 'an independent duty arising from principles of tort law'
other than the bad faith denial of the existence of, or liability under, the breached con-
tract" (quoting Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal.
1994))).
62. See id.
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breach of this duty has given rise to contractual, rather than tort, lia-
bility.63 Tort liability usually arises only if a franchisor makes fraudu-
lent material representations to induce a franchisee to enter into an
agreement,' or if the franchisor enters into a contract with no inten-
tion of fully performing its contractual duties. 5
Judicial application of the foregoing principles would allow a
team owner to breach a stadium lease agreement by relocating its club
to another city prior to the lease's expiration in exchange for the pay-
ment of contract damages caused by the breach. 66 Tort damages may
be recovered only if the team owner knowingly provided false assur-
ances that the team would not be relocated prematurely and did so to
obtain certain promises or actions from city officials. A team owner's
refusal to perform its obligations under the lease would not, in itself,
establish his intent not to perform fully at the time the lease was exe-
cuted-a showing that is necessary to recover tort damages.67 Under
these circumstances, the city's recovery for loss of a sports franchise
will usually be limited to contract damages.68
Merely allowing a city to recover contract damages for the prema-
ture loss of a team does not provide adequate compensation for the
city's lost "benefit of the bargain" in providing the public, financial
inducements necessary to attract or retain a sports franchise. Aside
from specified amounts of rent and income from ancillary revenues,
such as parking and concessions, the city's economic benefits from
hosting a sports franchise are difficult to determine and are probably
too speculative to recover as contract damages.69 The city's real bene-
63. See, e.g., Picture Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 864
(E.D. Va. 1980) ("It is the general rule that no cause of action in tort can arise from the
breach of a duty existing by virtue of a contract between the defendant and the person
injured.").
64. See Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 879-80 (8th Cir. 1970).
65. See Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 597
(Tex. 1992).
66. A former host city may have a tortious interference with contract claim for damages
against another city that lures a franchise away prior to the expiration of its lease obliga-
tions. See, e.g., City of New York v. New York Jets Football Club, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 987, 989-
90, 992 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("Under New York law, an essential element of inducing a
breach of contract is the breach of contract itself.").
67. See Crim Truck & Tractor, 823 S.W.2d at 597. Independent proof of the team
owner's intent to move the team prematurely at the time the stadium lease was negotiated
and executed is required to obtain tort damages. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Pomeranz v. McDonald's Corp., 843 P.2d 1378, 1381 (Colo. 1993) (holding that
in a breach of a commercial lease, "damages are not recoverable for losses beyond an
amount that a plaintiff can establish with reasonable certainty by a preponderance of
evidence").
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fits of the bargain are the highly valued, intangible benefits noted
above. 7' A professional sports team is a unique community asset that
cannot be readily replaced. For example, it has taken Baltimore more
than a decade to attract another NFL franchise after the Colts moved
to Indianapolis in March 1984.71 Other cities, such as Washington
D.C., whose major league baseball team (the "Senators") moved to
Texas more than twenty years ago, have been unable to replace their
lost teams.7' The value of such benefits is virtually impossible to quan-
tify and, therefore, is not recoverable for a team owner's breach of
contract.
E. Injunctive Relief and Specific Peformance
Courts have suggested that a stadium lease is the most effective
means of protecting a community's investment in the playing facility
that houses a professional franchise. 73 Because contract damages do
not provide an adequate remedy at law for breach of a lease with a
publicly owned playing facility and the premature relocation of a team
causes irreparable harm to a city and its fans, some courts have en-
joined teams from scheduling and playing home games outside their
host cities. In City of New York v. New York Jets Football Club, Inc.,7 4 a
New York State trial court preliminarily enjoined an NFL team from
violating a municipal stadium lease that expressly prohibited the team
from playing home games in any other city or location while the lease
was in effect.75 The court noted that the lease granted the city a right
to injunctive relief against a threatened breach.76 After weighing the
equities, the court held that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent
irreparable harm to the "welfare, recreation, prestige, prosperity and
trade and commerce" of the city's residents.77
70. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
71. SeeJon Morgan, Inside the Browns Deal, BALT. SUN, Dec. 17, 1995, at Cl, available in
1995 WL 2489851.
72. See Mark Maske, Collins Learns Rules of Game the Hard Way; After Much Wrangling
Northern Virginia Has No Team, but He Still Has Hope, WASH. PoST., Jan. 6, 1996, at F1O,
available in 1996 WL 3058343.
73. See, e.g., Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League (Raid-
ers I), 726 F.2d 1381, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[L]ocal governments ought to be able to
protect their investment through the leases they negotiate with the teams for the use of
their stadia.").
74. 394 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
75. Id. at 802-05. The court also held that any league scheduling of games in violation
of its injunction is null and void. Id. at 802.
76. Id. at 803.
77. Id.
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In City of New York v. New York Yankees,78 another New York State
trial court enjoined a baseball team from agreeing to play home
games in Denver, in violation of a lease term requiring the team to
play all home games in New York's Yankee Stadium. 79 Finding that
the threatened relocation of games would cause irreparable injury to
New York City, the court waxed poetic when it wrote:
Much more is at stake than merely the loss of direct and indi-
rect revenue to the City.
The Yankee pin stripes belong to New York like Central
Park, like the Statue of Liberty, like the Metropolitan Mu-
seum of Art, like the Metropolitan Opera, like the Stock Ex-
change, like the lights of Broadway, etc. Collectively they are
"The Big Apple." Any loss represents a diminution of the
quality of life here, a blow to the City's standing at the top,
however narcissistic that perception may be."0
The court's ruling precluded the team's owner from "grabbing a pre-
text to take his team to greener pastures-i.e. a larger stadium and a
populace with an unfulfilled yearning for major league baseball."" l
Courts have refused, however, to enjoin a professional sports
team from breaching a lease by playing home games elsewhere once
the team has relocated to another city. In HMC Management Corp. v.
New Orleans Basketball Club,"2 the Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed
the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction, requested by a sta-
dium authority, to prevent the New Orleans Jazz from playing home
basketball games outside the Louisiana Superdome after the franchise
had already moved to Utah."3 The trial court held that the lease did
not expressly require the franchise to play its home games in the
Superdome, that an affirmative injunction is not an available remedy
for breach of a lease, and that damages would adequately compensate
a stadium authority for the harm it suffered.84 While the appellate
court "[did] not agree completely with the trial judge's conclu-
sions," a3 it concluded that injunctive relief was inappropriate under
the circumstances because the team had already moved outside of
Louisiana. 6
78. 458 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
79. Id. at 487-88.
80. Id. at 489-90.
81. Id. at 489.
82. 375 So. 2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
83. Id. at 711.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Both the HMC trial and appellate courts refused to allow the City
of New Orleans to intervene as a plaintiff because it did not own or
have a financial interest in the stadium, and it was not a party to the
lease between the basketball franchise and the state stadium author-
ity.8 7 The City was not a third party beneficiary of the lease because
the lease's terms did not express an intention by the contracting par-
ties to confer benefits on the City merely by having a professional
team play home games in a state-owned facility in its downtown area.8
The appellate court did not find an implied contract between the City
and the franchise that would require the team to continue playing in
New Orleans while still a member of the NBA, because there was no
evidence of the parties' mutual intent to make such an agreement.89
The court also held that the franchise would not be unjustly enriched
at the expense of the City if the team relocated in breach of its lease
with a state entity.9" The City had no quasi-contract right to tax reve-
nues and increased tourism generated by the presence of a profes-
sional sports team.91
Read narrowly, the HMC case reflects judicial reluctance to re-
quire a sports franchise to play home games in a particular facility
absent an express agreement to do so, as well as an unwillingness to
imply such a term into the parties' lease. Under a broad construction,
HMC holds that damages are an adequate remedy when a franchise
breaches a playing facility lease by moving to another locale prior to
the expiration of the lease, thereby precluding the availability of in-
junctive relief.92 Neither view recognizes the unique value of a profes-
sional sports franchise to its host city and the irreparable harm that
87. Id. at 708-10.
88. Id. at 708-09.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 709-10. The court's refusal to allow the City of New Orleans to intervene and
its denial of injunctive relief appear appropriate in HMC because there was no showing
that the City had provided substantial public subsidies to the franchise and was subse-
quently being deprived of the intangible "benefits of the bargain" it expected to realize
from its investment. Id. at 708-10.
91. Id. at 710.
92. A California court apparently reached this conclusion, despite a lease provision
requiring that "Padres" baseball games be played in San Diego until expiration of its term,
possibly because the parties' lease did not expressly provide for specific performance
through injunctive relief. See City of San Diego v. National League, No. 343508 (Sup. Ct.
for the County of San Diego 1973), discussed in William L. Babcock, Comment, "Can We
Save Our Ball Club?": The Availability of Injunctive Relief for a Municipality to Prevent the
Threatened Breach of a Stadium Lease Agreement by a Professional Sports Franchise, 2 CoMM/ENT
97, 120-23 (1979).
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results from the premature loss of a team.93 It is appropriate for a
court to enjoin a sports franchise from breaching a lease to play home
games in a publicly owned or subsidized playing facility during the
parties' agreed period of time.94
F. Non-Renewal of Contract with Host City
Absent a contract renewal provision, the parties to an agreement
have no legal obligation to extend their relationship after it expires by
its express terms. In Barn-Chestnut, Inc. v. CFM Development Corp.,95 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that, without an express
renewal provision or statutory requirement, a franchisor need not of-
fer a subsequent lease agreement to a franchisee upon expiration of a
lease.96 The court refused to establish an implied obligation of good
faith, fair dealing, and commercial reasonableness, which would re-
quire a franchisor to renew the parties' business relationship.97 Ob-
serving that both parties openly accepted certain risks by entering into
a long-term lease with no renewal clauses or options for either party,98
the court declined to create a contrary intent by implication. 99
93. See generally Babcock, supra note 92 (arguing in favor of injunctive remedy to pre-
vent team's breach of lease and relocation);John A. Gray, Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
Control Over NFL Franchise Locations: The Problem of Opportunistic Behavior, 25 Am. Bus. LJ.
123, 143 n.69 (1987) (suggesting that specific performance should be available to prevent
premature loss of sports franchise).
94. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., No. 297833 (C.P. Cuyahoga,
Nov. 24, 1995) (preliminarily enjoining Cleveland Browns from relocating to Baltimore in
violation of sublease to play home games in municipally owned stadium). To settle litiga-
tion involving its relocation to Nashville, the Houston Oilers agreed to play all of its home
games through the 1997 NFL season in the Astrodome and that a federal court has the
authority to compel performance of this obligation. See Final Consent Decree, Houston
Oilers, Inc. v. Harris County, Texas, Civ. Action H-95-4193 (S.D. Tex., filed Sept. 13, 1995).
95. 457 S.E.2d 502 (W. Va. 1995).
96. Id. at 509.
97. Id. at 508-09.
98. Id. at 506 n.9.
99. Id. at 509. Other courts have also rejected an invitation to impose an implied duty
to renew a business relationship contrary to the express terms.of a written agreement. See,
e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., No. 88-0644, 1995 WL 12297, at *4
(N.D. Ill. jan. 11, 1995) (mem.) ("Although parties to an existing contract owe one an-
other a duty to negotiate in good faith over a term which they purposely leave open ... the
parties owe one another no duty to negotiate in good faith before a contract is executed or
after it expires."); Bryant Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., No. C 93-1365R, 1994 WL
745159, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 1994) (rejecting a distributor's argument that his prior
course of dealing with an outboard motor manufacturer implied an obligation on the part
of the manufacturer to renew the distributing contract), affd, 77 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1996);
Ball Martty Med. Corp. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., CIV. A. No. 87-4434, 1988 WL 72871, at *4
(E.D. La. July 5, 1988) (declining to "interpret the Uniform Commercial Code to forbid
bad faith or arbitrary terminations of distributorship contracts"); cf. Stanley v. University of
S. Cal., No. CV 93-4708, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5026, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 1995) (finding
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In some instances, courts have created an implied right of re-
coupment to allow an entity making a substantial investment in an-
other's business to recover its out-of-pocket expenses. For example, in
Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc.,' ° ° the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that a distributor is entitled to a reasonable period of time to
recoup its required financial commitment to serve as a manufacturer's
representative. 1 ' Because there was no agreed termination date, the
court ruled that the contract could not be terminated by the manufac-
turer without good cause.10 2 The court also observed that after a rea-
sonable time for recoupment had elapsed, "the distributorship
agreement [became] terminable at will upon reasonable notice."103
The Cambee's holding seems to apply only if the parties' contract
has no fixed and definite duration. 4 Even if one party invests sub-
stantial amounts of money that inures to the other party's benefit, a
court may not imply an obligation, contrary to an agreement's express
terms, to continue the parties' business relationship for a reasonable
time to allow recoupment of a financial investment.10 5
One court held that a franchisor has a common law duty not to
arbitrarily sever a franchise relationship having a definite, written du-
ration.1 0 6 To prevent unjust enrichment, the court imposed a duty of
good faith and fair dealing on the franchisor in terminating its busi-
ness relationship with a franchisee.107 This common law duty arises
only when the franchisor's power to terminate is not explicitly de-
no implied contract for a multiyear extension of a head basketball coach's employment
contract); Gahres v. Phico Ins. Co., 672 F. Supp. 249, 253-54 (E.D. Va. 1987) (finding no
implied duty to renew medical malpractice insurance). Some courts suggest that a course
of dealing may create a legitimate expectation of contract renewal. See, e.g., Schaal v. Flat-
head Valley Community College, 901 P.2d 541, 543 (Mont. 1995) (upholding a lower
court's finding of no basis for a reasonable expectation of continued employment on the
part of a university professor beyond the term of his second one-year contract and third
year of employment); Barn-Chestnut, 457 S.E.2d at 506 n.8 (finding no support for the
argument that a lessor-franchisor was "equitably estopped from refusing to renew [the
plaintiff's] lease and franchise agreement under reasonable terms and conditions").
100. 825 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1987).
101. Id. at 173.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 172-74.
105. See, e.g., Prince v. Miller Brewing Co., 434 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tex. CL App. 1968)
(refusing to allow a terminated distributor a reasonable time to recoup losses because writ-
ten agreement expressly allowed either party to terminate "at any time without incurring
liability to the other").
106. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 745 (Pa. 1978).
107. See id. at 742.
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scribed in the parties' written agreement. 08 Several states have en-
acted statutes effectively imposing a duty of good faith and fair dealing
by requiring that a franchisor have good cause to terminate a
franchise agreement.1"9
If a lease between a sports franchise and the operator of a pub-
licly owned playing facility has a definite duration without any obliga-
tion for renewal, there is no common law precedent or applicable
statute requiring a team owner to keep the team in its host city after its
playing-facility lease expires."' Notwithstanding a government en-
tity's substantial investment of public money in constructing or im-
proving a playing facility for the purpose of retaining or attracting a
professional team, a court may not require the team to remain in its
host city beyond the termination date of the lease, even if necessary to
enable the government to recoup its investment, nor may the court
award damages if the team departs.
In 1987, the taxpayers of Harris County, Texas incurred $67.5
million in bond indebtedness to finance improvements to the Astro-
dome as a condition of keeping the Houston Oilers in Houston
through the 1997 NFL season.111 Oilers owner Bud Adams intends to
move his team to Tennessee after the 1997 football season ends, leav-
ing behind an outstanding bond indebtedness of approximately $49
108. See Devery Implement Co. v. J.I. Case Co., 944 F.2d 724, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would not overcome a
bargained-for termination-at-will).
109. See, e.g, ARjz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-4452 (West 1995) (stating that, despite the
terms or conditions of an agreement, a franchisor may not cancel a franchise agreement
without good cause); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-209 (Michie 1996) (requiring franchisor to
repurchase franchise from franchisee, should the franchisor terminate without cause);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20020 (West 1996) (prohibiting franchisor from terminating
franchise prior to expiration of its terms); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f (West 1994 &
Supp. 1996) (prohibiting franchisor from actually or constructively terminating franchise
without good cause); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-651 (1995) (prohibiting franchisor from can-
celling any franchise, despite the terms of the agreement, without notice and good cause);
HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 482E-6 (Michie 1995) (stating that parties shall deal in good faith);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.7-1(7) (Michie 1995) (making it illegal for a franchisor and fran-
chisee to enter into an agreement that allows for unilateral termination); OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 4517.54 (Anderson 1995) (stating that, despite the terms of an agreement, a
franchisor may not terminate a franchise without a good cause); OR. REv. STAT. § 650.140
(1994) (stating that, notwithstanding the terms of an agreement, no franchisor shall termi-
nate a franchise without showing good cause).
110. Courts have evidenced an unwillingness to imply an obligation in a stadium lease
that is contrary to the express terms of the parties' agreement. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati
v. Cincinnati Reds, 483 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to hold club
liable for contingency payments based on scheduled games cancelled by players' strike
because lease requires payment only if games are actually played).
111. See Letter from Nick Turner, Assistant County Attorney, Harris County, Texas, to
MatthewJ. Mitten (Dec. 28, 1995) (on file with author).
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million for stadium improvements, designed primarily to benefit his
franchise; this indebtedness will not be fully paid off by Harris County
taxpayers until 2012.112 Under existing law, it appears that Adams is
free to relocate his team, although Houston area fans and taxpayers
have provided significant private and public financial support to the
Oilers for more than thirty years, thereby enabling the value of Ad-
ams's NFL franchise to grow to more than $100 million.' It is esti-
mated that the value of the Oilers franchise will increase significantly
and that its annual cash flow will rise by $20 million" 4 because of the
substantial public subsidization that the City of Nashville and State of
Tennessee are offering to encourage the Oilers to relocate. 5
The foregoing discussion illustrates judicial reluctance to make
aggressive use of the common law to rewrite the express terms of a
commercial transaction to prevent unfairness or financial hardship,
even when a significant disparity of bargaining power exists between
the parties. Courts have demonstrated a tendency not to reallocate
the risks of loss by interfering with the parties' contract.1 16 Moreover,
it is uncertain whether specific performance and injunctive relief will
be judicially recognized as remedies for a professional team's breach
of a lease with a publicly owned playing facility.1 17
II. PRIVATE MARKETPLACE COVENANTS FOR PROTECTION OF THE CITY
A. Preventive Law-Private Ordering
Any detailed contractual ordering of the legal relationship be-
tween a professional team and its host city"1 derives most of its force
112. See Telephone Interview with Nick Turner, Assistant County Attorney, Harris
County, Texas (Dec. 28, 1995). Similarly, when the NFL's Raiders left Oakland in 1982 to
move to Los Angeles, the City of Oakland and Alameda County taxpayers were left with an
annual debt service of $1.5 million through 2006 to repay financing for the Oakland-Ala-
meda County Coliseum, built specifically for the Raiders. See York, supra note 32, at 354.
113. See John Williams, Oilers Take Another Step on the Road to Nashville Riches, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 27, 1996, at A15, available in 1996 WL 5583817.
114. SeeJohn Williams, Nashville Sports Authority Gives Approval to Lease for Oilers, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 14, 1996, at A20, available in 1996 WL 5581734 [hereinafter Williams, Sports
Authority); John Williams, Oilers' Move Closer to Reality with Contract, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 5,
1995, at A25, available in 1995 WL 9407468.
115. See John Helyar, A Long Bomb: How Nashville Seeks, at High Cost, to Win Oilers from
Houston, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 9908758; John Wil-
liams, Nashville Turns on the Tap to Put Cash in Oilers'Pocket, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 6, 1995, at
Al, available in 1995 WL 9407679.
116. See supra notes 105, 108.
117. See supra Part I.E.
118. For purposes of this discussion, the term "city" includes a public or private sports
facility's commission or other entity authorized to act on behalf of the local governmental
unit which owns or controls the sports facility.
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from the models of private business law. Although some aspects of
the parties' private law relationship resemble a joint venture between
the public and private sector, most are reflected in the existence of a
landlord-tenant relationship."1 9 It is the premise of this section that
business law in the private marketplace has already evolved many
workable approaches for non-sports relationships that should be ex-
amined by cities and sports franchises. The marketplace models are
germane because the underlying business relationship between a city
and a professional team has many of the same legal characteristics as
the relationship between a private owner and its commercial tenants
in a large shopping center, office complex, or medical campus, for
example. The goal of such private ordering should be two-fold: pre-
dictability and flexibility.
In the sophisticated business and legal arrangements made be-
tween private owners and commercial tenants, there have been solu-
tions developed that can be applied to most of the seemingly knotty
questions which plague a team-city relationship. In the private mar-
ketplace, a variety of agreements have evolved with commercially crea-
tive provisions crafted to maximize the protection of the parties and
to minimize their exposure to unexpected loss. These private ar-
rangements allow for carefully nuanced adaptations suitable to a wide
variety of individual circumstances involving professional sports
119. For examples from Atlanta and Chicago, see Kimarie R. Stratos & Richard B. Hor-
row, Facility Development and the Sports Authority, in 2 LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR
SPORTS, at 20-11 n.5 (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1995). Some models, notably the Green Bay
Packers, are sui generis. Id. at 20-14 to -15. The Green Bay Packers were incorporated in
the State of Wisconsin in 1923. Id. at 20-15. Purchasers of the original stock had to be
season ticket holders. Id. In addition, a cap was placed on the maximum amount of shares
that an individual could hold. Id. Thus, the Packers were "a community project intended
to promote community welfare." Id. (quotingJ. TORINUS, THE PARKER LEGEND: AN INSIDE
LOOK 18 (1982)). To this day, almost all Packers shareholders are residents of Green Bay,
and because there is no profit or dividend, there is no incentive for anyone to sell or
purchase control of the franchise in order to generate a relocation. Id. Several other
sports teams have followed this example. See id. at 20-14 to -16. The Packers franchise is
structured so that the private shareholders have virtually no possibility of profit motive. Id.
Each shareholder is also a season ticket holder. Id. The Green Bay voting public is also the
controlling shareholder of a not-for-profit corporation. Id. Thus, the franchise will stay
fixed in Green Bay almost as firmly as if the city and the team were parent and subsidiary
corporations. The traditional private law model involving relationships akin to joint ven-
tures between teams and cities to develop new stadiums is also frequent. See supra notes 44-
49 and accompanying text.
Another very frequent model is the commercial landlord-tenant relationship with
principles of leasehold law governing the key relationships. See supra notes 48-49 and ac-
companying text. Thus, the models stretch along a continuum from partnerships to bilat-
eral leasing covenants, with each city's synthesis occurring in a variety of formats.
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franchises12 0-a preferable alternative to judicial policing of the par-
ties' contract by implying terms upon which the parties never agreed.
A city's true interest lies in sharply defining its goals and perform-
ing a cost-benefit analysis that assesses the need to attract or retain a
particular franchise. 21 This is the same discipline that any private de-
veloper of office buildings, shopping malls, or medical campuses must
undertake before committing private resources to a new project.1 22
The fiduciary relationship between city officials and the tax-paying
electorate should push these officials fully into the private market-
place model as far as analyzing and structuring the city's relationship
with a professional sports franchise. Only after a cost-benefit analysis
has been performed can the net burden of the relationship be identi-
fied to the city, and only then can the ultimate financial risk of the city
and its resources be considered clearly.121 With this in mind, a set of
adaptive principles, taken from the law of the private marketplace,
may be useful in addressing some of the more persistent problems
that arise between the city and team owners.
B. Approaching the End of the Term: Notification and
Negotiation Structures
For the protection of both city and team during the critical final
years of any lease arrangement under which the team uses a city-
owned facility, it is vital to have crafted a "no surprises" set of notifica-
tions that provides a structure for the timing of negotiations. The
same type of approach is frequently used when a major occupant of
office or commercial space is nearing the end of its lease term and the
parties have previously negotiated for covenants of mutual
protection. 124
120. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
121. See BAJM, supra note 27, at 1-2 (summarizing and analyzing the presentation of fi-
nancial data for 15 stadiums and providing calculations of outlays and revenues).
122. See id. at 195 (contrasting public and private stadiums).
123. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 65-77; Baade & Dye, supra note 29, at 270-71; Arthur
T. Johnson, Municipal Administration and the Sports Franchise Relocation Issue, PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 519, 524 (Nov./Dec. 1983); George F. Will, Modell Sacks Maryland, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22,
1996, at 70, available in 1996 WL 9471282. City officials should carefully consider the advis-
ability of constructing a new stadium before obtaining a binding commitment from a ma-
jor league team to play in it. In 1988, St. Petersburg built a 43,000-seat baseball stadium,
but has not yet attracted a major league baseball team. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 3, at 11.
To reduce the amount of public subsidies for playing facility construction or improve-
ments, the team owner should be required to provide some of the financing. In addition,
other means of private financing, such as the sale of personal seat licenses and stadium
naming rights, as well as user fees, like ticket taxes, should be used to the utmost extent.
124. See William B. Johnson, Annotation, Sufficiency As to Method of Giving Oral or Written
Notice Exercising Option to Renew or Extend Lease, 29 A.L.R. 4th 903-910 (1995).
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For example, provisions can easily be devised requiring that the
team, as tenant, give notice to the city, as landlord, of the team's de-
sire to renegotiate, terminate, move, or otherwise make a material
change in status at the end of the current lease term. 125 These notifi-
cations are common when a commercial tenant has committed for a
fixed term of years, but wishes to enjoy a series of special renewal or
other options that would allow the tenant to continue to enjoy the
leasehold site if it is successful. 12 16 These notifications should be a
mandatory covenant at some time in the final five years, perhaps not
later than one year before expiration of the current term. Failure to
provide notification to the city in a prescribed, written form could
trigger an automatic renewal of the term for a fixed period. For ex-
ample, failure of a team to notify the city of the team's desire to
change its status before one year prior to the end of the lease could
cause an automatic five-year renewal. The renewal would be governed
by the previous terms and conditions and would take place at the
city's election when the original term expires. These provisions would
tend to "smoke out" problems that a tenant, such as a sports franchise
owner, may have with the arrangement; focus both parties' attention
on the matter; and provide ample time for seeking a variety of mutu-
ally acceptable solutions.
Notification covenants should also include a grant to the city of
an exclusive right to negotiate with the team for a fixed period of
months. For example, once the team notifies the city of the team's
intention to seek another home, the city would have an exclusive right
to deal with the team ownership for a period, say six months, from the
date of the notification before the team becomes free to negotiate, or
make commitments, with a "wannabe" host city. Upon expiration of
the six-month period, and without some agreement having been
reached, the team would be free to negotiate simultaneously with
other cities.
This type of structured approach avoids the risk of the team's
making a "midnight evacuation" if the parties have not held genuine
negotiations, or if the city has been passive or nonforthcoming during
the period leading up to the expiration of the lease term.1 27 Forcing
125. See id.
126. See Richard D. Coats, Negotiating a Commercial Lease Termination Agreemen 9 THE
PRAc. RrA EST. LAW. 13,16 (1993); William B.Johnson, Annotation, Circumstances Excusing
Lessee's Failure to Give Timely Notice of Exercise of Option to Renew or Extend Lease, 27 A.L.R. 4th
266 (1994).
127. The litigation spurred by the "midnight move" of the former Baltimore Colts, a
Delaware corporation, from Baltimore to Indianapolis, provides a classic illustration of the
problems of seeking to accommodate what are essentially commercial business leasing ar-
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the issues to be addressed in a timely fashion is obviously a benefit to
the host city. Similarly, a team owner benefits from having a level of
certainty as to when and how it may negotiate with other cities. Thus,
if a team is faced with a rival city's relocation proposal, the team need
not risk lawsuits, league-imposed delays, or a political firestorm. The
team's ability to predict when, and under what circumstances, it will
be free to negotiate with the rival city would be clear at all times.
C. Early Departures
A structure for advance notification and negotiations can be in-
cluded for any proposed departure from the host city, regardless of
when this might become an issue in the mind of the team ownership.
If team ownership is contemplating the breach of its lease agreement
in the fifteenth year of a thirty-year term, it would still be obligated to
give notice and to negotiate for a fixed period before any rival negoti-
ations were legally permitted. To enforce this obligation, the parties
could craft the notice and negotiation covenants as preconditions to
the team's departure and include a covenant offering the host city
explicit remedies, such as specific performance for the term of the
lease, injunctive relief, or heightened damages, if the team departs at
any time without adhering to this structured notification and negotia-
tion provision. The virtues of crafting a structure that provides a high
degree of certainty regarding notices, negotiation time, and remedies
are apparent.
Other relief the city could seek in response to an early departure
might include a "call" by the city upon the team franchise. Subject to
obtaining league approval for transfer of franchise ownership, the city
could have a right to purchase the team at an appraised value (per-
rangements through the post hoc use of litigation. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Balti-
more (Colts II), 741 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1984). In early 1984, the football club had not
obtained a satisfactory new lease agreement with Baltimore's Memorial Stadium. Id. at
955. Concerned that the Colts would move to the City of Indianapolis, with whom negotia-
tions had already begun, the Maryland legislature enacted a bill empowering the City of
Baltimore to exercise eminent domain over the team. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of
Baltimore (Colts I), 733 F.2d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1984). Before a condemnation suit could
be perfected, the franchise moved itself and its property outside of Maryland, leaving be-
hind real estate held by a subsidiary of the parent corporation which owned the Colts. Id.
Since the corporation itself and its sports franchise were intangible property beyond the
jurisdiction of a Maryland court for eminent domain purposes, the issue to be resolved was
whether the mere ownership of land in Maryland by a subsidiary bestowed jurisdiction for
purposes of condemning the franchise. Id. See generally Ellen Z. Mufson, Note, Jurisdic-
tional Limitations on Intangible Property in Eminent Domain: Focus on the Indianapolis Colts, 60
IND. L.J. 389, 391-93 (1985) (discussing the difficulties of defining the jurisdictional limits
of a sovereign's condemnation power).
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haps through appraisal arbitration or other alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR) devices) if the team contemplates an early departure. The
call provision would obviate legally dubious attempts at achieving the
same result through eminent domain after the team has physically de-
parted or has announced its intent to leave.12 As a bargained-for
marketplace structure, rather than the coercive and confiscatory
weapon of eminent domain, a call provision would be quicker and
more predictable.
D. Rights of First Refusal: Tenant Protections
Rights of first refusal, which could be crafted to protect either
party, can be modeled on traditional commercial tenant protections.
This section will first examine the tenant's perspective when a profes-
sional team occupies a public facility.
During the life of the lease, a city may decide to privatize the
sports facility. In an era of devolving functions from government to
private parties, the privatization of a city or county sports facility is
certainly conceivable. The city may decide to sell the facility or convey
it by long-term ground lease, or otherwise, to a third party. If this
should occur, the team could be faced with a potentially undesirable
new landlord or be unable to realize the increased projected values
from what may have proven to be a very successful facilities site. The
team may feel that capturing these values, which its own sports success
has helped to create, is a wise business choice.1 29
128. During the 1980s, an epic court battle between the City of Oakland and the once-
and-current Oakland Raiders resulted in a four-year testing of the power of municipal emi-
nent domain over a team's ownership and, eventually, the supremacy of the Commerce
Clause. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Oakland I), 646 P.2d 835, 840 (Cal. 1982)
(holding that law authorizes the taking of intangible property); City of Oakland v. Superior
Court (Oakland II), 197 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that territorial re-
strictions of applicable statute were met when team owners failed to rebut prima facie
showing that the intangible property was located within the city); City of Oakland v. Oak-
land Raiders (Oakland III), 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that city's
action was invalid under Commerce Clause). The City of Baltimore also unsuccessfully
attempted to prevent the Baltimore Colts from moving to Indianapolis through the use of
eminent domain authority. See supra note 127. Some of the better descriptions of the
court battles and the principles of eminent domain involved in such disputes can be found
in Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61 (1986); Mufson,
supra note 127; Michael Schiano, Note, Eminent Domain Exercised-Stare Decisis or a Warning:
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 4 PACE L. REv. 169 (1983); LisaJ. Tobin-Rubio, Note,
Eminent Domain and the Commerce Clause Defense: City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1185 (1985).
129. Case law provides excellent analyses of the types of commercial tenant lease protec-
tions sought in many marketplace situations. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Trailer & Truck
Repair Co., 828 F.2d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that holder of right of first refusal
on a portion of land could not obtain specific performance of that option); Summit Blvd.
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Accordingly, it would be seen by most owners as highly desirable
for the team to hold a right of first refusal from the city as part of its
agreement. This desire may provide the government with a wedge-
issue incentive to get teams to amend existing agreements in order to
provide the protective procedures desired by cities as a quid pro quo for
granting teams a first refusal call on any transfers of interest in the
sports facilities they occupy.
The call would operate in the traditional fashion.13 1 In the event
that the city sought to sell or otherwise transfer all or any part of the
sports facility, the team would have a right of first refusal for a speci-
fied period.1 3 1 The covenant would require the city to offer to make
all transfers to the team on identical terms and conditions as transfers
contemplated to a third party.132 This would allow a team to avoid a
potentially hostile lessor in the future. More enticing, the team could
capture for itself the economic benefits of any increased values which
have accrued to the facility site-values which presumably provided
the marketplace incentive for the third party to negotiate with the
city.
Because many facilities are occupied by more than one perma-
nent team, 3 it would be necessary to create a pecking order among
the teams. For example, the NFL franchise may have bargaining
strength sufficient to allow it to have a right of first refusal that is
senior to that of the MLB club, or vice versa.M Naturally, the dura-
Animal Clinic v. Lemon Tree Plaza, 641 So. 2d 437, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that burden of proving ability to perform an option contract is on optionee); Hawthorne's
Inc. v. Warrenton Realty, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Mass. 1993) (holding that tenant's
interference with bona fide offer for purchase of property precluded remedy of specific
performance); Markert v. Williams, 874 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that lessee was not entitled to reformation because of mutual mistake). Such cases make it
clear that the commercial tenant's key interests in structuring rights of first refusal and
purchase options into their large, commercial leasing arrangements are twofold: (1) to
protect against the advent of a new landlord who may be more difficult to deal with and
(2) to protect the tenant's long-range interests in capturing the values of good will, market-
place identification, and going concern, which become identified with the leased location
during the years of operation.
130. See Shell Oil, 828 F.2d at 205.
131. Whether this specified period of time should be thirty days, two months, or longer
would be a hody negotiated matter.
132. But see Shell Oil, 828 F.2d at 209-10 (holding that holder of a right of first refusal on
portion of tract of land could not obtain specific performance of option when owners
contracted to sell larger tract).
133. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 8-9.
134. This prioritizing of property rights by covenant is merely an informal method of
accomplishing what recording act priorities in most jurisdictions achieve as a matter of
statutory law. See 66 AM. JUR. 2D Receivers §§ 54-68 (1973). Pursuant to most recording acts,
competing claims to land and buildings are sorted out by means of a date-driven filing
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tion of rights of first refusal must be compressed if several permanent
occupants share the facility, with each of them being granted a se-
quential right of first refusal. The rationale for time compression is
that no third party would pursue the deal if as many as three or four
franchises had a two-month period of first refusal rights that must ex-
pire before the property could be transferred to the third party.
Third party transferees typically desire a quick "trigger" on such
rights, whereas the holder of the call desires a lengthy period of time.
It is vital to resolve the issue, frequently litigated in first refusal
cases, of whether the transfer of less than the entire facility site consti-
tutes a "trigger" of the right of first refusal.'" 5 If less than the entire
facility site is sought to be transferred (for example, the parking area),
the question arises whether the team should have a right to protect its
interest and purchase that limited area."3 6 Similarly, if special prop-
erty rights are created in parts of the facility (for example, elite
skyboxes), any portion sought to be transferred would first need to be
offered to the team. Also, transfers from the city by leases (for exam-
ple, parking areas or vending booths) should be addressed.
The parallel questions are whether a transfer in excess of the fa-
cility site triggers a right of first refusal and whether a formula exists to
segregate the facility site from the balance of the transfer.'" 7 For ex-
ample, suppose that a sports facility were located on a site of 500 acres
of land on the outskirts of the city. Suppose further that the city pro-
posed to transfer to a third party a total of 1000 acres, including the
500-acre sports facility, together with an additional 500 acres of other
city-owned property adjacent to the sports facility, thus raising ques-
tions as to the scope of the team's first refusal right. It should be
determined in advance, by agreement of the city and team, whether
by holding the right of first refusal the team must acquire the entire
one thousand acres, acquire nothing, or may acquire the five hun-
dred-acre facility site pursuant to some formula for segregating the
cost of that site from the rest of the larger transaction.13 8
system so that the more senior have prior claims to the more junior interests. When multi-
ple users of a facility are all desirous of protecting their positions, a system of covenant
priorities can remove the uncertainties experienced by each. If these covenants are de-
vised over time, then, much like the recording acts, the first franchise to enter into a lease
agreement containing rights of first refusal and purchase options would be senior in time
to those that might negotiate such positions later.
135. See supra note 132.
136. See Shel Oi4 828 F.2d at 210.
137. See id.
138. See id.
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The team's ongoing interest in the facility site probably dictates
that first refusal rights be continuing, and not terminate, if the team
"passes" on its call in the first instance of a transfer of site ownership.
Thus, survival language would be helpful. If a team has an existing
lease on a facility, there may well be an interest in reopening the
agreement to obtain such valuable call rights. This could be the
wedge issue for opening those other vital procedural protections per-
taining to notice and negotiations.13 9
E. Rights of First Refusal: Protections for the City
Risk for the city comes about in one of two ways. Typically, a city
finds itself at risk when a team accepts a proposal from a rival city to
relocate the franchise at some future time. 40 However, a second pos-
sibility exists that may place a significant public interest at risk: owner-
ship transfers involving the team.' This usually arises when the team
is not a publicly traded entity, but rather, is closely held. 4 ' In the
event of a sale of all or some of the control group of the team to a
third party, the city may have an interest in acquiring that which is
being offered for sale.Y3
As in so many other business arrangements, special covenants can
be crafted to prevent a proposed change in team ownership or man-
agement that the city would view as hostile to its long-range best inter-
ests without the city's having had an opportunity to protect its
interests in the marketplace.
1. Protections When the Team Wishes to Move to a Rival City.-Sup-
pose the present ownership of a team receives an acceptable offer that
includes a package of leasing agreements, guarantee of a new facility,
and ancillary benefits in return for moving the franchise to the rival
city. This is the same dilemma faced by a lessor in a commercial mall
context when a rival attempts to lure away a key tenant. Like the mall
owner, the city views itself as having a bundle of vital interests in keep-
139. See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
140. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing effects on cities when teams seek to
relocate); EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 65-77 (exploring the "feverish competition among
North American cities to attract professional sports teams").
141. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 165.
142. See id.
143. For example, a sale of the Houston Astros baseball team to a Virginia-based group
of investors was recently contemplated-representing the first step in a sequence that
could quickly lead to the team's relocation out of the Lone Star State and into the Old
Dominion. SeeJohn Williams, Baseball Stadium Hopes Dim, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 1, 1995, at
A17, available in 1995 WL 9412256.
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ing the tenant. The city could hold a right for a specified period,",
during which the city may match the terms of the rival's offer. Some-
times, in the realities of the marketplace, the rival's offer simply can-
not be matched. For example, if the sports franchise is entitled to
keep all local television and radio broadcast revenues generated by its
games, rather than sharing them on a pro rata basis with other league
teams, the size of the viewing and listening markets becomes a valued
commodity; hence, the revenue guarantees for broadcast rights in a
larger rival city may be of such economic magnitude as to deter the
host city from exercising its right of first refusal and matching the
terms of the offer. If so, the team may move, and the result would
simply reflect the economic reality of the marketplace.
Allowing a city to decide whether to match the rival offer also has
the virtue of forcing the local democracy to assess its priorities. The
cost of retaining the franchise becomes starkly defined. Thus, the
body politic can work its will within a specified period while focusing
on a defined target: the magnitude of the tax and other burdens
needed to retain its status as the host city upon expiration of the lease
term. This structure diminishes the "bidding war" between host city
and rival, as each offer is met with increased demands from the
team. 
1 4 5
2. If the Team Wishes to Sell Control of Manageent.-A host city
may feel uncomfortable if the team occupying the city's facility is to be
sold and replaced by new team ownership. The city may be faced with
seeking to preserve the team at its current facility while new team
management is hostile to that goal.146 Perhaps the new control group
favors moving the franchise to a different city. Accordingly, a city
might decide that exercising a right of first refusal would be appropri-
ate to forestall this result. For the city to become the owner of a sports
franchise-perhaps only temporarily, because the city may well inspire
a group of local investors to become the ultimate new owners-the
city will need a right of first refusal.' 47 This covenant simply achieves
144. Here again, whether it should be 15 days or 15 months will be hotly negotiated.
145. See Beisner, supra note 31, at 434-35.
146. For a city to become the owner-proprietor of a franchise requires statutory empow-
erment as well as league approval. See, for example, the arrangements for the Green Bay
Packers described supra at note 119 and the potential sale of the Houston Astros to Vir-
ginia investors described supra at note 143.
147. This is by far the most likely scenario any time a team's continuation at a host city is
jeopardized. The Minnesota Twins remained in Minneapolis by virtue of the purchase of
control of the franchise by a local Minnesota family from the Griffith family interests,
which had owned the team in Washington and Minnesota for generations prior. See Lee
Schafer, Banker or Baseball Man? Carl Pohlad Decides His Legacy, CoRP. REP. MINN., Nov. 1,
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through private means the result sought by eminent domain actions
against teams. A city's acquisition of a franchise through the market-
place and a negotiated covenant of first refusal is preferable to the
uncertainties of litigation and turmoil involved in any attempt to con-
demn a sports franchise against the resistance of ownership. These
attempts have uncertain results and will likely take years to resolve. 4
F. Liquidated Damages
The "passive landlord," whose only economic interest is collecting
rentals, has no claim for breach of lease damages beyond the present
value of the future rents. 4 v City-team relationships are not this sim-
plistic. If a team moves to a rival city, the most significant risk of in-
curring major damages would stem from the host city's unpaid
indebtedness on the land and buildings that constitute the facility.
For example, in 1987, Harris County undertook a major upgrade of
the Houston Astrodome.15 0 The upgrade was financed through pub-
lic borrowing and had an amortization period far longer than the du-
ration of the lease renewal that was negotiated at that time with the
Houston Oilers.' Accordingly, if the Oilers departed for a rival city,
Houston would be faced with the prospect of completing the amorti-
zation of city indebtedness without the benefit of the team's rents and
without any of the ancillary tangible and intangible benefits derived
from the presence of the team, such as tourism, prestige, and en-
hanced tax bases in the vicinity of the facility.
Under these circumstances, the most direct measure of liqui-
dated damages1 52 would be the unpaid portion of the public indebt-
edness. 5 This calculation would be rather simple, and liquidated
damages could easily be tied to the team's payment of the present
1995, at 28, available in 1995 WL 7906033. Accordingly, it could be expected that the city
would exercise a right of first refusal in many cases merely as a conduit to transfer the club
to a local group of investors, thereby preventing acquisition by an outside rival group.
148. See supra note 128 (providing a multiyear history of the Oakland Raiders' struggle).
149. See BERNARDi H. GOLDSTEIN, A DOCUMENTARY GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL LEASING 133
(1985).
150. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
152. This is the reverse of the situation in which the net rental income would be the
basis for computing damages through capitalization. See Howard E. Kane et al., Defaults,
C410 A.L.I.-A.B.A- 325, 339 (1989) [hereinafter Kane I]; Howard E. Kane et a!., Defaults,
C320 A.L.I.-ABA 413, 434 (1988) [hereinafter Kane II]. Here it would be the out-of-
pocket costs of amortization to the lessor, rather than the net income stream to the lessor.
153. The use of various equitable remedies in commercial lease disputes is a topic ex-
plored in Glen E. Mercer, McCrary v. Park South Properties: Entering Dangerous Grounds:
The Use of Equitable Remedies in Commercial Lease Disputes, 51 I_. L. Rxv. 1123, 1129-39
(1991).
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value of the unamortized public bonds. 54 Fine tuning this arrange-
ment with a cap to protect the team, or the absence thereof, would
force negotiators for the city and the team to focus ex ante upon the
direct costs to be borne by each if the team departs before the debt
incurred to develop the sports facility is paid. 5
A measure of liquidated damages, though easily formulized,
would also raise the issue of setoff.156 The formula could include pro-
visions granting the team a setoff against liquidated damages for any
monies that may inure to the city from sources which replace the activ-
ities of the departing team. For example, the facility may become
available for additional events during the season when the departing
team would otherwise be in occupancy, or as in the case of the former
home of the Minnesota Vikings and Twins near Minneapolis, the sta-
dium site becomes the notable "Mall of the Americas" development.
The departure of the team from the site permits the city to realize new
revenues, thus reducing the city's direct costs for amortizing its bond
indebtedness. In addition-hope beats-eternal within the civic breasts
of local politicians and business leaders-another team, of equal or
greater drawing power, may arrive to use the facility. If, for example,
this type of liquidated damages clause had existed in St. Louis when
the former Los Angeles Rams moved to the City of St. Louis and occu-
pied the same stadium and game dates as the former St. Louis, now
Arizona, Cardinals, an argument for setoff against any amounts owed
by the Cardinals would have been in order. 5 7 Liquidated damages,
mitigated by a setoff provision, would be appropriate in these
instances.
It has been suggested that attempting to formalize liquidated
damages based upon lost tourist revenues, diminished tax bases or
business activity, and other speculative amounts would not be fruitful
154. See id.
155. The lease agreement between the Nashville Sports Authority and the Houston Oil-
ers has a performance clause requiring the franchise to pay millions of dollars in penalties
if it leaves the city prematurely. See Williams, Sports Authority, supra note 114; see also W & G
Seaford Assocs. v. Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1336, 1346-50 (D. Del. 1989)
(discussing liquidated damages and penalties in breach of commercial leases); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. General Elec., 644 A.2d 346, 347 (Conn. 1994) (discussing damages and penal-
ties in commercial leases).
156. For a generalized discussion of commercial leasing damage computations, see
Wolfen v. ClinicalData, Inc., 16 Cal. App. 4th 171, 179-82 (Ct. App. 1993); Lofchiev. Washing-
ton Square Ltd. Partnership, 580 A.2d 665, 667-68 (D.C. 1990); Coats, supra note 126, at 21;
Kane I, supra note 152, at 329; Kane II, supra note 152, at 434; Johnson, supra note 126, at
266.
157. See Wolfen, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 180-82 (discussing permissibility of setoff to diminish
liability).
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for profitable negotiation."'8 The issue would cry out for vigorous
contest, as these speculative numbers can be hyped almost to infinity.
Most team owners would balk at the notion of being required to pay
speculative amounts as the price of moving to a rival city. One possi-
ble solution would be to permit a city to claim speculative damages, or
even punitive damages or specific performance, only under limited
circumstances. For instance, whenever the city's public indebtedness
is unpaid at the time the team vacates the public facility, or where the
team has failed to give required notice or to negotiate in good faith,
the city would be entitled to protection in the form of a covenant
allowing special damages or specific performance. This covenant
makes economic sense even when the city is truly a passive landlord.
G. Variables: Revenue Participations
In a matter closely related to liquidated damages, teams fre-
quently negotiate for a monopoly, or at least a participation, in all
facility revenues." 9 Sometimes this takes the form of revenues gener-
ated from the sale of refreshments, liquor, or merchandise; parking;
catering; or funds accruing from the rental of skyboxes and similar
facilities. 60 These participations in favor of the tenant need to be
included in calculations or departure covenants, as they may repre-
sent a major stream of income from which both the city and tenant
have received or plan to receive profits.
These items can be formulized based on revenues from recent
operating years or fixed by agreement at the original term of the
lease, as is often customary in commercial retail leases. The formula
also can be adjusted continually for operating experiences, inflation,
and other factors. This formalization, though more difficult than sim-
ply looking to the amortization pattern of public bonds, is frequently
done in the private marketplace and is certainly well within the knowl-
edge and ability of most commercial lawyers. Finally, ADR devices can
be used to resolve any unforeseen variables in application of the dam-
ages formula.161
158. See Stratos & Horrow, supra note 119, at 20-1, 20-11 n.44, 20-12 to -14. The variety
of profit centers in the operation of any sports facility is huge. See id. In addition to taxes
levied upon each of the activities, there are innumerable sources of profits, such as park-
ing, sale of programs and souvenirs, concession revenues, and special charges for the use
of skyboxes or other seating arrangements. See id.
159. See GOLDSrEIN, supra note 149, at 214-15.
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Jett v. Hays, 283 Cal. Rptr. 40, 41 (1991) ("In a contractual arbitration
proceeding.., an arbitrator does not have the power to proceed with a hearing and make
an award in the absence of a party unless the arbitration has been ordered by the court or
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H. Periodic Estoppel Certificates
In a commercial leasing relationship, a tenant will frequently sup-
ply, periodically or upon request, estoppel certificates for the use and
protection of the commercial landlord. 162 Conversely, some tenants
can require certificates from landlords regarding certain matters, par-
ticularly those involving computations of shared operating costs. Be-
cause of the need for assurances regarding exclusive negotiating
rights 6 ' and the possibility of a dynamic formula for liquidated dam-
ages,164 the parties might include a covenant requiring an exchange
of annual or periodic estoppel certificates. For example, if the liqui-
dated damages formula calls for a periodic recalculation of interest
because public bonds are refunded or annualized determinations of
revenue participations by the team and the city from such things as
parking or refreshments, then an exchange of annualized estoppel
certificates would be appropriate so that at periodic intervals a fixed
baseline for such calculations would be available to both parties.
Concerns about the possibility of hidden negotiations for matters
that could trigger rights of first refusal, notification, and negotiation
could also be covered in the estoppel certificates as a sort of "comfort-
giving" element to the parties on an annual or other periodic basis.
For instance, the city could certify as to whether it contemplates, or is
negotiating for, a sale of all or any portion of the facility. The team
could certify its involvement in any sale of control to a rival city. Be-
cause some of the items pertaining to the relationship may require
such power has been conferred by the arbitration agreement."); 166 Mamaroneck Ave.
Corp. v. 151 E. Post Rd. Corp., 575 N.E.2d 104, 107 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that lease renewal
option providing for arbitration in the event that parties could not agree was definite and
enforceable). See generally William M. Burke et al., Lender Liability, C422 A.L.I.-A.BA. 81,
298 (1989) (stating that arbitration clauses are generally enforceable);John W. Daniels,Jr.,
Primer Remediesfor Landlord Defaults, C532 A.L.I.-A.BA. 195, 215 (1990) (discussing ways the
landlord can limit his duty to mitigate damages in cases of default by tenants); Marvin
Garfinkel, The Office Leases from Tenants' Point of View, C410 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 107, 122 (1989)
(stating that procedures designed to resolve disputes that may arise with respect to the
determination of rentable space should be articulated);John A. Gose & Brian N. Poll, The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Impacts on Tenants, Landlords, and Lenders, C908 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 263, 274 (1994) (stating that, because of the vagueness of the law and the failure to
allocate responsibility, there are inherent conflicts that could better be resolved by dealing
with them prospectively); Steven L. Sloca, ADR in Landlord-Tenant Cases, 40 PPAc. LAw. 45,
46 (1994) (discussing the increasing use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in land-
lord-tenant cases); James H. Wallenstein, A Potpourri of Selected Lease Provisions, C410 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 517, 543 (1989) (discussing how parties may specify in a continuous occupancy
clause agreed-upon liquidated damages).
162. See8 AM.JUR. 2D (rev.) Legal Forms §§ 102.1-.14 (1991); 11AAM.JUR. 2D (rev.) Legal
Forms §§ 161:1143-46 (1991).
163. See supra notes 124-127.
164. See supra Part II.F.
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audited reports from certified public accounting firms (for example,
participations in parking and refreshment revenues), estoppel certifi-
cates covering the wide range of concerns to both parties should also
be issued when annual audit statements are exchanged.
I. Confidentiality, Arbitration, and Mediation
Although local or state "open meeting" statutes and "open
records" laws may make confidentiality of negotiations and other
items impossible, a municipal government should consider seeking
covenants of confidentiality regarding certain matters involving the
local team and the sports facility. The parties should, at least, identify
those items sensitive enough to remain confidential and not subject to
widespread media dissemination. For example, teams will be likely to
have a strong desire not to reveal publicly the identities of offerors
that have sought to purchase ownership or control of the franchise.
The problem of protecting such legitimate requests for confidentiality
needs to be addressed.1 65
A city may find it advantageous to remove discussions of rights of
first refusal, resolution of disputes about liquidated damages, and res-
olution of disputes about the structure of notification and negotiation
from the public limelight, and possibly from the sensationalism of the
courtroom. This can be accomplished by including appropriate medi-
ation and arbitration clauses in the agreements with the team
owner. 6 6 It would be relatively simple to identify the most sensitive
issues and to allow them to be addressed, at least in the first instance,
by confidential mediation. It might also be possible to structure
165. The use of documents from which identities of certain parties have been redacted
is one promising approach.
166. Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994), if a lease is
deemed to be within interstate commerce, then the provisions of the Act would apply. See,
e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 841 (1995) (holding that if an
arbitration agreement relates to an activity involving interstate commerce, the FAA applies,
thereby preempting any conflicting state law); Mosca v. Doctors Assocs., 852 F. Supp. 152,
155 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that where a contract concerns interstate commerce, claims
arising under the contract are subject to arbitration as required by the FAA); Fairchild &
Co., Inc. v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1316
(D.D.C. 1981) (holding that leasing agreement was a "contract evidencing a transaction
'involving commerce' within the meaning of [the FAA]" and was, therefore, governed by
the Act). If the provisions of the Act would not apply, local arbitration provisions would.
See Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 841. In either event, the resolution of commercial landlord-tenant
disputes arising between a city and a team are handled more quickly and with greater
expertise than the posturing and jury trials which may require years of litigation. See Burke
et al., supra note 161, at 298; Daniels, supra note 161, at 215; Garfinkel, supra note 161, at
122; Gose & Poll, supra note 161, at 263; Sloca, supra note 161, at 45; Wallenstein, supra
note 161, at 543.
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clauses requiring binding arbitration of specific issues in the event
that mediation fails. Rules of confidentiality may stand a better
chance of being enforced and respected during the arbitration or me-
diation process than when such questions are resolved before the lo-
cal or federal courtroom, the chambers of the city council, the
legislature, or the media.
J. Game Plan for City
In summary, the practices used in the private economy pertaining
to negotiations for long-term arrangements between developers and
commercial tenants offer a number of devices that can be creatively
adapted to address the issues between a city and a major league
franchise occupying its sports facility. Even if the final resolution of
some covenants reaches an impasse, and some elements are thus not
addressed in the final agreements between the city and the team, forc-
ing the public agenda to focus on these issues should have a signifi-
cant, healthy effect. Rather than rushing into an agreement for the
sake of landing or retaining a major league team, relying on little
more than bullish high hopes and civic appetites, a city would be well
served to take a hard-headed look at the potential consequences to
the community of the departure, perhaps many decades later, of a
local sports franchise. The analog to the courtship between the city
and its team is not a "prenuptial agreement," but rather, the commer-
cially creative arrangements of the business marketplace. Preventive
law through private ordering, like preventive medicine, can frequently
-ensure maximum health.
III. MAJOR LEAGUE MONOPOLY POWER CREATEs DISPARITY OF
BARGAINING POWER
The preceding section assumes that a city will be able to negotiate
contract provisions necessary to effectively protect its interests.
Although a city often provides millions of dollars in public subsidiza-
tion to attract or retain a major league professional sports franchise,
the team owner may have the upper hand in contract negotiations. A
major league's monopoly power provides a franchise owner with supe-
rior bargaining leverage, enabling it to resist a city's demands for ade-
quate protection by contract.
A. Monopoly Nature of Sports League
The historical tendency in America favors a single major profes-
sional league in baseball, football, basketball, and hockey. Through-
out the twentieth century, competition among rival leagues in the
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same sport has never existed for any appreciable period. Because mo-
nopoly control of each sport has been the norm, it may be unrealistic
to expect that the free market model of competition, which produces
a wide variety of competing products in most industries, applies
equally to the professional sports industry.1 67 It is questionable
whether a professional sports league is an example of a "natural mo-
nopoly" simply because significant economies of scale enable a single
league to produce games most efficiently, or because there may be
certain conditions, inherent in the sports industry, that predispose to-
ward dominance by a single league.' 68
One persuasive reason for one-league monopoly control of a pro-
fessional sport is the "hierarchical nature of sports competition" in the
United States.16 9 Each sport is played at various levels of competition,
from sandlot games up to organized major league professional
teams. 7 Under this system, fans come to expect one premier level of
sports competition and the "crowning of a single champion." '7
Therefore, eventually, fans will prefer the product of one league over
that of another, thereby causing the demise of the disfavored
league. 17
2
It is extremely difficult for more than one major professional
league to exist in the same sport for a prolonged period.' 7  To be
viable, a professional sports league must place teams in several large
cities containing the population and economic base to support the
franchises;1 74 the league must also procure access to adequate playing
167. See JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.11, at 726-27
(1979) (discussing antitrust aspects of the ownership and location of sports league
franchises); James Quirk, An Economic Analysis of Team Movements in Professional Sports, 38
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 42, 64 (1973) (stating that competitive leagues will not survive in
professional sports because the incentives for monopoly control are too strong); Gary R.
Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Re-
straints on Intraleague Rivaby, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219, 257 n.134 (1984) (providing a historical
overview of how rival professional leagues have failed to survive for more than a few finan-
cially disastrous years).
168. See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MiNN. L. REv. 643, 715-33 (1989)
(arguing that sports leagues do not satisfy economic definition of natural monopoly).
169. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 167, § 5.11, at 728.
170. See id.
171. Kevin E. Martens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of Small-Market Teams in Major League
Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 323, 342 (1994).
172. See WEIsTART & LOWELL, supra note 167, § 5.11, at 728.
173. See id.
174. See American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60, 76 (D.
Md. 1962) (discussing the relevant factors for determining whether a particular city is a
suitable location for a professional football franchise), affd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963);
John C. Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Coop-
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facilities,1 75 obtain major-league quality players, 176 and secure a na-
tional television contract. 1 7 7 Even if a league is able to satisfy these
minimum requirements, its long-term survival as a profitable, in-
dependent entity is not ensured. 178 Upstart leagues often fold after a
relatively short period of existence because of financial problems 79 or
improper management and poor strategic business decisions. 8 °
The evolution of professional sports has seen viable competing
leagues, such as the National Football League and the American Foot-
ball League, merging after receiving congressional antitrust immunity
to do so 81 or forming an alliance, as the National and American base-
ball leagues have done. 82 To prevent violation of the antitrust laws,
courts have preliminarily enjoined mergers of rival professional
leagues that lack congressional approval. 8 Nevertheless, truces or
"peace agreements," enabling the NBA and the NHL to absorb some
teams from rival leagues while other franchises in those leagues
folded, were successfully used in the 1970s to restore the existence of
a single major professional league in both basketball and hockey. 184
eration in the Sports Industry, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1029 n.52 (1984) (noting the importance
of having teams in cities with a certain minimum population base to sustain the league).
175. See Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that "refusal to
lease the Chicago Stadium violated [the Sherman Act] and constituted tortious interfer-
ence with prospective advantage"); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 985-86 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (discussing whether a restrictive covenant proscribing the leasing of RFK Sta-
dium to any team other than the Redskins is a violation of the Sherman Act).
176. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 473 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (discussing the importance of obtaining high-quality play-
ers to support a rival league).
177. See United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1341-
42 (2d Cir. 1988) (examining claims that the NFL, by contracting with the three major
league networks and by acting coercively toward them, prevented the United States Foot-
ball League (USFL) from acquiring a network television contract).
178. See Weistart, supra note 174, at 1029.
179. For example, the World Football League discontinued operations because its teams
incurred substantial losses. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 167, § 5.11, at 727 n.282.
180. See United States Football League, 842 F.2d at 1341-42 (upholding jury finding that
USFL's financial instability was caused by the league's managerial mistakes).
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1995).
182. See National League of Prof l Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc., 269 F. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
183. See, e.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 894 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (refusing to dissolve injunction because "merger... would result in the total elimi-
nation of competition in the major league [basketball] market"); Robertson v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (granting injunction
because "should a merger occur and later be found to be illegal under the Sherman Act,
the court will be confronted with the unscrambling complexities inherent in divestiture
which might well work severe hardship upon innocent parties").
184. See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 444-45 (1993).
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In some cases, an established league has resorted to anticompeti-
tive exclusionary practices to drive a newly formed rival league out of
business.185 Courts have held that attempts to restrict a competing
league's access to players or a national television contract are illegal
restraints of trade that violate the antitrust laws.' 86 Despite winning
their respective antitrust cases,' 8 7 neither the World Hockey Associa-
tion nor the United States Football League (USFL) now exists. This
evidence further reflects the inability of a rival professional league to
effectively compete coast-to-coast against an established league for a
sustained period.
There are presently a combined total of 113 teams in the NFL,
NBA, MLB, and NHL, 1a' the dominant leagues in their respective
sports throughout the twentieth century.1 9 Although each of these
leagues has expanded since its inception, either by adding existing
teams through merger or by creating new franchises, 90 the rate of
expansion has not been sufficient to satisfy the current demand of
cities for major league professional teams. 9' Because of the develop-
ment of the interstate highway system, localized broadcast competi-
tion, and league revenue sharing, the number of communities
capable of supporting a major league sports franchise has expanded
to include smaller cities and suburban areas.192
A natural business paradox exists between the competing inter-
ests of a league as a collective entity and its individual owners. A
sports league has an economic incentive to expand its membership up
to the number of teams necessary to maximize its franchises' collective
profitability and, equally important, to preempt and deter attempts to
form successful rival leagues. 9 ' However, a league's current owners
appear to have an even stronger incentive to maintain the number of
available franchises below market demand, thereby increasing the
value of existing teams, preventing the reduction of their pro rata
185. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 167, § 5.11, at 727 n.284.
186. See infra note 370 and accompanying text.
187. See United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1380
(2d Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's jury verdict award of one dollar in damages and
denying injunctive relief); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 519 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that NFL committed antitrust
violations).
188. See Brownout, supra note 28.
189. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 184, at 444-45.
190. Since the mid-1950s, major league baseball, basketball, football, and hockey have
each added between ten and twenty teams. See Noll, supra note 1, at § 17.02[1].
191. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 23.
192. See id. at 23, 29-32.
193. See Quirk, supra note 167, at 47.
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share of league revenues from national broadcast and other sources,
and enhancing each owner's bargaining power with stadium authori-
ties by the threat of moving to cities without teams. 194 Moreover, in-
creased capital costs of creating a new league, as well as the history of
failed attempts, indicate that the formation of a rival league does not
present a viable threat to an established league, thus reducing the
pressure on existing leagues to expand to additional cities as a strate-
gic response to potential competition.19
B. League Monopoly Power and Its Effects
A major professional league's monopoly power gives it the ability
to control the number of major league franchises in its sport.19 6 The
league grants each franchise an exclusive charter to operate a team in
a particular geographical area.19v An exclusive geographical distribu-
tion of franchises is believed necessary to ensure league survival and
the economic viability of individual teams.' 98 Unless a local market is
protected from economic competition by other league teams, a
franchise may face potentially ruinous competition that harms league-
wide competitive balance and overall league financial stability.199
Positing that cities are consumers of professional sports
franchises, it follows that a major professional league as a collective
entity has monopoly power in its business dealings with communities
that seek to host teams. Unlike almost any other form of modem en-
tertainment, from the perspective of a city that desires to acquire or
retain a major league team, there are no reasonable substitutes."°0
For example, cities generally do not offer tens or hundreds of millions
of dollars in public subsidization to attract teams from other non-ma-
jor leagues, such as the Canadian Football League, Continental Bas-
ketball Association, International Hockey League, or minor league
baseball. In this context,20 1 the NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB each con-
194. See Gray, supra note 93, at 155-56; Noll, supra note 1, at 17-30.
195. See supra note 194.
196. See Morris, supra note 39, at 90-91.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Weistart, supra note 174, at 1027-30.
200. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). In
determining the existence of monopoly power, the Supreme Court has held that the de-
fendant's product, and any reasonable substitutes for it, should be included in the relevant
market. See id.
201. SeeJames L. Seal, Market Definition in Antitrust Litigation in the Sports and the Entertain-
ment Industries, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 737, 764 (1993) (noting the importance of focusing on
unique characteristics of the sports and entertainment industries and the potential harm
to a particular plaintiff in defining relevant market).
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trols the supply of franchises in their respective sports and thus exer-
cises monopoly power20 2 that gives their individual franchises
significant leverage in negotiations with operators of government-fi-
nanced playing facilities.203
While the granting of geographically exclusive franchises benefits
a league and its member teams, it places cities that desire to host a
team at a significant disadvantage in contract negotiations. 20 4 There
are few regular, long-term uses for a large playing facility, particularly
an outdoor stadium that only generates substantial revenues as the
venue for a major league sports franchise. Because the aggregate de-
mand for teams exceeds the available supply, and because a city can
only negotiate with one team per major league sport at a time, clubs
are able to extract public funds from government entities for the
team's own private benefit.
20 5
The disparity between the number of major league professional
sports franchises and the number of cities desiring to host them has
spawned some classic monopoly characteristics-opportunistic behav-
ior by teams, bidding wars among communities for a limited supply of
teams, and an inability of cities to protect the interests of their taxpay-
ers and fans solely by contract.20 6 The threat of relocation gives the
owners of professional teams substantial leverage in negotiations with
cities seeking to retain or attract a sports franchise.20 7 Franchise own-
ers often shop their teams to competing cities in an effort to increase
their profits, largely at taxpayer expense. 2 8 A sports franchise can
extract a monopoly price from a community by insisting on millions
of dollars of publicly financed subsidies, such as reduced rental fees,
202. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (stating
that a single brand may be the relevant market); Seal, supra note 201, at 742-43 (observing
that a single product in the sports or entertainment industry may constitute relevant mar-
ket under particular circumstances). In his exhaustive article, Professor Ross concludes
that both MLB and the NFL possess monopoly power that harms taxpayers and fans. See
Ross, supra note 168, at 646. Ross further observes that the NBA and NHL may also possess
monopoly power. See id. at 646 n.14.
203. See Noll, supra note 1, at 17.03[5].
204. See Wunderli, supra note 41, at 83-86.
205. See BM, supra note 27, at 3.
206. Although Oakland capitulated to owner Al Davis's demands for stadium improve-
ments in an effort to prevent the Raiders from relocating to Los Angeles, Davis refused to
enter into a long-term lease to secure bond financing for those improvements. See Ross,
supra note 168, at 652.
207. See BAlM, supra note 27, at 6; EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 24-26, 163.
208. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 79-159 (discussing the influence of threatened relo-
cation on efforts by Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Chicago to acquire or retain a profes-
sional sports team).
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playing facility or infrastructure improvements, or new arenas or
stadiums.
Economists believe that teams which play home games in publicly
owned facilities pay below free market rents.20 9 Through the effective
use of bargaining leverage, a franchise owner is able to appropriate to
itself many of a city's economic benefits of hosting a team. 1 ' Playing
facility-related revenues and owner savings due to public financing of
subsidies significantly affect a sports franchise's profitability.2 "
Political factors also enhance a team owner's ability to obtain
favorable concessions from government officials of cities that want to
host sports franchises. 2  Cities compete vigorously among themselves
to attract business, enhance their economic development, and expand
their tax base.2 13 Local politicians are susceptible to pressure to pre-
vent the loss of area businesses to other communities.2 14 The pressure
to retain a local professional team can be even more intense than in
other business contexts because of the significance of professional
sports in American society, the community's development of a strong
emotional bond with the home team, and the limited supply of other
professional teams.2 15
Losing or attracting a sports franchise may have an impact on an
elected official's political future.2 16 To satisfy prevailing public opin-
ion and to further their political ambitions, elected officials may not
fully consider the costs and benefits to the community of providing
millions of dollars in public subsidies to a sports franchise. 217 The
adverse effects of committing taxpayer funds over a long period, with-
209. See BAlM, supra note 27, at 3; Baade & Dye, supra note 29, at 265-66; Noll, supra note
1, at 17.03[5]; Quirk, supra note 167, at 64-65. When the Baltimore Orioles franchise was
sold in 1993, its largest single asset was considered to be its stadium lease. See Andrew
Osterland, Field of Nightmares: Professional Sports Franchises Are Giving Local Taxpayers Sleepless
Nights, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 14, 1995, at 104, available in 1995 WL 8083025.
210. SeeWunderli, supra note 41, at 94; Allen R. Sanderson, Games Oilers Play: It's No-Win
for Houston in These Childish Antics, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 20, 1995, at C1, available in 1995
WL 9399877. Cities with diverse and stable economic bases appear to be in the best posi-
tion to resist the often exorbitant demands of professional team owners. See EUCHNER,
supra note 24, at 174.
211. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 33-34.
212. See id. at 176-77.
213. This can be attributed to the fact that local governments bear the primary responsi-
bility for providing certain services to their constituents, such as police and fire protection,
as well as sanitation. See id. at 166.
214. See id. at 176-77.
215. See Dean, supra note 2; supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
216. See Baade & Dye, supra note 29, at 266.
217. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 176-77.
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out ensuring that the community's interests are safely protected, may
not manifest themselves until after the politician has left office.2 18
"Ironically, sports franchises may exert greater leverage over city
government than other interests do because of their overall economic
insignificance." 219 The populace of communities of the size necessary
to host a professional sports franchise tends to be diverse and difficult
to organize in a unified manner.2 ° The general citizenry does not
have the time, resources, or common purpose to affect local govern-
ment policy on issues involving playing facilities for professional
teams.22 1 This makes it more difficult for ordinary citizens and local
coalitions to unite and effectively oppose expensive stadium construc-
tion projects or to insist that their elected officials act in a manner
that best advances the public good.22 Nevertheless, the tax dollars of
the average citizen are appropriated on a major scale to fund publicly
owned playing facilities.223
Small groups of the wealthy elite, such as banks, construction
firms, bond brokers, and real estate developers, having disproportion-
ate political power and the most to gain from facility construction,
improvement, or infrastructure changes, have the strongest voice on
stadium issues. 224 These special interest groups, often allied with the
team owner, derive the most benefits from public subsidization of pro-
fessional sports.225 Businesses and affluent individuals can afford the
escalating price of tickets to major league sporting events, while the
average person in the community cannot.226
218. For example, the $67.5 million in bond indebtedness incurred in 1987 by Harris
County, Texas, to finance stadium improvements necessary to keep the Houston Oilers
from relocating to Jacksonville, Florida, will not be paid off when the Oilers move to Nash-
ville, Tennessee, after the 1997 NFL season. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
219. EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 14. The typical sports franchise derives lower annual
revenues than a large department store and employs a relatively small number of employ-
ees. See Noll, supra note 1, at 17.02, 17-2.
220. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 14.
221. See id. Voter referendums on tax increases to support stadium construction or im-
provements appear to be an exception. See Raymond J. Keating, Pitching Socialism, NAT'L
RExv., Apr. 22, 1996, at 38, available in 1996 WL 8382124.
222. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 14. Other commentators have noted instances of
successful taxpayer resistance to the demands of franchise owners and politicians who have
yielded to owners' demands. See, e.g., Baade & Dye, supra note 29, at 266-67 (noting that
mayor of South Bend, Indiana lost his job, in part, due to his efforts to build a stadium for
a minor league baseball team and that stadium referendums have failed in Cleveland and
Miami).
223. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
224. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 58-60.
225. See id. at 59.
226. See id.
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C. Franchise Free Agency and Opportunistic Behavior
Movement of professional sports teams from one community to
another is not a recent phenomenon.227 One of the first franchise
relocations occurred in 1882 when the Troy Haymakers baseball team
moved to New York City and was renamed the "Giants."2 2 1 In the first
half of the twentieth century, professional basketball and football
franchises frequently shifted locations as part of the competition be-
tween rival leagues.229 During this time, gate receipts constituted a
major portion of a team's revenues, and franchise relocations usually
occurred because of a failure of fan support for the local team. 30
In the late 1940s, teams began moving because of "economic and
business advantages of the new location and not the economic failures
of the previous location."21 Franchises relocated to growing popula-
tion centers in the southern and western states and from decaying
industrial urban cities to affluent suburban areas. 2 2 The 1958 moves
of the Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles and the New York Giants to
San Francisco symbolized this shift from the local community's inabil-
ity to financially support a team to the team owner's desire to maxi-
mize profits in a better market as the dominant factor influencing
franchise relocations. 23 Although the movement of a cherished and
economically viable franchise out of a community often creates emo-
tional distress for local fans, courts have upheld the transfer of teams
as a legitimate means of enhancing the franchise's profitability. 214
Roger Noll, a leading sports economist, has characterized the cur-
rent, overall financial health of the professional sports industry as
"generally very strong" because the sales price of the limited supply of
major franchises has increased steadily.23 5 The average value of all
sports franchises is estimated to have increased at an annual rate of
227. See Brownout, supra note 28.
228. See id.
229. See Johnson, supra note 124, at 519. Because MLB and the NHL did not face com-
petition from rival leagues during this period, the geographical location of their respective
franchises was relatively stable. See id,; see also Quirk, supra note 167, at 48 (noting that
there were no franchise relocations in baseball's American or National Leagues from 1903
to 1953).
230. See Wong, supra note 37, at 22-24.
231. Id. at 25.
232. See id. at 25-27; Johnson, supra note 124, at 520-22.
233. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 16-20.
234. See, e.g., November v. National Exhibition Co., 173 N.Y.S.2d 490, 499 (Sup. Ct.
1958) (dismissing suit by New York Giants shareholder who challenged board of directors'
vote to move team to San Francisco).
235. Noll, supra note 1, at 17-14.
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twenty percent during the late 1980s.116 Major league professional
sports teams generally share revenues equally from national television
contracts and trademark licensing royalties.23 7 Moreover, NFL and
MLB franchises divide gate receipts from live attendance in an estab-
lished percentage between the home and visiting teams.23 However,
franchises are not required to share revenues with other league teams
from local television or radio contracts, concession and parking re-
ceipts, personal seat license sales, or luxury box rentals.2" 9 This causes
significant disparities in the annual revenues and franchise values of
teams within the same league and may affect a franchise's ability to
field a competitive team. 4 °
The best way for a franchise to increase its profitability is to ex-
pand its local revenues or to reduce its costs.2 41  One way for a
franchise owner to accomplish this objective is to obtain a lucrative
arena or stadium lease with the host city that either increases the
owner's share of revenues from the sale of concessions, souvenirs,
parking, luxury boxes, and personal seat licenses or reduces the
owner's facility usage costs, or both. Because the supply of major
league sports franchises is far less than the cities' demand, team own-
ers have a strong incentive to engage in franchise free agency and to
shop among cities for the best possible terms of a playing facility
arrangement.24 2
236. See Martens, supra note 171, at 12.
237. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 3, at 10.
238. See id. at 10-11 (discussing similarities and differences of league revenue-sharing
practices).
239. See id. at 10.
240. Due to significant differences in stadium revenues, there are extreme disparities in
gross revenues among NFL teams. See King, supra note 14, at 28; Michael Ozanian, Suite
Deals: Why New Stadiums Are Shaking up the Pecking Order of Sports Franchises, FIN. WORLD, May
9, 1995, at 42, available in 1995 WL 8083117. The NFL's 1993 collective bargaining agree-
ment permits cash bonuses to be prorated over the duration of a player's contract. See id.
Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones, whose stadium-related revenues are the league's high-
est, uses this cash flow to attract star players by offering large bonuses. See id. This has
encouraged other NFL owners to increase their annual cash flow by seeking more
favorable stadium deals through franchise free agency. See id.
241. Because player salaries are the largest costs incurred by a franchise, team owners
seek to minimize these costs by limiting competition among teams for player services and
by establishing a maximum, annual aggregate amount that each team pays its players. See
Noll, supra note 1, at 17.03[4].
242. Teams in all four major professional leagues appear willing to play "musical chairs"
with cities and are threatening to relocate if their demands are not met. Several MLB and
NFL teams are now seeking better stadium deals. See King, supra note 14, at 28; Murray
Chass, A New Field of Dreams orJust a Dreamt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at B1O (discussing
the construction or renovation of stadiums to attract relocating baseball teams). The 1995
Stanley Cup champion NewJersey Devils threatened to move to Nashville until its demands
were met. See Michael Farber, Swept Away, SPORTS ILLUS., July 3, 1995, at 18, available in
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Because the host city's local population base significantly affects
attendance-related revenues, one would not expect an owner to move
its team to a smaller metropolitan area in search of a better stadium
deal.2 4  However, league-wide revenue sharing of live gate receipts
spreads the adverse financial effects of reduced attendance among all
teams and forces a relocating team to internalize only a portion of
these lost revenues.24 Moreover, a smaller city, seeking to achieve
"big league status," may be willing to offer a more lucrative deal that
compensates for the negative effects of leaving a larger city.245 Thus,
the smaller city's taxpayers end up compensating for marketplace dif-
ferentials in live attendance, sales of team-related merchandise, and
local revenues from radio and television broadcasts.
Even if moving a franchise from a large to a small market harms
the league's national television contract or other interests, the
franchise bears only its pro rata share of these losses, while individu-
ally reaping the economic benefits of relocation.246 Because all sta-
dium-related revenues are not required to be shared with other
league members, an owner has an economic incentive to relocate the
franchise if the move can increase revenues. Playing in a new publicly
subsidized stadium may have the desirable effect of allowing small-
market teams to reduce the disparity in profits and values and to en-
hance their competitiveness; 247 it is, however, the product of a bid-
ding war among cities for a limited supply of sports franchises and
reflects the substantial bargaining leverage created by the monopoly
power of major professional sports leagues.
1995 WL 12558342. The former two-time defending NBA champion Houston Rockets has
complained that its arena is inadequate and the team owner is considering moving the
franchise. SeeJulie Mason, Mayor Says Data Back Downtown Basketball Site, Hous. CHRON.,
Aug. 8, 1996, at 33, available in 1996 WL 11557910.
243. SeeWunderli, supra note 41, at 87-88. Most fans who attend professional games live
within 20 miles of the playing facility. See Noll, supra note 1, at 17-16. The "team's winning
percentage" is another important factor influencing its local revenues. Wunderli, supra
note 41, at 87.
244. See Wunderli, supra note 41, at 88.
245. See id. at 89. Historically, teams tended to move from smaller markets to larger
cities because of economic projections that moving to larger markets would generate
higher revenues for the teams. SeeJames Quirk & Mohamed El Hodiri, The Economic Theory
of a Professional Sports League, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BuSINEss 45-52 (Roger G.
Noll ed., 1974). However, recent moves, such as the Los Angeles Rams to St. Louis and the
Houston Oilers to Nashville, support the hypothesis that movement from larger to smaller
cities is more profitable for some teams, depending on the amount of public subsidization
offered by the new host city. See Wunderli, supra note 41, at 88-90.
246. See supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.
247. See Ozanian, supra note 240, at 42.
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D. League Response to Franchise Relocations
A sports league has a strong interest in franchise stability and is
collectively harmed by its member teams' exercise of opportunistic be-
havior and franchise free agency. This conduct breaks down the
symbiotic relationship between teams and their host communities.
Eventually, city taxpayers may be unwilling to provide publicly owned
and subsidized playing facilities for teams that can casually relocate
despite a history of fan support that has enabled the franchise to be
profitable.24 Without taxpayer subsidies, leagues may be unable to
field competitive teams in optimal geographical locations.24 9
Opportunistic relocation also hurts a league's good will and fan
loyalty, especially if it disrupts geographical balance and causes the
elimination of traditional rivalries among teams. Game attendance
may decline and reduce the league's overall gate revenues and pres-
tige, particularly if a team has committed to relocate to another city in
the future.25 ° Franchise relocations may also adversely affect league
media exposure. Television networks will offer less money for rights
to an unstable product, particularly if franchises transfer out of major
market areas, cumulatively reducing the nationwide viewing
audience.251
Leagues and individual team owners have a series of economic
contradictions at work within their relationships. Because of the im-
portance of maintaining stable franchises and preventing unwar-
ranted team movements, leagues require super-majority de jure
approval before a franchise is permitted to relocate; 52 however, this is
often a meaningless requirement defacto.255 Individual franchise own-
ers often lack a significant economic incentive to protect a host city's
interests. Because owners share gate receipts and national television
revenues, it is in their collective interest to keep franchises in, or allow
franchises to move to, communities offering the highest potential
sources of shared revenues.25 4 Moreover, freely permitting franchise
movement enables all member teams to use the threat of future relo-
cation to enhance their bargaining power in stadium negotiations
248. See Jeffrey Glick, Professional Sports Franchise Movements and the Sherman Act: When
and Where Teams Should Be Able to Move, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 55, 84 (1983); Gray, supra
note 93, at 131.
249. See Glick, supra note 248, at 84.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 86-87; Ross, supra note 168, at 653-54.
252. See Beisner, supra note 31, at 436 n.39.
253. See id. at 436.
254. See id.
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with their host cities.2 5 5 An owner must also consider the possibility
that voting against a fellow owner's relocation may cause the fellow
owner to disapprove of future efforts to move another team.2 56
Professional leagues historically have not made vigorous efforts to
prevent franchise movements. 257 One commentator has observed:
"There is no reason to expect that franchise owners routinely will in-
terfere with their joint-venturers' efforts to make more money at the
taxpayers' expense. From 1950 through 1982, seventy-eight
franchise movements occurred in the four major league professional
sports.259 Most league attempts to block franchise relocations were
directed at owners, such as Charlie Finley, Bill Veeck, and Al Davis,
who were perceived as mavericks.2 60 Apparently, "personal animosity"
and other factors motivated these actions, rather than an honest de-
sire to protect a host city's interests.26 a
Since 1982, when the NFL and its members were found to have
violated the antitrust laws by voting against the proposed move of the
Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles,262 leagues have been forced to con-
sider potential legal liability for attempting to prevent franchise relo-
cation. 63 In 1983, the NHL was sued for rejecting the sale of the St.
Louis Blues to a group that planned to move it to Saskatoon, Saskatch-
ewan. 264 The Ralston Purina Company, which owned the Blues at the
time, sought $60 million in antitrust damages from the league. 265 The
NHL subsequently approved the sale of the Blues to a local consor-
255. A popular league strategy is telling host city officials that they should cave in to the
demands of franchise owners to avoid the loss of a team by relocation. For example, NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue stated that Houston's best chance of continuing to host an
NFL team would be to satisfy Oilers owner Bud Adams's demand for a new stadium. See
John McClain, Tagliabue: City Won't Get Guarantee, Hous. CHRON. Jan. 17, 1996, at CI, avail-
able in 1996 WL 5577348. Tagliabue observed: "'If the Oilers' situation doesn't work down
there, I don't see any circumstances in which we're going to guarantee a team, especially
when one team's already found it unsatisfactory.'" Id.
256. See Beisner, supra note 31, at 436 n.39.
257. Quirk, supra note 167, at 48-52.
258. Ross, supra note 168, at 654.
259. See Wunderli, supra note 41, at 90.
260. See id.
261. See Ross, supra note 168, at 653 n.41.
262. See infra notes 316-324 and accompanying text.
263. Despite the jury verdict for the Raiders, the NFL filed a 1984 suit seeking to prevent
the Philadelphia Eagles from relocating, on the basis that "'[s] uch a move would abandon
a community that has supported a team superbly for more than half a century.'" Wong,
supra note 37, at 34 n.108 (quoting NFL Asks Court to Block Eagle Move, N.Y. TiMsS, Dec. 15,
1984, at 43). That suit became moot when Eagles owner Leonard Tose decided to keep
the team in Philadelphia. See id. at 34-35.
264. See id. at 66.
265. See id.
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tium that kept the team in St. Louis, and the antitrust suit was ulti-
mately settled. 66 The operator of the stadium that houses the St.
Louis Rams recently filed an antitrust suit against the NFL, alleging
that conditioning league approval of the team's move from Los Ange-
les on the payment of a $29 million relocation fee harmed the sta-
dium operator's economic interests. 67 The now Oakland Raiders
sued the NFL on antitrust grounds for alleged unlawful interference
with the team's 1995 move from Los Angeles back to Oakland.268
IV. ANTITRUST CLAIMS BY CITIES
The relocation of a major league professional sports team causes
psychological distress and a sense of loss to the fans of the former host
city.2 6 9 The government entity that owns the playing facility may be
left with a significant amount of debt incurred to attract or retain the
franchise.270 Taxpayer dollars are used to pay outstanding facility-re-
lated debt, while the franchise, which derived the benefits of taxpayer
subsidization, has no legal obligation to remain or pay damages, ab-
sent an agreement to do SO. 271
A city's inability to protect its taxpayers' financial investment and
prevent fan exploitation by a team owner's opportunistic behavior is
the product of a major professional sports league's monopoly power.
As previously discussed, both the undersupply of major league
franchises and the excess demand by cities give each team owner
strong leverage in playing facility lease negotiations.272 The threat of
relocation is an incentive to obtain favorable terms and concessions at
taxpayer expense. 273
Cities, as owners of stadiums, and states, in their sovereign capac-
ity, have sought relief under the antitrust laws for harm caused by
franchise relocation. This section of the Article discusses the inappro-
priateness of using the antitrust laws to regulate a professional
266. See id. at 66-67.
267. See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. National Football League, No.
4:95CV02443T1A (E.D. Mo., filed Dec. 18, 1995).
268. See Oakland Raiders v. National Football League, No. C-95-03547-SBA (N.D. Cal.,
filed Oct. 5, 1995).
269. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 188-192, 206-211 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
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league's determination of the total number and geographical location
of franchises. 74
A. Loss of Team by Franchise Relocation
1. Standing and Antitrust Injury Requirements.-The objective of
the antitrust laws is to prevent, or to allow recovery for, economic
losses caused by anticompetitive commercial activity. An antitrust
plaintiff must prove actual or threatened harm to its economic inter-
ests as a result of the defendant's antitrust violation.2 75 A city must
show that the anticompetitive conduct of a professional sports league
and its member franchises has harmed the city's proprietary inter-
ests. 276 For example, lease revenues and revenues associated with the
operation of a publicly owned stadium that are lost as a result of the
relocation of a professional sports franchise satisfy the economic dam-
ages requirement. 277 A government body cannot recover damages for
injury to its general economy that has been caused by the movement
of a sports franchise out of its jurisdiction.2 78
274. This Article will not provide an extensive discussion of the viability of an antitrust
claim by a city against a single professional team owner for choosing to relocate the
franchise to another city. This type of claim, however, is not likely to be successful. This
unilateral act is outside the coverage of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)
("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal.). In a suit
under section 2 of the Act, arising out of the team's move elsewhere, it would be difficult to
prove that a single professional sports franchise has monopoly power. 15 U.S.C. § 2
("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... ). This is because other
league teams, which a jilted city could seek to host as a replacement for the departing
franchise, would be reasonable substitutes. See, e.g., Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston
Sports Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. 109, 110-11 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (mem.) (refusing to find that radio
broadcasts of Houston Astros games were the relevant product market because reasonable
substitutes-other radio formats-existed to satisfy the plaintiff radio station's needs).
Moreover, a businessperson generally has the unilateral right to select the customers and
parties with whom she conducts business. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,
307 (1919) (holding that the Sherman Act does not prohibit a private manufacturer from
announcing in advance the conditions under which he will sell).
275. Section 4 of the Clayton Act requires that a plaintiff "be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C § 15(a) (1988).
See generally Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337-45 (1979) (holding that loss of
money satisfies the injury requirement to "business or property").
276. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 395-99
(1906) (holding that the wrongfully induced payment of money is an injury to property);
WEISTART & LowELL, supra note 167, § 5.11, at 752-53.
277. See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League (Raiders II),
791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).
278. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263-65 (1972) (holding that section 4
of the Clayton Act does not allow a state to bring a suit for injury to its economy as a result
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The antitrust laws do not permit recovery of damages for per-
sonal injury.1 9 Disappointed local fans cannot recover for any emo-
tional distress resulting from the home team's movement to another
city. In McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,28° a group of
Southern Methodist University (SMU) alumni, football players, and
cheerleaders alleged that the NCAA's one-year suspension of the uni-
versity's football program for making improper payments to players
violated the antitrust laws.281 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the claims of
SMU alumni for "loss of the opportunity to see football games,"282 as
well as the cheerleaders' claim for "considerable emotional anguish
and distress" resulting from the lost opportunity to lead cheers at
games.283 The court reasoned that this type of harm does not consti-
tute economic loss. 28 4 The court also held that the alleged devalua-
tion of an SMU degree because of the suspension of the school's
football team was too speculative to be compensable in antitrust
damages.285
Although the Clayton Act expressly permits "any person" who has
suffered economic loss from an antitrust violation to bring suit,286 the
Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff must be either a consumer
of the antitrust violation). Although section 4C of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(1)
(1988), enacted after Standard Oi4 permits a state to bring a parens patriae action to recover
damages to the property of natural persons within the state caused by an antitrust viola-
tion, it does not authorize a damages action for harm to the state's general economy. See
In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 54, 56-60 (D. Md. 1978)
(mem.) (holding that the State of Maryland can sue on behalf of its consumers, regardless
of whether its general economy has been injured); Irving Scher, Emerging Issues Under the
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 713 n.195 (1977). A government
body, however, has parens patriae standing to sue for injunctive relief to prevent continuing
injury to its general economy. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945)
(holding that the State of Georgia can sue a railroad company for an injury that resulted
from a violation of the Clayton Act).
279. See Reiter, 442 U.S. at 343-44.
280. 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
281. Id. at 1340.
282. Id. at 1342.
283. Id. at 1340. Although the SMU players suffered an economic injury because the
challenged NCAA rules prevented them from selling their services to the highest bidder,
the court held that the players did not have standing to recover treble damages, but could
seek injunctive relief. Id. at 1342-43.
284. Id. at 1340.
285. Id. at 1342. Courts have also rejected a city's claim that the loss of a professional
sports franchise defames its reputation. See, e.g., HMC Management Corp. v. New Orleans
Basketball Club, 375 So. 2d 700, 710 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (denying a preliminary injunction
to keep a professional basketball team in a stadium lease).
286. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
19971
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
or a competitor in the restrained market. 87 This standing require-
ment has the practical effect of precluding parties only "tangentially
affected by an antitrust violation" from bringing a claim for harm
caused by anticompetitive activity. 88 In the context of antitrust litiga-
tion surrounding the relocation of sports franchises, federal courts
have held that a stadium owner or operator has standing to claim that
a professional league's rules or conduct restrain its ability to compete
with rival stadiums to house a league team.
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League (Raiders 11),289 the Ninth Circuit upheld a trebled $14.5 million
antitrust damages award in favor of a football stadium. 290 The sta-
dium suffered economic loss from the NFL's efforts to prevent the
Oakland Raiders from honoring its contract to relocate to Los Ange-
les and play its home games in the plaintiffs stadium. 291 Rejecting the
league's contention that the plaintiff had no standing because its in-
jury was too remote from the antitrust violation, the court observed:
"Football stadia constitute a special market distinguished from those
comprised by, say, hotels, laundering establishments, or limousine
services, by their indispensable and intimate connection with profes-
sional football and football teams."292
Raiders H1 limited the class of potential plaintiffs that may recover
antitrust damages for economic loss caused by the relocation of a pro-
fessional sports franchise. 293 A city must have a direct economic stake
in hosting a sports franchise, such as the ability to earn rent from the
lease of a publicly owned playing facilityY94 The court's distinction
between a stadium and local businesses that only indirectly derive a
financial benefit from the presence of a professional team suggests
that any other economic loss that a city and its inhabitants suffer from
287. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 545-46 (1983) (holding that a union is not a person injured within the meaning
of the antitrust laws); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 485 (1982) (holding that a
consumer has standing to assert an antitrust claim).
288. McCready, 457 U.S. at 477.
289. 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).
290. Id. at 1364-65. But see Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that a stadium owner has no standing to recover antitrust damages for lost value of stadium
improvements that would have been financed by public offering of minority interest in a
team that was disapproved by the league).
291. Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1364-65.
292. Id. at 1365.
293. Id. at 1363.
294. Id.
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the relocation of a professional sports franchise, such as a reduced tax
base, is not compensable under the antitrust laws. 95
More important, even if a city satisfies the economic injury and
standing requirements, it can obtain an injunction or recover dam-
ages under the antitrust laws only if its harm is caused by an anticom-
petitive effect in a properly defined market as a result of a professional
team's relocation.296 This is known as the "antitrust injury" require-
ment.297 Raiders II implicitly recognizes that cities compete to host
professional sports franchises and to house them in publicly owned
stadiums and that the antitrust laws encourage such free market com-
petition.2 " Thus, it appears virtually impossible for a city to prove
that it has suffered an antitrust injury after it has lost a professional
team because the franchise owner accepted a better stadium deal
from another city. That type of harm flows from increased competi-
tion, rather than decreased competition, for which the federal anti-
trust laws do not provide a remedy.
2 99
The antitrust laws are intended to promote consumer welfare by
preserving the competitive process.500 If a team leaves one city and
moves to another, the people in the former host city have suffered a
loss, whereas the citizens of the new host city have simultaneously re-
ceived a benefit. Hence, it is probably impossible to accurately mea-
sure the net effect of a sports franchise relocation on consumer
welfare. Even if this measurement can be made, an antitrust suit by a
jilted city against a league and its member teams does not provide an
appropriate means of compensating for the loss. The underlying eco-
nomic assumption of the federal antitrust laws is that free market
competition among cities is the best means of allocating scarce re-
sources, such as the geographical location of major league profes-
295. However, some courts have recognized that a city may suffer irreparable harm from
lost intangible benefits caused by the premature departure of a professional sports team
that may justify injunctive relief under a breach of contract theory. See supra notes 74-81
and accompanying text.
296. Cf Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109 (1986) (holding that a
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act must show loss result-
ing from increased competition); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977) ("The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the viola-
tion or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.").
297. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 103, at 7-8 (1978).
298. Raiders II, 791 F.2d at 1364.
299. In Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489, the Court rejected the plaintiffs antitrust claim
because the plaintiffs economic loss resulted from a procompetitive effect of the defend-
ant's challenged conduct. See id. at 489-91.
300. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979) ("The essence of the anti-
trust laws is to ensure fair price competition in an open market.").
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sional sports franchises throughout the United States, to maximize the
consumer welfare of all Americans.
In an eminent domain proceeding, one court has held that per-
mitting the city to take a professional sports franchise through con-
demnation proceedings unduly interfered with a professional sports
league's national geographical dispersal of its teams."' 1 In City of Oak-
land v. Oakland Raiders (Oakland III), o2 the California Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the City of Oakland's use of state eminent domain
laws to prevent the Raiders from moving to Los Angeles violated the
Commerce Clause.3" 3 Because the NFL's member teams provide na-
tionwide entertainment and are financially interdependent, the court
recognized the league's legitimate need to determine the location of
its teams.30 4 Observing that "[a]n involuntarily acquired franchise
could, at the local government's pleasure, be permanently indentured
to the local entity," the court concluded that "[t]his is the precise
brand of parochial meddling with the national economy that the com-
merce clause was designed to prohibit." °3 0  Although not an antitrust
case, Oakland Illimplicitly recognized that market competition among
cities should be left free of local interference that would determine
the geographical location of professional sports franchises.30 6 More-
over, the case buttressed the principle of using private ordering, not
eminent domain, to achieve this result through a "call mechanism."30 7
2. Merits of Claim.-Holding that matters of internal league gov-
ernance are outside the scope of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 08
courts initially provided professional sports leagues with broad author-
ity to regulate franchise relocation. In San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. Na-
tional Hockey League,309 a 1974 case, a federal district court dismissed a
team's antitrust claim against other league members for prohibiting
the team's relocation to Vancouver. 3 '0 The court found that league
301. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Oakland III), 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 158 (Ct.
App. 1985).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 154. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
304. Oakland III, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
305. Id. at 157. Ironically, the court reached this conclusion even though this was a
franchise relocation within California that was opposed by the NFL. Id. at 158.
306. Id. at 157.
307. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
308. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
309. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
310. Id. at 972.
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teams "are not competitors in the economic sense," but rather are "all
members of a single unit competing as such with other similar profes-
sional leagues."3 1  Because a sports league cannot exist without coop-
eration on matters such as the geographical location of franchises, the
court found that the requisite conspiracy among independent eco-
nomic competitors did not exist as a matter of law.3 12
Although the Supreme Court has not resolved this issue, 13 the
prevailing judicial view among circuit courts is that the member teams
of a professional sports league are separate and independent eco-
nomic entities whose collective action is subject to section 1 scru-
tiny.3 14 It is reasoned that each team acts to further its individual
311. Id. at 969-70.
312. Id. at 971.
313. On one occasion, the Supreme Court refused to review the Second Circuit's hold-
ing that "the characterization of NFL as a single economic entity does not exempt from the
Sherman Act an agreement between its members to restrain competition." North Am.
Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1074 (1982). Justice Rehnquist dissented from the denial of certiorari and suggested
that a professional sports league is a single entity outside the scope of section 1 of the
Sherman Act:
The NFL owners are joint venturers who produce a product, professional foot-
ball, which competes with other sports and other forms of entertainment in the
entertainment market. Although individual NFL teams compete with one an-
other on the playing field, they rarely compete in the marketplace. The NFL
negotiates its television contracts, for example, in a single block. The revenues
from broadcast rights are pooled. Indeed, the only interteam competition occurs
when two teams are located in one major city, such as New York or Los Angeles.
These teams compete with one another for home game attendance and local
broadcast revenues. In all other respects, the league competes as a unit against
other forms of entertainment.
National Football League v. North Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1077 (1982) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.).
314. See, e.g., Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994)
(reviewing a professional team owner's allegation that the league violated antitrust laws by
prohibiting owners from selling team shares to the public), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1252
(1995) (mem.); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League (Raid-
ers I), 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the NFL is not a single entity
for antitrust purposes); North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1256-58 (holding that it is a
Sherman Act violation for a league to ban ownership by team members in other leagues).
But see Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 599
(7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the NBA "looks more or less like a firm depending on which
facet of the business one examines.").
Commentators disagree on whether issues of internal league governance should be
subject to antitrust review under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Their dispute primarily
reflects differing views of the nature of a professional sports league and conflicting inter-
pretations of the Supreme Court's holding in Coppeyweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984), which stated that a parent corporation is legally incapable of
conspiring with a wholly owned subsidiary under section 1. See id. Some authorities argue
that league decisionmaking is conduct of a single entity because (1) no individual team
can produce the league's entertainment product-on-field competition; (2) cooperation
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economic interests rather than the league's common interests; there-
fore, teams are capable of conspiring among themselves. As the First
Circuit recently observed: "NFL member clubs compete in several
ways off the field, which itself tends to show that the teams pursue
diverse interests and thus are not a single enterprise under § 1. "1315
This line of authority allows a team owner to challenge, on antitrust
grounds, a collective decision by other league teams not to allow the
owner's franchise to relocate.
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League (Raiders
1) ,16 the Ninth Circuit upheld ajury finding that the collective refusal
of league member teams to approve the 1980 proposed move of the
Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles violated the antitrust laws.3 17 The
court initially concluded that the defendants were "an association of
teams sufficiently independent and competitive with one another" to
be covered by section 1 of the Sherman Act.31s An NFL rule required
the approval of three-quarters of the league's teams before a franchise
was permitted to relocate into another team's designated home terri-
tory.319 With five abstentions, NFL owners voted 22-0 against the pro-
posed relocation of the Raiders into the territory of the Los Angeles
Rams. 320
and consideration of the league's best interests are essential to produce this product and
compete effectively against other forms of entertainment; and (3) league teams share reve-
nues and are financially interdependent. See, e.g., Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the Na-
tional Football League As a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the
Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1, 23-35 (1983) (arguing that the NFL is a single
entity for antitrust purposes); Roberts, supra note 167, at 260-62 (arguing that the Sherman
Act does not require individual clubs to act as natural competitors); Weistart, supra note
174, at 1048-49 (analyzing the majority opinion in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Other analysts contend that league decisionmaking is concerted action because (1)
teams are separately owned businesses; (2) they do not share all revenues and losses; and
(3) they do not have a complete unity of economic interest and may consider their individ-
ual best interests in participation in league governance. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Sports,
Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 751, 789-90 (1989) (discussing whether
section 1 of the Sherman Act should be applied to sports leagues); Michael S. Jacobs,
Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67
IND. L.J. 25, 30-46 (1991) (arguing against single-entity status for professional sports
leagues); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in
Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157, 169 (1988) (discussing the antitrust questions
raised by the sports franchise relocation restraint).
315. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099.
316. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
317. Id. at 1401.
318. Id. at 1389.
319. Id. at 1385.
320. Id.
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The challenged NFL rule was found to be a means of establishing
exclusive geographical territories among economic competitors, thus
interfering with a team owner's right to do business where it
pleased. 21 Although team owners have a legitimate collective interest
in protecting the league's integrity and attractiveness as an entertain-
ment product by controlling the geographical placement of
franchises, the court held that a standardless relocation approval re-
quirement would not necessarily accomplish these objectives.3 2 2 The
owners' refusal to allow the Raiders to relocate restrained economic
competition unreasonably between league teams.3 2 ' The Ninth Cir-
cuit suggested that in order to withstand an antitrust challenge by a
franchise owner or stadium authority, a league must have objective
franchise relocation standards that are no more restrictive than neces-
sary to protect its legitimate interests.324
Allowing a former host city to bring an antitrust claim against a
league and its members for merely permitting a franchise to relocate
to another city creates conflicting legal obligations.3 25 Raiders I limits
a league's authority to govern franchise relocation and creates poten-
321. Id. at 1391. Certain rulings by the Ninth Circuit in the Raiders antitrust litigation
appear internally inconsistent. In Raiders II, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury's finding
that the Raiders lost profits in an amount exceeding $11.5 million because of a two-year
delay in moving to Los Angeles caused by other league teams' vote against this relocation,
which was found to be an unreasonable restraint of trade. Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1986). The panel
also found that the opportunity to expand the league belonged to the league as a whole
and that by moving to Los Angeles, the Raiders appropriated for itself the league's expan-
sion opportunity for a new NFL franchise in this area. Id. at 1371. A league lawfully
charges the owner of a new franchise a multi-million dollar expansion fee that is distrib-
uted to all existing franchises on a pro rata basis. Id. Therefore, to prevent the Raiders
from gaining a windfall at the expense of other league teams, the Ninth Circuit found it
necessary to subtract from the value of the league's lost expansion opportunity in Los
Angeles, the value of the Oakland expansion opportunity returned to the league by the
Raiders relocation; the court then offset this sum from the antitrust damages award to the
Raiders before trebling. Id. at 1371-74. The court remanded the case for resolution of this
issue. Id. at 1376.
322. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1395-98. The court observed that a professional sports league
has a legitimate procompetitive interest in (1) encouraging and protecting each
franchise's financial investment; (2) establishing geographical scope, regional balance,
and coverage of major and minor markets; and (3) preventing franchise relocations before
local governments can recover their investments in the team's playing facility, thereby
preventing erosion of local confidence and interest in the league. Id. at 1396.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1396-97.
325. The Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum was prepared to file an antitrust suit if the
NFL and its member teams had voted to permit the Oakland Raiders to move to Los Ange-
les in 1980. SeeWEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 184, at 382 n.6. The theory of the proposed
suit was that the relocation of the Raiders would reduce economic competition among
NFL teams in the San Francisco Bay area. See id.
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tial exposure to antitrust treble damages for disapproving a team's
move to another city. 26 Therefore, it is inconsistent with Raiders I to
permit a jilted city to use antitrust law as a sword against a league for
failing to prevent a franchise from relocating.
Raiders I not only appears to preclude a city that has lost a profes-
sional sports team from prevailing in an antitrust action; it also gives
the "green light" to franchise free agency and encourages opportunis-
tic behavior by team owners.3 2 7 Raiders I creates uncertainty regarding
a league's legal ability to prevent franchise relocation and increases
the likelihood that a franchise owner will move the team to another
city if the host city does not satisfy the owner's demands. Thus, Raiders
I reinforces, rather than ameliorates, the disparity of bargaining
power between franchise owner and host city.
In the context of franchise relocation, a professional league
should be viewed as an economically interdependent entity whose de-
cisions are outside of the scope of section 1 of the Sherman Act.32
The success of a league depends upon exciting on-field competition
between evenly matched teams that are financially viable. 29 An exclu-
sive geographical territory for each league team appears necessary to
ensure the league's economic stability.33 ' Moreover, it is unlikely that
league teams in the same metropolitan area engage in any significant
economic competition for fan support.33 ' A team owner's decision to
relocate its franchise in pursuit of individual economic gain may harm
the league's collective interests.33 2 League franchise relocation re-
strictions are necessary internal regulations to protect host cities' in-
terests, to preserve the good will of the fans, and to secure the league's
326. Raiders I, 726 F.2d at 1381.
327. Ironically, one court expressed its concern that allowing a city to take a sports
franchise by eminent domain "would seriously disrupt the balance of economic bargaining
on stadium leases [presumably in favor of cities] throughout the nation." City of Oakland
v. Oakland Raiders (Oakland III), 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (Ct. App. 1985).
328. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 167, at § 5.11, 734-36; Gray, supra note 93, at
134-39.
329. See North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251-53
(2d Cir. 1982); Weistart, supra note 174, at 1018 n.17.
330. See Raiders 1, 726 F.2d at 1396 (agreeing that the nature of professional football
requires some territorial restrictions).
331. See Weistart, supra note 174, at 1030-31.
332. See id. at 1028. Some courts have held that a team owner has a fiduciary duty not to
act in its own self-interest if doing so will harm the league's collective interests. See, e.g.,
Professional Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass'n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that owners comprising a league's governing body have a fiduciary duty requiring
them to make decisions for the benefit of the league as a whole). See generally Shropshire,
supra note 43, at 589-97 (arguing for the existence of a fiduciary duty in the context of
franchise relocation).
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geographic stability."' 3 These underlying purposes require that the
league not be subject to antitrust challenges, as asserted in Raiders I,
by teams seeking to engage in opportunistic behavior.33 4
B. No Right to Obtain Replacement Team
Cities that formerly lost an NFL sports franchise have, ironically,
filed antitrust suits claiming that NFL efforts to interfere with an ex-
isting team's agreement to relocate to one of these communities un-
reasonably restrains trade. The operator of a new stadium housing
the St. Louis Rams has sued the NFL and its member teams for condi-
tioning the move of the Rams from Los Angeles on the payment of a
$29 million relocation fee, which the plaintiff claims deprived it of
substantial economic benefits under its lease with the Rams. 35 The
City of Baltimore also filed an antitrust suit against the NFL in an
effort to force the league to approve an agreement with the owner of
the Cleveland Browns to move his team to Baltimore.336 Thus, the
paradox: cities like St. Louis and Baltimore are suing to preserve the
very system that allowed them to be jilted by opportunistic owner be-
havior in the first place, and that may jilt them again in the future.
These lawsuits are patterned after the successful Raiders antitrust
litigation, 3 7 and they contend that league efforts to prevent or hinder
franchise relocation represent a concerted, illegal refusal to deal with
a city that has reached an agreement to host a league team. 38 Judicial
recognition of these types of claims will preserve unbridled, free mar-
ket competition among cities for professional sports franchises, but
will also have the adverse effect of encouraging franchise free agency,
to the detriment of host cities."' In addition, such recognition would
preclude a league from preventing franchise moves that are contrary
to the collective best interests of its member teams. 340
1. Antitrust Injury Requirement.-Although an antitrust claim aris-
ing out of a league's refusal to permit an existing team to relocate is
333. See Raiders , 726 F.2d at 1396 (agreeing that exclusive territories aid new franchises
in achieving financial stability and in fostering fan loyalty).
334. See Roberts, supra note 167, at 590; Weistart, supra note 174, at 1023, 1035-40.
335. See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. National Football League, No.
4:95CV02443TIA (E.D. Mo., filed Dec. 18, 1995).
336. See Maryland v. National Football League, No. L 96-155 (D. Md., filed Jan. 18,
1996).
337. See supra notes 289-299, 316-327 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 335-336 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
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viable under current law, a city probably could not successfully assert
that a league's failure to provide a replacement team for a lost
franchise violates antitrust laws. In two cases, federal courts have held
that a league's denial of an application for an expansion franchise is
not an antitrust violation. Although these cases involve efforts by an
existing sports franchise to gain admission to a major professional
league, they seem to apply equally to a city seeking to host a team.
In Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League,"' the Third Cir-
cuit rejected a former World Football League team's claim that the
NFL's denial of the Grizzlies' application for an expansion franchise
in Memphis violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 42 While conced-
ing that NFL member teams could legitimately refuse to deal with a
team seeking admission to the league by "applying objective, rational
and fair decisional criteria," 4 ' the plaintiff asserted that there was no
valid basis for rejecting its application, as it had satisfied the league's
criteria. 44 The court initially ruled that the 1966 congressional ap-
proval of the merger between the NFL and the AFL' 3 did not require
the league to share its dominant market power with all applicants."'4
The court also held that denial of the plaintiff's application for an
NFL franchise would not cause any actual or potential injury to eco-
nomic competition among league teams, as none of them was in the
same market area as the proposed Memphis franchise. 4 Observing
that the plaintiffs exclusion from the NFL left Memphis available as
the site of a franchise for a rival league, the court stated that the NFL's
conduct was "patently pro-competitive. " s48
In Mid-South Grizzlies, the Third Circuit properly concluded that a
league's refusal to admit new member teams does not reduce eco-
nomic competition among NFL teams or in the broader professional
football market.149 This ruling is consistent with the correct position
that collective league member decisions on franchise location issues
341. 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
342. Id. at 787.
343. Id. at 777-78.
344. Id. at 778.
345. See infra note 356 and accompanying text.
346. Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 784-85.
347. Id. at 785-87.
348. Id. at 786.
349. Id. at 787. The court, however, suggested that denial of a franchise application in a
geographical area where league members compete for fan support and local revenues
"might require a different antitrust analysis." Id. See generally Christian M. McBurney, The
Legality of Sports Leagues' Restrictive Admissions Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 925 (1985) (argu-
ing that league's denial of franchise application may violate section 1 of the Sherman Act).
116 [VOL. 56:57
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FRANCHISE RELOCATIONS
should not be subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act.35° Because it
would hamper a league's ability to protect its interests in a manner
that enhances the image and attractiveness of its product to consum-
ers, allowing a section 1 claim by a disappointed applicant or city
would not further the antitrust law's paramount objective of preserv-
ing interbrand competition among competing forms of
entertainment.3 5
1
2. Legal vs. Illegal Use of Monopoly Power.-Although it is appro-
priate to view a league as a single entity in making franchise location
and expansion decisions, the mere fact that a league has monopoly
power does not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. Monopoly
power has been judicially defined as the ability to affect the product
price charged to consumers or to exclude competitors from the mar-
ket.3 12 A violation of section 2 occurs only if a monopolist abuses its
power by illegally acquiring or maintaining its market dominance.3 53
Despite disagreement over whether a sports league is a natural
monopolist, 54 lawfully acquired or maintained aspects of the league's
monopoly position are not subject to antitrust challenge. 3  For ex-
ample, Congress approved the 1966 merger between the NFL and
AFL.356 MLB has a judicially created antitrust exemption that effec-
tively immunizes its monopoly status.3 57
The federal antitrust laws do not affirmatively require a monopo-
list professional sports league or its member teams to deal fairly with a
current or prospective host city. A sports franchise's demand that a
350. See supra notes 328-334 and accompanying text.
351. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) ("Inter-
brand competition ... is the primary concern of antitrust law.").
352. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (de-
fining monopoly power as "the power to control prices or exclude competition").
353. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (stating that section
2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident").
354. See supra note 314.
355. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
356. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (exempting from antitrust laws agreements combining two
professional football leagues).
357. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-84 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346
U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953) (per curiam); Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Prof'l
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922). Some courts, however, have recently held that
baseball's antitrust exemption encompasses only the reserve clause system regarding a
team's rights to a player's services. See, e.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp.
420, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Butterworth v. National League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 644 So.
2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. 1994).
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city pay a monopoly price in the form of multi-million dollar public
subsidization of a playing facility does not violate the antitrust laws.358
A city's loss of, or inability to attract, a sports franchise is often the
direct result of the city's failure to make the best offer to the team's
owner.3 59 Notwithstanding the league's limitation on the supply of
franchises in the supply-demand equation, any economic harm to a
city caused by competition among communities to attract a team is
not compensable under the antitrust laws.360
Even a monopolist has the right to unilaterally select its custom-
ers. 61 A refusal to deal with an existing or potential customer is law-
ful unless a monopolist is seeking to establish or maintain its market
dominance by excluding a rival from the market.3 62 It is unlikely that
a professional sports league's mere unwillingness to locate a franchise
in a city is an abuse of the league's monopoly power, actionable under
the antitrust laws. In fact, a dominant league's refusal to award a
franchise to a city or group of cities with the necessary population
base and playing facilities to support a team arguably creates an op-
portunity for a rival league to form, although the history of successful
rival leagues is not encouraging. 363
In Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League,364 the
Ninth Circuit held that a league's denial of an application for an ex-
pansion franchise did not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act's pro-
hibition against monopolization.363 The court found no antitrust
injury because there was no showing that the plaintiff's exclusion from
358. See, e.g., Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d
593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A high price is not itself a violation of the Sherman Act.");
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that a
monopoly will not have to pay damages because its prices are excessive, unless it can be
shown that the monopoly increased its power by wrongful actions). See generally HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 6.1,
at 243 (1994) (stating that "the monopolist's sale of its product at a monopolistic price is
not an 'exclusionary' practice" that violates section 2 of the Sherman Act).
359. See supra text accompanying note 10.
360. See supra notes 295-296 and accompanying text.
361. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (stating that the Sher-
man Act was not intended to restrict a private enterprise's right to choose with whom it will
do business).
362. See id.; see also Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (holding
that a newspaper publisher's refusal to deal with advertisers unless they agreed not to ad-
vertise with competing radio station was a violation of the Sherman Act).
363. For a discussion of the historical failure of most rival leagues, see supra notes 167-
180 and accompanying text.
364. 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1986).
365. Id. at 1350.
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the league reduced competition among existing league teams.36 The
court ruled that the league's challenged conduct was not an effort to
monopolize professional hockey in North America, because the plain-
tiff was "not competing with the NHL; [it was] seeking to join it."3 67
This is consistent with the classic judicial interpretations of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act as prohibiting the abuse of monopoly
power by unfair exclusionary practices that harm a monopolist's com-
petitors.36 8 Aggressive competition on the merits resulting from the
production of an attractive product for which there is strong public
demand is legal even if it creates reduced market opportunities for a
monopolist's rivals.36 9 Most antitrust suits asserting section 2 claims
against a dominant professional sports league have been brought by a
competing league complaining about exclusion from the market,
rather than by a city that has been unable to retain or attract a major
league team in a particular sport.
37 0
366. Id. This finding was consistent with the Third Circuit's findings in Mid-South Griz-
zlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), discussed supra at notes 341-349
and accompanying text.
367. Totems, 783 F.2d at 1350.
368. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 358, §§ 6.1, 6.3, at 243, 247.
369. See id. at 246.
370. See, e.g., American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60 (D.
Md. 1962), affd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963). In this case, an upstart football league
alleged that the NFL's expansion practices were an illegal attempt to retain its monopoly
power in the major league professional football market. Id. at 62. Soon after the forma-
tion of the AFL, the NFL established expansion franchises to be placed in Dallas and Min-
neapolis, cities in which the AFL had tentative plans to locate two of its eight franchises.
Id. at 69-74. Because most cities do not have the population base and playing facilities
necessary to host competing professional football teams, the AFL contended that the
NFL's action was an effort to destroy a potential competitor in violation of section 2. Id. at
76-77.
The district court found that the NFL did not have the power to exclude the AFL from
major league professional football because the NFL did not have the capability to (1) ex-
pand into all the cities that could support football teams; (2) prevent the AFL from signing
an adequate number of quality players; or (3) prevent the AFL from obtaining a national
television contract. Id. at 77. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the NFL did
not have the power to prevent the formation of the AFL merely because it was the first
competitor in the professional football market and already occupied the most desirable
franchise locations. 323 F.2d at 131. Some commentators have suggested that the NFL's
expansion plan was "unfair" because of its timing and its focus on two cities in which the
AFL intended to place teams. See, e.g., WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 167, § 5.11, at 720-
21. However, an aggressive expansion of output, consistent with growing consumer de-
mand for a monopolist's product, appears to be more appropriately characterized as legiti-
mate competition on the merits. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 358, § 7.3, at 261-62.
In two instances, courts have found that a professional sports league violated section 2
by engaging in exclusionary practices designed to inhibit competition from a rival league.
In Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462
(E.D. Pa. 1972), a federal court granted a preliminary injunction against the NHL's reserve
clause, which prevented players signing a standard NHL player contract from ever playing
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There has been one federal antitrust action brought by a city
threatened with the loss of a professional sports team. In Buffalo v.
Atlanta Hawks Basketball, Inc., 71 the City of Buffalo, which owned the
arena leased by the NBA Buffalo Braves, asserted a section 2 claim
against the NBA and its member teams after the Braves announced its
intention to relocate to North Hollywood, Florida.37 2 The complaint
alleged that the NBA was monopolizing major league professional bas-
ketball by (1) restraining the market for player services through its
draft procedure, uniform player contracts, and player boycotts; (2)
impeding the development of a rival league by negotiating a merger
with the American Basketball Association (ABA); and (3) placing NBA
franchises in each major advertising market, even if some locations
were unprofitable.373 The case was settled before resolution of its
merits, after the Braves chose to remain in Buffalo.374
The Atlanta Hawks Basketball suit appeared to challenge indirectly
the proposed dissolution of the ABA and the entry of some of its
member teams into the NBA. The City of Buffalo's primary conten-
tion was that the elimination of competition between the NBA and
ABA harmed the city's ability to retain or attract a major league pro-
fessional basketball franchise." 5 It thus appears that the City of Buf-
falo was not claiming a legal right to host an NBA franchise, nor was it
claiming that the NBA's refusal to provide a replacement team, if the
for teams in a rival league. Id. at 519. The court found that this practice, combined with
the NHL's aggressive expansion into new cities during the World Hockey Association's
formation, was an illegal effort to maintain the NHL's monopoly "position as the only
major professional hockey league in the United States and Canada." Id. at 512.
In United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988),
the Second Circuit upheld ajury finding that the NFL had violated section 2 by attempting
to prevent the USFL from competing in the market for major league professional football.
Id. at 1380. The jury found the following conduct by the NFL to be improper exclusionary
conduct: (1) trying to co-opt certain USFL owners and franchise locations for the NFL; (2)
increasing NFL player rosters from 45 to 49 players; and (3) holding a supplemental draft
of USFL players. Id. at 1353. The court, however, affirmed the trial court's jury instruc-
tions, which were the basis of ajury finding that the NFL did not have the power to prevent
the USFL from obtaining a network television contract, as well as a jury verdict of $1 in
damages. Id. at 1356-57, 1377.
371. Civil No. 76-0261 (W.D.N.Y., filedJune 15, 1976) discussed in WEISTART & LOWELL,
supra note 167, at § 5.11, 716-19.
372. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 167, at § 5.11, 716.
373. See id. at 717,
374. See id. at 716. As a "consumer" of a professional sports franchise, rather than as an
actual or potential competitor of a league, it is unclear whether a host city would have
standing to challenge a dominant league's exclusionary practices that harm a rival league;
similarly unclear is the appropriate relief to remedy harm to a city from a section 2 viola-
tion. See id. at § 5.11, 747-50; see also supra notes 274-288 and accompanying text.
375. See WEtsTART & LOWELL, supra note 167, at § 5.11, 716-17.
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Braves relocated, violated the antitrust laws.376 Buffalo's complaint
clearly identifies the underlying cause of franchise free agency and
opportunistic behavior by team owners as being an undersupply of
major league professional teams in comparison to the demand by cit-
ies to host such teams, and it asserts that antitrust law is the solution to
this market imbalance.3 77 This central issue was not resolved when
the case was settled.
3. Preserving Competition vs. Requiring Fairness.-Apart from seek-
ing damages for its economic harm, a city that has lost a popular and
well-supported sports franchise as a result of its relocation generally
desires to obtain another league team as a replacement. In State v.
Milwaukee Braves, Inc.,378 the State of Wisconsin alleged that the Na-
tional League and its member baseball clubs violated state antitrust
law by allowing the Milwaukee Braves to move to Atlanta and by refus-
ing to provide a replacement team in Milwaukee.3 79 The trial court
issued an injunction barring the Braves from relocating unless the
league granted a franchise to a group that sought to operate a major
league baseball team in Milwaukee.38 0
The trial court made several material findings of fact, including
(1) the National League and the American League and their respec-
tive member teams collectively have monopoly power over major
league professional baseball, thereby giving them "unlimited power
and discretion to determine the location of" franchises;38 1 (2) expan-
sion by the National League was feasible; (3) the Braves franchise had
been profitable in Milwaukee; (4) Milwaukee had the economic and
population bases needed to support a major league baseball team;38 2
(5) the National League had no objective standards for evaluating the
propriety of franchise relocations or any procedure to enable cities
faced with the loss of a team an opportunity to be heard;3 8 3 and (6)
the move of the Braves to Atlanta would cause a substantial economic
loss to Milwaukee's metropolitan area.38 4
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,738 (Wis. Cir. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 144 N.W.2d 1
(Wis. 1966).
379. Id. at 82,363.
380. Id. at 82,411-12.
381. Id. at 82,410.
382. Id. at 82,410-11.
383. Id. at 82,410.
384. Id. at 82,409-10.
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The trial court heard testimony that MLB "is an operation in a
sense quasi public in nature,""8 5 and the court cited the league's "per-
sistent refusal to expand. '3 s 6 The court also heard testimony that,
from the perspective of a host community, the loss of a baseball
franchise "would be a detriment where there was a benefit before."3 8 7
The court held that the defendants unreasonably exercised monopo-
listic control over major league baseball and engaged in a concerted
refusal to deal with a consumer in violation of state antitrust law.3 88
In deciding not to restore competitive conditions in the baseball
industry, the court noted that the common law declared certain busi-
nesses, "because they were monopolies, to be 'effected with the public
interest' and therefore subject to judicially imposed rules of reason-
able behavior."38 9 As an alternative to facilitating competition by dis-
solving the league, the trial court permitted the league to continue its
monopoly status, but required the league "to respond in a responsible
and reasonable manner in matters pertaining to the transfer and allo-
cation of franchises. "390 The court awarded the plaintiff $5000 in
damages and ordered the National League to place a baseball
franchise in Milwaukee. 91
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's judgment.3 92 Assuming that the defendants' conduct violated
the Wisconsin antitrust laws, 93 the appellate court properly held that
the use of state law to require the National League to expand the
number of its franchises conflicts with the Supremacy 94 and Com-
merce Clauses 93 of the United States Constitution. 9 6 Because MLB
has a common law exemption from the federal antitrust laws,3 97 the
court ruled that application of state antitrust law to league decisions
regarding franchise location and league membership would conflict
385. Id. at 82,373.
386. Id. at 82,391 (citation omitted).
387. Id. at 82,376.
388. Id. at 82,411. The court's opinion states that the American League's failure to
grant Milwaukee an expansion franchise was part of this conspiracy, but neither the league
nor its member teams were named as defendants in the suit. Id.
389. Id. at 82,402.
390. Id. at 82,406.
391. Id. at 82,411-12.
392. State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
393. I& at 11.
394. The Supremacy Clause declares that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST., art VI, § 2.
395. See supra note 303.
396. Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 12-18.
397. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
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with national policy and violate the Supremacy Clause. 9 8 Observing
that government regulation of a professional sports league requires
uniformity, the court also concluded that applying Wisconsin law to
prevent the National League from allowing the Braves to relocate and
refusing an application for a Milwaukee franchise would violate the
Commerce Clause.399
The Milwaukee Braves trial court improperly used state antitrust
law to accomplish a laudable, but nonantitrust law objective, namely,
imposing a fairness requirement on a professional sports league in
making franchise relocation and expansion decisions as a means of
protecting a host city's interests.40 0 Assuming the appropriateness of
characterizing a league as a single entity regarding matters of internal
governance,40 ' the move of the Braves to Atlanta and the National
League's refusal to grant Milwaukee an expansion franchise were not
the products of anticompetitive conduct.40 2 There was no allegation
or finding that the defendants impeded the formation of a rival
league or prevented the American League from placing a team in Mil-
398. Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 12-18. This holding is consistent with the Supreme
Court's subsequent ruling that state antitrust law cannot be used to regulate the business of
baseball. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1972).
399. Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 15-18. Courts have been reluctant to permit state
law to govern the internal affairs of national sports leagues or associations because of the
need for uniform regulation and the desire to avoid burdening interstate commerce if
conflicting state legislation is enacted. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller,
10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that application of a Nevada statute to the NCAA is a
violation of the Commerce Clause); Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 194 Cal.
Rptr. 367, 372 (1983) (en banc) (holding that application of state antitrust law to football
league would burden interstate commerce and undercut the need for uniform national
regulation). But see HMC Management Corp. v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So. 2d
700,705-07 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a professional basketball team's breach of a
stadium lease may be an actionable violation under Louisiana antitrust law).
400. Other local legislative attempts at attracting or retaining professional teams may
include creating municipal sports authorities, granting teams the power to condemn and
develop land or facilities, levying taxes, issuing municipal bonds, and operating and man-
aging facilities and parking areas, as well as ancillary matters such as lodging and restau-
rants. Stratos & Horrow, supra note 119, at 20-1 to -26 (discussing the usual actions taken
by a city to attract and retain a professional sports franchise). As more fully discussed supra
at note 119, the City of Green Bay, unique among major league sports franchises, has
created a municipal corporation for the actual ownership and operation of the Green Bay
Packers football team.
401. See supra notes 328-334 and accompanying text. Even if the National League's fail-
ure to provide Milwaukee with a replacement franchise was viewed as a concerted refusal
to deal with a consumer, ajudicial order requiring the league to admit a new team would
be improper, as the league has no affirmative legal duty to do so. See Mid-South Grizzlies v.
National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 785 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that legislation per-
mitting the merger of two competing leagues did not obligate the league to permit entry
by any particular applicant to its shared market power).
402. See Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 1.
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waukee.4 °s Rather, the State of Wisconsin merely contended that the
National League chose to no longer have a team in Milwaukee.40 4
The primary focus of antitrust law is to enhance consumer wel-
fare by prohibiting anticompetitive conduct.40 5 It is important to con-
sider the welfare of all consumers who are affected by the relocation
of a sports franchise. 4 6 Although the fans of a city losing a sports
franchise are harmed, the fans of a city gaining a franchise are
benefitted. 1 7 Accordingly, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
for a court to measure accurately the net consumer welfare effects of a
sports franchise relocation.40 8 Milwaukee Braves illustrates an unwar-
ranted intrusion, in the form of an antitrust claim, by local politics
and emotion into a dispute involving conflicting claims to the same
team by different communities.
Antitrust law is concerned with prohibiting anticompetitive acts
that impair the operation of a free market.4 9 It is not designed to
enable activist judicial regulation of private business and the second-
guessing of business judgment, particularly parochial second-guessing
in a charged atmosphere of disappointed fans and cities. Neither is
antitrust law grounded in appeals to "fairness," which are not at the
core of antitrust policy. The limited focus of antitrust law in ajudicial
proceeding does not consider harm caused by "unfairness," unless it
flows from anticompetitive conduct. 410 Whether it is fair for a sports
franchise to move out of a city or how a city should be compensated
for noneconomic harm caused by a team's relocation are important
issues, but they should not be resolved by courts in antitrust suits.
The Milwaukee Braves trial court's finding that MLB is "quasi pub-
lic in nature"4 ' demonstrated an erroneous mix of common law doc-
trine-subjecting a public utility to judicial control-with antitrust
403. See State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,738 (Wis. Cir. Ct.),
rev'd on other grounds, 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
404. Id. at 82,363.
405. See supra note 300.
406. See Gray, supra note 93, at 140; Lazaroff, supra note 314, at 214-15.
407. See Lazaroff, supra note 314, at 214-15.
408. See id.
409. See supra note 300.
410. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985)
(stating that under section 2, it is "relevant to consider [challenged conduct's] impact on
consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way");
National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978) (stating that
under section 1, "inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive condi-
tions"); see a/so 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 297, 1 109, at 21-22 (observing that mere
general concern for fairness is not a legitimate part of antitrust analysis).
411. State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,738, at 82,373 (Wis.
Cir. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 144 N.W.2d I (Wis. 1966).
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principles. The court attempted to engage in affirmative regulation
of a private monopolist's conduct, regulation that is normally under-
taken, pursuant to legislative authority, by a specialized administrative
body.412 Private businesses subject to this form of regulation are typi-
cally monopolists whose activities are vital to basic public welfare.4"'
Although the presence of a major league team may provide significant
economic and psychological benefits to its host community, a profes-
sional sports franchise is not vital to the public welfare as is the provi-
sion of energy, transportation, telephone service, food, shelter, or
sanitation.414 Neither Congress nor state legislatures have established
a regulatory framework governing professional sports leagues. 415 It is,
therefore, inappropriate for a court to affirmatively regulate a private
business enterprise such as a professional sports league, which does
not provide a public utility service.416 Those constraints are most ap-
propriately the province of private ordering between the city and the
team.
4. Remedies for Anti-Competitive League Conduct.-The Milwaukee
Braves trial court's affirmative remedy of forced league expansion was
improper because expansion did not establish or restore a competi-
tive market for major league professional baseball franchises harmed
by an antitrust violation. At best, this relief is a step toward equalizing
the available supply of major league franchises in a given sports league
with the collective demand of cities for teams.
Artificially interfering with the output decisions of private busi-
ness by judicial fiat is not appropriate under antitrust principles.41 7
412. In 1876, the Supreme Court upheld the general authority of state legislatures to
regulate private businesses having an impact on the local public interest. See Munn v. Illi-
nois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 (1876). Congress has the power to regulate businesses that affect the
national public interest. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922).
413. See WEIs-rART & LOWELL, supra note 167, § 5.11, at 741-42.
414. See id, at 742-43.
415. See id. at 743.
416. See id. at 743-44.
417. As a practical matter, it would be difficult for a court to formulate a workable stan-
dard to govern a league's expansion decisions. It is not feasible to require a league to
provide a team for each city that wants one, irrespective of the franchise's profitability or
the effect of expansion on the quality of league competition. See WEISTART & LOWELL,
supra note 167, § 5.11, at 736-37. Requiring a league to grant or continue a franchise in a
city if the team would be reasonably profitable would create an issue that may be incapable
of objective verification. See id. at 738-39. A court may find it necessary to determine the
.reasonable" terms and conditions of the contractual arrangement between a host city and
a league franchise and to supervise the parties' agreement on a long term basis. See id. at
739-40. Given the limited availability of league franchises, a court could be faced with
evaluating the merits of competing proposals by cities to host the same team. See id. at 739.
Courts are not well suited to resolve these issues that are "essentially business judgments"
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This interference runs contrary to antitrust law's objective of preserv-
ing a free market that determines supply and demand for products.
418
Requiring a league to expand may have the anticompetitive effect of
inhibiting the formation of a rival league by foreclosing potential
franchise locations.419
The normal equitable remedy to correct conduct that restrains
trade is an injunction prohibiting the continuation of the activity.42 °
Courts generally grant affirmative injunctive relief requiring an anti-
trust violator to do business with another party only if necessary to
correct harm to the competitive market system caused by the
violation.42'
A single-league monopoly at the major league level for baseball,
basketball, football, and hockey has been the historical norm. 4 22
Although new rival leagues periodically have been established, they
have not provided viable competition to a dominant league or re-
mained in existence for any sustained period.423 This exacerbates the
problem of franchise free agency and opportunistic behavior.
Because of this phenomenon, Professor Ross advocates breaking
up a monopoly professional sports league, such as the NFL or MLB,
into three or four independent competing leagues.424 Thereafter,
marketplace competition from rival leagues will provide a disincentive
best made by the involved parties. See id. at 740; see also Ross, supra note 168, at 702-11
(arguing that a marketplace approach to sports franchise allocation decisions is preferable
to judicial regulation).
418. See 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 297, 103, at 7-8.
419. See Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. National Hockey League, 783 F.2d 1347, 1350
(9th Cir. 1986); Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 786 (3d Cir.
1983). Commentators also agree thatjudicially mandated expansion of a dominant league
would deter the future entry of a new league. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 168, at 706-07;
Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81
HARv. L. REV. 418, 427-28 (1967) [hereinafter The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act]; WEIS-
TART & LOWELL, supra note 167, § 5.11, at 751.
420. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994) (providing the opportunity to sue for injunctive relief to
avoid threatened loss or damage caused by a violation of federal antitrust laws); E. THOMAS
SuLLIvAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY & PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERI-
ALS, PROBLEMS 170 (3d ed. 1994) ("Conduct-oriented injunctions are most generally in the
form of 'cease and desist' orders.").
421. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600-05
(1985) (upholding jury's treble damages award for defendant monopolist's decision to
withdraw from a successful joint venture in the absence of a valid business justification); cf.
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153-55 (1951) (holding that an injunc-
tion ordering newspaper publisher to accept advertising from advertisers who also placed
advertisements with the newspaper's competitors was the appropriate remedy for the anti-
trust violation).
422. See Quirk, supra note 167, at 64; see also supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 167-195 and accompanying text.
424. See Ross, supra note 168, at 734.
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for each individual league to develop policies or to act in a manner
inconsistent with consumers' best interests.425 Under this market-
place competition model, competing leagues are likely to place teams
in virtually all cities with the population and economic base to support
them.426 An equilibrium in the supply of, and demand for, major
league professional sports franchises could effectively eliminate the
current disparity of bargaining power between team owners and cities
seeking to host a franchise.42 7 This, in turn, could eliminate franchise
free agency and the incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior.4 28
Professor Ross correctly asserts that congressional action is the
best means of preserving the desirable aspects of a particular sport,
implementing divestiture, and avoiding the need to reconsider or re-
verse applicable judicial precedents.4 29 He acknowledges, however,
that sports franchise owners may have the political power to defeat
this type of legislation.430 Congress has not seriously considered
Ross's proposal thus far. As an alternative, Professor Ross suggests
thatjudicially ordered divestiture would be an appropriate remedy for
correcting unlawful monopolization by a professional sports league;
he again admits, however, that a court is unlikely to order that kind of
relief.431
Although implementing the Ross proposal could stimulate com-
petition among rival leagues to place franchises in all cities capable of
supporting them, the idea appears unlikely to become reality. A sin-
gle major professional league may be a "better quality entertainment
product" that optimally satisfies consumer demand.43 2 Breaking up
any major league professional sport found to have illegally acquired
or maintained monopoly power is a drastic, broad-gauge remedy that
may have the net effect of harming, rather than benefiting, consumers
425. See id. at 734-39.
426. See id.
427. See id.
428. See id. A marketplace of economically viable competing leagues would enhance
each league's legal ability to more effectively restrict teams from relocating. See id. A
franchise owner that challenges league denial of approval to relocate on antitrust grounds
would have difficulty proving antitrust injury, a necessary prerequisite to a successful claim.
See id.
429. See id. at 748-52.
430. See id. at 748.
431. See id. at 752-54.
432. Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited:
Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAmi L. REv. 729, 772 (1987). Historically, rival
major leagues in the same professional sport have not co-existed for any significant period
of time. See supra notes 167-195 and accompanying text. The weaker league has either not
been financially viable or has merged, in whole or part, with the dominant league. See
Ross, supra note 168, at 717-23.
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by diluting product quality.43 3 It would be more appropriate to use a
rifle, not a shotgun. Effective remedies would include prohibiting
specific anticompetitive practices or enacting federal legislation to
correct market imbalances and externalities in a manner least intru-
sive to the existing structure of professional sports leagues.
V. PROPOSALS TO LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD
The principal goals of any proposal to remedy the harm to tax-
payers and fans caused by franchise free agency and opportunistic be-
havior by team owners should include (1) preserving marketplace
competition as the optimal method of allocating a limited number of
professional sports franchises; (2) strengthening league authority to
protect its members' collective interests and host cities' investments in
their local teams; and (3) requiring fairness to prevent exploitation of
taxpayers and fans. These proposals appropriately balance the inter-
ests of all concerned parties and provide a solution that furthers na-
tional policy objectives.
Congressional legislation is necessary to correct the problem of
externalities434 imposed on a host city's taxpayers and fans when a
professional sports league exercises its monopoly power to limit the
supply of franchises in a destructive combination with a franchise
owner that engages in opportunistic behavior.435 During its tenure in
a host city, a privately owned sports franchise often reaps the benefits
of public subsidization, while not having to bear the costs imposed on
the community after the team relocates.436 A team owner generally
chooses to move to another city to enhance profitability. A city may
be faced with continuing to pay off playing facility or infrastructure
bond indebtedness, while bearing the cost of other externalities, such
as a reduced tax base and disruption of ancillary business activity and
employment after a professional sports franchise departs for greener
pastures.4 37
The unfortunate reality is that the marketplace, if left entirely
alone, will not equalize the supply of, and demand for, professional
sports franchises in order to eliminate the significant disparity of bar-
433. See Rosenbaum, supra note 432, at 772-73.
434. An "externality" is "an uncompensated pecuniary or social cost imposed on society
by a business." Charles Gray, Comment, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CAL. L. REV.
1329, 1350 (1986) (citation omitted).
435. See id. at 1350-52.
436. See id. at 1350-51.
437. See id.
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gaining power between a city and team owner,43 8 nor will the current
marketplace effectively require a sports franchise to bear the public
costs that its relocation creates.43 9
Current legal regimes fail to deal effectively with the problem.
Private law may be inadequate to safeguard a city's interests because
city officials may not have the political strength, will power, or fore-
sight to insist on appropriate contract terms to ensure that the city
receives the full benefit of its bargain from providing multi-million
dollar public subsidization to host a sports team.4 0 An incumbent
government official may agree to provide millions in public subsidiza-
tion to reap an immediate gratification-the political benefits of re-
taining or attracting a team-but will escape downstream
accountability for allowing a sports franchise to drain the local treas-
ury.4 1 Even if appropriate contractual provisions are considered and
requested, a city may lack the bargaining power necessary to obtain a
franchise owner's agreement.442
In the private law context of commercial transactions, courts gen-
erally hold parties to the express terms of their agreement and are
reluctant to impose implied obligations, even if necessary to remedy
an imbalance of bargaining power.44 Although, if proved with rea-
sonable certainty, damages may be recovered for breach of a playing
facility lease, it is uncertain whether judicially compelled specific per-
formance is an available remedy to prevent a team from prematurely
departing and depriving its host city of the agreed upon term of the
team's stay.444
The current public law regime also does not provide an appropri-
ate measure of protection for a host city's taxpayers and fans. Apply-
ing antitrust law to interfere with a league's business judgment
concerning franchise location and expansion decisions does not fur-
ther the antitrust policy objectives of preserving the competitive pro-
cess as a means of allocating scarce resources, while maximizing
consumer welfare.445
Rather than alleviating the negative effects of externalities on cit-
ies created by a major professional league's monopoly power, current
federal law contributes to the problem. Congress approved the 1966
438. See supra Part H1I.
439. See Gray, supra note 434, at 1350-52.
440. See Ross, supra note 168, at 649-53.
441. See supra notes 212-218 and accompanying text.
442. See Ross, supra note 168, at 650-51.
443. See supra Part I.C.
444. See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
445. See supra notes 296-307 and accompanying text.
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merger between the AFL and NFL,446 thereby reducing competition
among those leagues to establish football teams in all cities with the
population and economic bases to support a franchise. The same fed-
eral statute authorizes the NBA, NFL, NHL, and MLB to pool their
television rights and divide television revenues." 7 This legislation
makes it easier for teams to move from large market cities to medium
and small market cities because a relocating franchise shares, on a pro
rata basis, any reduction in national television revenues from these
moves." The Raiders litigation impedes a league's ability to restrict a
member team from abandoning a host city despite a demonstrated
history of community support for the team. 4 9
The federal tax laws provide special benefits to owners of profes-
sional sports franchises.45 ° Professional sports is the only industry in
which player salaries may be claimed as depreciable capital assets.45
Player contracts are considered to be capital assets that can be depre-
ciated over the average length of the player's career.4 52 In general, up
to fifty-percent of the purchase price of a sports franchise may be allo-
cated to player contracts.453 This facilitates characterizing apprecia-
tion in franchise value as a capital gain and enables the team owner to
take advantage of favorable tax treatment. Because many sports
franchises are part of conglomerates of unrelated businesses, creative
accounting can be used to selectively include different parts of the
team's operation in various enterprises to minimize overall tax liabil-
ity.4 54 In addition, tax-exempt municipal bonds are frequently used to
finance playing facilities for professional teams, thereby providing an-
other form of taxpayer subsidization that benefits sports franchise
owners.
455
There are several potential bases for federal legislation to protect
host cities and their taxpayers and fans from exploitation by owners of
professional teams. Pursuant to its authority to regulate interstate
commerce, Congress may govern the conduct of the members of na-
446. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
447. See id.
448. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 289-307 and accompanying text.
450. See Martens, supra note 171, at 349-54; Stafford Matthews, Taxation of Sports
Franchises, in 2 LAw OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 22-1 (G. Uberstine ed., 1995);
Benjamin A. Okner, Taxation and Sports Enterprises, in GovERNMENT AND THiE SPORTS Busi-
NESS 159, 165-67 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974).
451. See Okner, supra note 450, at 165.
452. See Matthews, supra note 450, at § 22.02(2]; Okner, supra note 450, at 165-66.
453. See 26 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1995); Matthews, supra note 450, at § 22.02[2].
454. See EUCHNER, supra note 24, at 47-49.
455. See Ross, supra note 168, at 649-51.
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tional professional sports leagues.456 Congress may also modify the
antitrust laws, the tax laws, or both to strengthen league authority to
restrict franchise relocations, to provide a disincentive for profitable
teams to move, and to enable cities to protect themselves from harm
caused by franchise free agency and opportunistic behavior.457
Consistent with the belief that a solution to this problem be based
on free market and private law principles to the greatest extent possi-
ble,45 Congress should enact legislation effective enough to correct
existing problems, yet least intrusive upon a sports league's autonomy
to govern itself and a franchise owner's property rights. Before dis-
cussing these recommendations, it is important to identify some legis-
lative proposals that appear to be unwarranted.
A. Others' Regressive Proposals
Some have suggested that a sports franchise should be prohibited
from relocating unless certain legislatively enumerated criteria are sat-
isfied. InJanuary 1985, responding to the proposed move of the Raid-
ers to Los Angeles,459 California Congressman Ronald V. Dellums
reintroduced the Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of
1983,"6° which would have permitted any professional baseball, foot-
ball, basketball, hockey, or soccer franchise to move outside of the city
or county of the team's current operation only if (1) the stadium
owner materially breached the team's lease; (2) the stadium is inade-
quate to enable profitable operation of the team, and the stadium
owner refused to make necessary improvements; or (3) the team has
incurred net losses for three consecutive years."'
This proposal unduly interferes with a franchise owner's property
rights as well as a league's ability to place teams in the most desirable
locations. It also limits the ability of cities without sports franchises to
engage in competitive bidding to attract a team and disregards the
potential competing desires of different cities and fans for the same
franchise. The bill does not establish an unambiguous and complete
456. See Gray, supra note 434, at 1343-44.
457. See supra notes 248-271 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 417-421 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 289-295 and accompanying text.
460. H.R. 3944, 98th Cong. (1983) (reintroduced as H.R 785, 99th Cong. (1985)).
461. Id.; see York, supra note 32, at 360-61. In response to the proposed move of the
Philadelphia Eagles to Phoenix in 1985, Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter introduced
the Professional Football Stabilization Act of 1985, S. 172, 99th Cong. (1985), which would
have prohibited moves by professional football teams previously located in a city for at least
six years, unless certain conditions similar to those in Congressman Dellums's bill were
met. IM § 4; see York, supra note 32, at 358-59.
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standard to guide courts in litigation brought by a city seeking to pre-
vent a team from relocating.462
Even if a sports franchise is able to satisfy one of the criterion
necessary to relocate, Congressman Dellums's bill would have allowed
the team's host city to purchase the franchise at its fair market
value.46 This is a form of congressionally authorized eminent do-
main that, while protecting a host city's local interests, does not con-
sider fully the welfare of all cities and fans from a national perspective.
The proposal obviously deprives fans in cities without a team from
competing to attract a franchise.
A team owner normally wants to relocate to enhance the profit-
ability of its franchise.1 4 If it can be forced to sell its team at its cur-
rent fair market value so that the team remains in its present location,
the owner is being prevented from maximizing the future value of its
investment in the team by moving to another city. This would be con-
trary to our strong national policy of relying on free market competi-
tion to ensure that scarce resources are allocated to their most
productive and efficient use, thereby providing the greatest net bene-
fits to all consumers.4 "5 Congressman Dellums's proposal would ad-
versely affect a league's ability to place teams in the optimal
geographical locations that would further the best interests of the
league and enhance the value of the league's entertainment product
to consumers.
466
Similarly, the Sports Community Protection and Stability Act,
4 7
proposed in 1985 by Arizona Senator Dennis DeConcini, would have
inhibited a professional league's ability to select its franchise locations
and disregarded the interests of a community seeking to attract a
sports team." 8 This bill would have granted antitrust immunity to de-
cisions by professional basketball, football, hockey, and soccer leagues
refusing to allow a member franchise to relocate to another city, yet it
did not establish any specific criteria to be considered. 4 9 League ap-
provals of franchise relocations would not have been immunized from
antitrust challenges.470 This proposal, if enacted, would have had the
potential to lock a franchise into its current location, "regardless of
462. See York, supra note 32, at 360-61.
463. See id. at 360.
464. See id. at 356.
465. See Ross, supra note 168, at 702-06.
466. See id. at 706-11.
467. S. 298, 99th Cong. (1985).
468. See York, supra note 32, at 361-62.
469. See id.
470. See id.
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inadequate facilities, financial losses, and fan disloyalty."471 The bill
did not affect MLB's antitrust exemption 472 and would have allowed
league-approved baseball franchise movements to remain outside the
scope of the antitrust laws, thereby perpetuating unjustified disparate
antitrust treatment of major league professional sports.473
Some previously proposed federal legislation attempted to equal-
ize the overall supply and demand for major league sports franchises
by mandating league expansion. In 1984, Washington Senator Slade
Gorton introduced the Professional Sports Team Community Protec-
tion Act, 474 which would have required MLB and the NFL to expand
the number of baseball and football franchises.475 It is unwise for
Congress to interfere directly with the output decisions of private busi-
nesses, particularly those that do not produce products essential to
the public health, welfare, or safety.476 Legislatively mandated expan-
sion of professional sports leagues would be an unwarranted interfer-
ence with the working of a free market system.4 7 7  The federal
government obviously is not well suited to determine the most appro-
priate number or location of league teams.4 7 8 Moreover, Senator Gor-
ton's legislation provided no means for determining which
communities receive expansion franchises.
Consistent with Senator Gorton's proposal, one commentator re-
cently suggested Congress should reduce barriers to entry by requir-
ing MLB to grant a franchise to any city willing and able to pay a
471. Id. at 362.
472. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
473. See York, supra note 32, at 361.
474. S. 2505, 99th Cong. (1984) (reintroduced as S. 287, 99th Cong. (1985)).
475. See Slade Gorton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocation: Introductory Views from the
Hill, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 4-5 (1985).
476. See supra notes 411-416 and accompanying text.
477. During 1985 congressional hearings on regulation of the professional sports indus-
try, Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department
ofJustice, stated:
In a free market system, firms-not regulators or legislators-are generally con-
sidered the best judges of how and where their products are marketed.... The
assessment of demand and the amount of athletic and managerial talent available
to satisfy this demand are best left to the judgment of the NFL and Major League
Baseball.
Gray, supra note 93, at 158. Legal scholars agree that Congress should not force profes-
sional leagues to expand. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 31, at 443; Wong, supra note 37, at
74-75. For these same reasons, establishment of a federal regulatory agency for "sports
leagues," as proposed in Roger G. Noll, Alternatives in Sports Policy, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESs 423-26 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974), is an unwarranted government interfer-
ence with league policies and decisions.
478. See Wunderli, supra note 41, at 117-18.
1997]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
predetermined price for league entry.4 79 John Wunderli proposes
that entry requirements "should approximate the population and sta-
dium capacity of the community with the smallest media market cur-
rently in the league" and that a city meeting these criteria can obtain a
franchise by agreeing to subsidize a team, if necessary, in an amount
equal to the target city's average annual gate receipts over a given
time period.480 In his view, a city would be able to determine whether
the cost of hosting a franchise is worthwhile, thereby promoting allo-
cative efficiency. 4
81
This proposal, which attempts to eliminate all competition
among cities to host professional sports franchises,48 would radically
skew the free market process. It offers no workable means of fairly
and accurately determining when a city deserves to acquire or lose a
franchise, because league expansion decisions necessarily involve con-
sideration of a variety of factors, not merely gate receipts. It would
eliminate the ability of a league to have any control over the number
or location of its member teams. Despite Wunderli's contention to
the contrary,483 forced expansion on these terms has a very real and
significant potential for severely reducing the quality of a league's en-
tertainment product to the detriment of consumers.4 84
Recently proposed congressional legislation would require the
NFL, NHL, and NBA to provide a replacement team within three
years to a city that loses a league franchise from relocation if certain
conditions are met.48 In the wake of the announced intention of the
Cleveland Browns to relocate to Baltimore, Ohio Representative Mar-
tin R. Hoke, and several cosponsors, introduced the Fan Freedom and
Community Protection Act of 1995.486 This bill would require a pro-
fessional sports league to grant an expansion franchise to an investor
that is financially able to purchase and support a team in a city that
479. See id. at 118-19. Others have advocated federal government-mandated expansion
of professional sports leagues to satisfy cities' demands for teams. See, e.g., Noll, supra note
477, at 414-15.
480. Wunderli, supra note 41, at 119.
481. See id.
482. Wunderli notes:
Cities without franchises could get one if they wanted one, and cities with
franchises could not be extorted by threats of relocation, since a city could re-
place a lost franchise. It appears to be the only solution which does not distinctly
advantage the "haves" over the "have-nots," or vice versa.
Id. at 118.
483. See id. 119-20.
484. See supra notes 432-433 and accompanying text.
485. See H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. § 5(b)(2) (1995).
486. Id.
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formerly hosted a league franchise.48 7 Within three years after the
franchise's relocation, the identity of a proposed investor must be sub-
mitted to the league by a city that formerly hosted a league team.488
The investor must pay an expansion fee to the league in an amount
no greater than the expansion fee charged by the league the last time
it expanded.48 9
The bill provides for draconian punishments to ensure league
compliance with this provision. Any league that fails to grant an ex-
pansion franchise to an investor satisfying these conditions is liable to
the host city for damages equal to three times the greater of the
purchase price or market value of the team.49 In addition, the
league's antitrust exemption permitting joint pooling of television
rights is suspended for one year,491 and an antitrust exemption cre-
ated by the bill for league decisions concerning franchise movement is
lost.492 A qualified investor may seek injunctive relief in federal court
to require a league to sell an expansion franchise to the investor.49
Congressman Hoke's bill would require a league to expand each
time it permits a franchise to relocate if the former host city finds a
buyer with the financial strength and willingness to locate a league
team within its environs. It would force a league to expand its overall
operations every time it permits the relocation of a franchise to a
more profitable location. By establishing a city's vested right to a
team once it has hosted a franchise, this proposal makes it difficult for
a league to shift the locations of its franchises or leave a less profitable
city.494 This proposal interferes with league autonomy and govern-
ance and severely frustrates the marketplace by making it extremely
difficult for cities that have never hosted a league team to bid for an
expansion franchise.495
487. Id. § 5(a).
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. § 7(a)(1).
491. Id. § 7(a)(2).
492. Id. § 8(b).
493. Id. § 7(b).
494. Congressman Hoke's bill does not expressly require that a relocating team have
been profitable in its former host city. If it was not, however, it is unlikely that an investor
would have a strong financial incentive to place an expansion franchise in that city.
495. Essentially, unlike other private businesses, a professional sports league that
chooses to relocate some aspects of its business operations would be forced to pay a form
of ransom to a former host city as the cost of leaving. This grants a proprietary preference
to the first location, rather akin to the old English preservation policies under the doctrine
of ancient lights or first user and other similar legal principles. See generally Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-47 (1882) (holding that the first appropriator of water
from a stream for a beneficial purpose has a "priority of appropriation"); Fountainebleau
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On January 26, 1996, the Executive Committee of the United
States Conference of Mayors adopted a resolution titled, Professional
Sports Franchise Location and the Protection of Local Governments
and Taxpayers, which called for federal legislation imposing restric-
tions on the movement of professional sports franchises.496 It would
require a professional sports league "to provide a city or community
from which a profitable team has relocated the first option on any
expansion the league would pursue exclusive of any expansion
fees."
49 7
This proposal would allow a former host city to regain a team,
without paying an expansion fee, as soon as a league expands.498
Facially, this appears to be an unconstitutional attempted taking of
the economic value of a league-created expansion opportunity.
499
Like Congressman Hoke's bill, the Conference's proposal also se-
verely hampers cities that have never hosted a league team from ob-
taining an expansion franchise. Accordingly, enactment of this
proposal would provide cities desiring a team with an added incentive
to acquire an existing league team by luring it away from another city.
This proposal appears to unduly favor cities that have historically
hosted major league professional sports franchises and to improperly
interfere with a league's property rights and ability to govern its inter-
nal affairs.
Regulations requiring the forfeiture of team logos and trade-
marks have been proposed.500 Such proposals act as additional disin-
centives to franchise free agency by requiring a profitable franchise
that moves from a community, in which it has been located for a des-
ignated number of years, to forfeit the trademark ownership rights in
the team's name, logos, and colors to the former host city. If, as part
of the price of relocation, a profitable franchise is required to leave its
identity in the city in which it was developed, opportunistic behavior
Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(explaining that the English doctrine of ancient lights has been unanimously repudiated
in the United States). Such doctrines create a system whereby the first party to acquire an
interest trumps the rights of all other parties, wherever located, regarding future allocation
of resources. See generally id.
496. UNITED STATES CONF. OF MAYORS POLICY RESOLUTION, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
FRANCHISE LOCATION AND THE PROTECTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND TAXPAYERS,Jan. 26,
1996 [hereinafter MAYORS].
497. Id. at 9F.
498. See id.
499. The Raiders H court recognized that an expansion opportunity is a property right
for which a professional sports league is entitled to charge a fee. See supra notes 321-327
and accompanying text.
500. See, e.g., S. 1598, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. (1996).
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by a team owner may be discouraged, and a city may retain an impor-
tant part of its sports heritage."0 1 A provision of the Fan Freedom and
Community Protection Act of 1995,0' as originally introduced by
Ohio Representative Martin R. Hoke, would require a league to re-
serve a departing franchise's trademarks for use by another league
team that subsequently locates in the former host city,5 0 3 thereby rais-
ing an intriguing Takings Clause issue."0 4
The Takings Clause50 5 issue is a very close one under current
Supreme Court doctrine. A statute or regulation such as that pro-
posed by Congressman Hoke would instantly run afoul of the Fifth
Amendment requirement that compensation be paid when an owner
is deprived of all economic benefits of real property rights;5" 6 this re-
sult does not apply with equal force to personal property rights.50 7
Accordingly, government regulations requiring that the departing
team's personal property rights in its name, logo, and colors be for-
feited to the former host city might escape the Takings Clause re-
quirement for paying just compensation. Notwithstanding this
technical distinction between real and personal property, the policy of
forfeiture of business interests without payment of just compensation
501. See Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd. Partner-
ship, 34 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding "Colts" name continues to signify NFL team
to Baltimore residents 10 years after team moved to Indianapolis); Major League Baseball
Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F. Supp. 1103, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(finding that the "Brooklyn Dodgers" was a nontransportable cultural institution separate
from the "Los Angeles Dodgers"). Settlement of the litigation concerning the relocation
of the Cleveland Browns to Baltimore required the "Browns" name, colors, and logos to
remain in Cleveland, to be used by another NFL franchise to be placed by 1999. See Larry
Weisman, NFL Approves Broons Move, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 1996, at C1, available in 1996 WL
2045811;John Williams, Cleveland to Get "Brownis"by '99, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 9, 1996, at B1,
available in 1996 WL 5580959.
502. H.R. 2740.
503. Id. § 3.
504. A representative of the International Trademark Association recently testified
before a House Judiciary Committee that this proposed statute would unconstitutionally
deprive the owner of a relocating team of property rights protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment. See Group Challenges Trademark Curbs in Sports Team Relocation Bill, 51 PAT., TRAD-
AMAK & CoPVRGITJ. (BNA) 471 (Feb. 8, 1996). In its April 26, 1996, modification of this
bill, the House Judiciary Committee deleted this provision. See H.R. REP. No. 104-656, pt.
1, at 11 (1996).
505. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not "be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
506. Id.
507. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (finding
only two situations that do not require case-specific inquiry. (1) regulations that are tanta-
mount to a physical invasion of property and (2) regulations denying all "economically
beneficial or productive use of land"); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("[L]oss of
future profits-unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-provides a slender
reed upon which to rest a takings claim.").
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is precisely the type of mischief by the sovereign that fueled the Amer-
ican Revolution and the Bill of Rights in the eighteenth century.10 8
B. Level the Bargaining Table
"[F]reedom of contract begins where equality of bargaining
power begins."5" 9
1. Limited League Antitrust Immunity.-The objective of any con-
gressional legislation should be to "create a level playing field for all
participants,"510 and "government must involve itself only so far as to
make the position of the owners and the cities at the bargaining table
equal.""' The first step in accomplishing this objective is to
strengthen a league's authority to prevent franchise free agency and
opportunistic behavior by individual team owners. Congress should
modify the antitrust laws to immunize professional sports league rules
governing franchise relocations and actions taken thereunder from
antitrust challenge. A league's internal franchise location decisions
should not be subject to review under the antitrust laws.
Several House and Senate bills introduced in 1995 and 1996 pro-
pose that professional sports league decisions on franchise movement
be immunized from antitrust scrutiny. The Fans Rights Act of 1995,5"2
introduced in the Senate by Ohio Senators John Glenn and Michael
DeWine and Washington Senator Slade Gorton and in the House of
Representatives by Ohio Congressman Louis Stokes, would provide
this exemption.515 In addition, the Fan Freedom and Community
Protection Act of 1996;514 the Professional Sports Franchise Reloca-
tion Act of 1996,515 sponsored by Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter;
and the Professional Sports Antitrust Clarification Act of 1996,'16
sponsored by South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, also would
provide antitrust immunity.5" 7
Each bill appropriately would immunize all league decisions re-
garding franchise movement, not only decisions against a team's pro-
508. See Bruce W. Burton, Regulatory Takings and the Shape of Things to Come: Harbingers of
a Takings Clause Reconstellation, 72 OR. L. REv. 603, 606-10 (1993).
509. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., quoted in GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 229
(1967).
510. Wunderli, supra note 41, at 118.
511. Beisner, supra note 31, at 443.
512. S. 1439, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2699, 104th Cong. (1995).
513. S. 1439 § 4; H.R. 2699 § 4.
514. H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. (1995).
515. S. 1625, 104th Cong. (1996).
516. S. 1696, 104th Cong. (1996).
517. See supra notes 459-493 and accompanying text.
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posed relocation, from antitrust attack.518 These bills set forth
specific criteria that must be considered by a league in determining
whether a franchise should be permitted to relocate. 5 19 Each bill lists
a variety of factors that a league must consider, including the host
city's history of fan loyalty and support for its team; the extent of any
public subsidization received by the team and not generally available
to other businesses; the effect of franchise relocation on the team's
contracts with public and private parties; the degree to which the
franchise owner has engaged in good faith negotiations to keep the
team in its present location; the adequacy of the stadium in which the
team played its home games in the previous season and the willing-
ness of the stadium, arena authority, or local government to remedy
any deficiencies in the facility; whether the team has incurred net op-
erating losses, exclusive of depreciation and amortization, sufficient to
threaten the continued financial viability of the team; and whether a
bona fide investor has offered fair market value for the team and in-
tends to keep it in its current location.5 2 °
Each bill requires that appropriate notice of a team's intention to
relocate be given to certain parties and that the league hold a hearing
in which interested parties may participate before the league votes on
the proposed relocation.5 2 A league should be required to permit all
interested parties, including representatives of a team's host city and
prospective host city, to be heard concerning the propriety of a pro-
posed franchise movement before the league decides whether to allow
relocation.
All of the bills, except the Fan Freedom and Community Protec-
tion Act of 1996,522 provide for judicial review of league franchise
movement decisions. The Professional Sports Antitrust Clarification
Act of 1996 provides for de novojudicial review, 525 whereas the Profes-
sional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1996 provides that a league's
franchise relocation decision will be upheld unless it is arbitrary or
capricious.524 The proposed 1984 Professional Sports Team Commu-
nity Protection Act52 5 would have established a federal arbitration
board to determine whether a league-approved franchise relocation is
518. See H.R. 2740 § 6; S. 1625 § 4; S. 1696 § 2; S 1439 § 4; H.R. 2699 § 4.
519. See H.R. 2740 § 6; S. 1625 § 5(b); S. 1696 § 3; S. 1439 § 4; H.R. 2699 § 4.
520. See supra note 519.
521. See H.K 2740 § 4; S. 1625 § 5(a); S. 1696 § 3(a)(2); S. 1439 § 5; H.R. 2699 § 5.
522. See H.R. 2740.
523. S. 1696 § 4(a).
524. S. 1625 § 6(d)(2).
525. S. 2505, 98th Cong. (1984).
19971
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"necessary and appropriate,"52 6 and the Act would have empowered
federal courts to review the arbitration decision.52 7
In determining whether a franchise should be permitted to relo-
cate, it is appropriate to require that a league give due regard to the
interests of the team's host city and its taxpayers, as well as to local
fans. These parties' interests are not considered fully in antitrust liti-
gation concerning the relocation of professional sports franchises5 28
and are not otherwise effectively protected under existing public law.
Providing a host city with a cause of action for a league-approved relo-
cation contrary to the league's established criteria would create a
strong incentive for a league to consider fully the interests of that host
city. It would also establish a powerful remedy, which presumably
would include a court order requiring reconsideration of the league's
decision or prohibiting a franchise from relocating, if the league fails
to consider adequately a host city's historical record of fan support
and public subsidization for its local team. 29
Creating a procedure for judicial or administrative review of
league decisions regarding franchise location, however, would require
second-guessing the business judgment of a private entity. A neutral
court or administrative body would find it virtually impossible to re-
solve fairly the question of whether a league team should remain in its
host city or be permitted to move to another city.530
None of the relocation criterion in any of the proposed legisla-
tion necessitates analyzing the terms of an offer submitted by a city
that seeks to entice a franchise to move, nor does any proposal require
a comparative evaluation of competing cities' respective offers. This is
an economic blind spot. Requiring a franchise to remain in its cur-
rent location against the judgment of both the team owner and league
members is an improper exercise of governmental authority and
526. Id. § 7.
527. SeeGray, supra note 434, at 1362-63. Other 1985 federal legislation proposals would
have provided for judicial review of league franchise relocation decisions. See id. at 1364.
Some commentators favor administrative oversight of franchise movements, see, for exam-
ple, Lazaroff, supra note 314, at 217-20; whereas, others advocate judicial review as the
preferred means of oversight. See, e.g., York, supra note 32, at 364-71.
528. See supra notes 275-288 and accompanying text.
529. See supra notes 289-299 and accompanying text.
530. Several commentators have expressed opposition to government resolution of dis-
putes regarding franchise movements. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 31, at 443 ("This ap-
proach is inappropriate because market forces, not political ones, should control franchise
movement."); Gray, supra note 434, at 1365-67 ("Government intervention ... could aggra-
vate league instability, as well as produce delay, expense, and inhibit league competition.");
Wong, supra note 37, at 71-72 ("While each of the legislative proposals was laudable, each
had its faults.").
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would likely result in allocative inefficiency regarding the geographi-
cal distribution of sports franchises.5 3 1
Permitting a league to exercise its autonomy in determining the
location of its franchises, without the potential for antitrust challenge
or judicial oversight of its decisions, will not, alone, create the neces-
sary incentive to discourage franchise free agency and opportunistic
behavior. Merely "allowing the fox to guard the hen house" will not
ensure that the interests of a host city's taxpayers and fans are pro-
tected adequately. 32 Congress should enact the following proposals
to satisfy this objective.
2. Publicly Traded Ownership.-League antitrust immunity for
franchise relocation decisions should be conditioned upon a league's
allowing publicly traded ownership of a minority interest in each
franchise.533 In addition to providing a franchise with an infusion of
local capital, this would enable fans and investors to have an owner-
ship interest in a local team and some voice in its management.534 It
would also be more difficult for a profitable franchise to abandon its
host city and engage in opportunistic behavior. To prevent the short-
term profit motives of a franchise's shareholders from adversely affect-
ing the team's competitiveness and the league's collective long-term
interests, restrictions could be placed on the size of any individual's
stock holdings, and the total extent of public ownership could be lim-
ited to a minority percentage.5"5
The NBA, NHL, and MLB all have at least one publicly owned
franchise in their respective leagues.5 36  The Green Bay Packers
franchise has been publicly owned by citizens of its local community
531. See Gray, supra note 93, at 153-59; Wong, supra note 37, at 61-69.
532. See Wong, supra note 37, at 12-18.
533. A resolution by the Executive Committee of the United States Conference of May-
ors calls for allowing professional sports teams to be publicly owned. See MAYORS, supra
note 496. The First Circuit recentiy held that an NFL policy restricting franchise owners
from selling shares of stock to the public may violate the antitrust laws. See Sullivan v.
National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1106 (1st Cir. 1994). Commentators have opined
that an absolute, class-based prohibition against franchise ownership does not have a legiti-
mate business purpose. See, e.g., The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act, supra note 419, at 428
(explaining that other league owners may not "be very convincing in the role of disinter-
ested advocates"). The Fan Rights Act of 1995 would prohibit a league from preventing a
group of multiple owners or one or more local governments from owning a franchise. S.
1439 § 5(d)(1) (1995); H.R. 2699 § 5(d)(1) (1995).
534. See supra note 119.
535. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1102-03.
536. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON SPORTS
AND THE LAW 175 (1995 Supp.).
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for many years,537 and forty percent of the Boston Celtics franchise is
publicly owned.53 The Toronto Blue Jays, New York Knicks, and Bos-
ton Bruins are publicly owned in whole or in part.539 Permitting pub-
lic ownership of a minority interest in a professional team's stock has
not harmed the operation of the franchise or a sports league.
3. Collective League Decisions on Revenue Shaing.-Collective
league decisions requiring the sharing of each franchise's locally gen-
erated revenues and all nationally generated revenues among all
league teams should be immunized from antitrust challenge by a team
owner.54" The primary impetus behind franchise free agency in the
NFL is the availability of certain locally generated revenues, such as
the rental of luxury suites and the sale of personal seat licenses, which
are kept by a team owner and not shared with other owners.54 This
creates a strong economic incentive for a franchise owner to relocate,
or threaten to relocate, to obtain a new stadium, or improvements to
an existing stadium, thus enhancing revenues generated from these
local sources.542
537. See Mike Royko, Cheeseheads Fear No Franchise Loss, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 12, 1995, at
C6, available in 1995 WL 9414341.
538. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1095.
539. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 536, at 174.
540. Courts have recognized the appropriateness of league-required sharing of a
franchise's locally generated revenues because of the financial interdependence of all
league teams and the symbiotic nature of a league's commercial success. See, e.g., Chicago
Prof'l Sports, Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir.
1992). However, it would not be appropriate to require league members to share all sta-
dium-related revenues because some franchises own their playing facilities in whole or in
part and have made a capital investment that others have not. A league should be allowed
to determine collectively the percentage of locally generated revenues to be shared and to
create an economic incentive for a franchise to retain some of the fruits of its on-field
success and self-promotion. It is necessary to provide each team with a strong economic
incentive to field a winning team to maintain the integrity of a sports league. See Ross,
supra note 168, at 677-78 n.158. The NFL and the Dallas Cowboys franchise recently set-
tled their litigation regarding the legality of certain aspects of league revenue sharing. See
Thomas Heath, NFL, Cowboys Settle Suits, WASH. PosT, Dec. 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL
14680011.
541. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
542. The Professional Sports Antitrust Clarification Act of 1996 would provide league
immunity for franchise relocation decisions only if a league "promotes comparable eco-
nomic opportunities by sharing revenue among member franchises to account for dispari-
ties in revenue received or costs saved due to direct or indirect public benefits and
subsidies." S. 1696, 104th Cong. § 3(a) (3) (1996) In his introduction of this bill, Senator
Strom Thurmond stated that this provision "would level the playing field, so to speak, so
that teams need not move or threaten to move in order to obtain more public funds to
keep from falling behind others in the league." 142 CONG. REc. § 3954-02, S3956 (Apr. 23,
1996) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). He provided the following illustration:
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Revenue sharing allows small-market teams with an inherently
lower local revenue base to exist along with large-market teams, thus
enhancing a league's competitive balance.54 This improves the eco-
nomic viability of the league as a whole and of each member
franchise. 5" By reducing revenue disparities among league teams, a
franchise has a reduced economic incentive to relocate in search of
enhanced individual revenues.545 Thus, revenue sharing helps to pro-
tect a city's investment in a local franchise, particularly if a team's lo-
cally generated revenues are also required to be shared with other
league teams.
4. Model Lease Terms by Cities.-Congress should also provide an-
titrust immunity to enable cities to collectively establish model terms
for playing facility leases necessary to protect a host city's taxpayers
and fans.5" Under existing federal law, cities are subject to antitrust
liability for collectively agreeing on uniform lease terms."47 Cities
Last fall, Art Modell, owner of the Cleveland Browns, announced that he
planned to move his team from Cleveland to Baltimore. His move reportedly was
motivated by financial pressure on the franchise caused by rapidly increasing
player salaries, plus promises of large public benefits from Baltimore. If my reve-
nue-sharing provisions had been in place, however, Mr. Modell would have faced
different options. Under my legislation the league would have instituted proce-
dures to promote comparable economic opportunities to address disparities in
team revenue due to public benefits and subsidies. So in our example, if Mr.
Modell was obtaining fewer public benefits in Cleveland than average, he would
receive transfers to bring his team up to the league average. On the other hand,
if the annual public benefits received for moving to Baltimore pushed Mr. Modell
above the average, he would have to share some of the value of the public bene-
fits in order to keep his team at the league average. Faced with these choices and
a hometown that loved his team, it is hard to imagine that Mr. Modell would have
chosen to move-and endure tremendous criticism-if he would receive the
league average either way. Even if Mr. Modell still wishes to relocate, however,
the league might well have blocked the move, based on the factors established
and the antitrust certainty provided by this legislation.
Id.
543. See Martens, supra note 171, at 366-69; Quirk, supra note 167, at 45-46. But see
Wunderli, supra note 41, at 88-89 (arguing that revenue sharing may create an incentive for
a team owner to move from a large city to a smaller one).
544. See Martens, supra note 171, at 366-69.
545. See Gray, supra note 93, at 132-33, 151-53; Morris, supra note 39, at 95-96.
546. One commentator aptly noted: "The professional leagues are organized to protect
the interests of the owners; an individual city's ability to protect its interests during negotia-
tions is limited because no adequate method exists for cities to band together to insist on
conditions that will protect all taxpayers." Beisner, supra note 31, at 437.
547. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 57 (1982)
("' [W]hen the State itself has not directed or authorized an anticompetitive practice, the
State's subdivisions.., must obey the antitrust laws."' (quoting City of Lafeyette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 416 (1978))); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 396 (1978) (explaining that "a municipality is not a 'person'
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should be permitted to band together to protect their mutual interests
in order to counteract a league's monopoly power. If a league should
have antitrust immunity for franchise location decisions, cities should
have a corresponding antitrust exemption for their joint efforts to de-
velop model lease terms to protect cities' interests. 548
Even if cities are allowed jointly to establish uniform lease terms
without fear of antitrust liability, officials of some cities will deviate
from such terms if necessary to attract or retain a team. Cities cannot
be required to adhere to all jointly proposed model lease terms.
While allowing price competition among cities and the exercise of col-
lective league autonomy to determine the geographical location of
franchises, Congress should correct the imbalance of bargaining
power between host cities and sports franchises by enacting the follow-
ing proposals.549
5. Tax-Exempt Debt Service and Lease Length.-A May 29, 1996,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) 5 ° report analyzed tax-exempt
stadium bond financing and federal subsidization of professional
sports playing facilities. 55' This subsidy exists when a stadium is fi-
nanced by state or local bonds, or both, issued at below-market inter-
est rates, because interest on such bonds is exempt from federal
income tax.552 The report found that the federal government loses
millions of dollars in tax revenues without generating any net eco-
within the meaning of § 8 of the Sherman Act"). Although a city is not liable for treble
damages, it may be enjoined from engaging in an antitrust violation and be required to pay
a prevailing plaintiffs attorneys fees. See Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C
§§ 35-36 (1996).
548. It would be inappropriate to allow cities to engage in "price fixing" by agreeing on
the maximum amounts or forms of public subsidies to be offered to attract or retain a
professional sports franchise. Doing so would eliminate competition among cities for
sports franchises and result in an inefficient geographical allocation of franchises. At most,
cities should be permitted to agree on the necessary contractual terms to protect their
respective investments of public funds in local sports teams.
549. As previously discussed, the relationship between a sports franchise and its host city
is analogous to that of a franchisor-franchisee relationship in which unequal bargaining
power often exists. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. Congress previously has
enacted legislation to remedy disparate bargaining power in certain private commercial
relationships. See, e.g., Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225
(1994) (authorizing contract suits by automobile dealers against manufacturers in federal
courts, regardless of the amount in controversy); Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (1996) (preempting state law and defining preconditions and
grounds for termination or nonrenewal of a franchise relationship). It has an even greater
justification for protecting the financial interests of a state or local government body.
550. See Zimmerman, supra note 7.
551. Id.
552. See id. at 1.
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nomic benefits to the nation as a whole from sports stadium construc-
tion.553 Moreover, federal taxpayers' revenue loss usually exceeds the
value of stadium bond interest savings to state or local taxpayers, or
both, who, in reality, do not collectively receive any net economic ben-
efits from stadium construction in their community.55
The CRS report noted that current federal laws require stadium
bonds to be issued as governmental bonds,55 5 which are structured as
an open-ended matching grant and essentially make stadium subsidies
a form of federal entitlement program.556 In other words, all federal
taxpayers automatically subsidize the construction of new professional
sports stadiums if state and local officials and voters agree to build
them and bond financing and repayment are structured appropri-
ately.557 The report concludes that "[t]he economic case for federal
subsidy of professional sports stadiums is weak" and should be recon-
sidered.558 The report correctly recognizes that federal subsidization
of stadium construction is an unwarranted wealth transfer from fed-
eral taxpayers to team owners and players.
The report discusses two options to reduce the loss of federal tax
revenues from tax-exempt stadium bond financing. Congress could
eliminate any state or local government use of tax-exempt bond fi-
nancing for stadium construction. 55 9 Alternatively, Congress could
prohibit state and local governments from issuing tax-exempt govern-
mental bonds for stadium financing, but allow the issuance of tax-ex-
empt private activity bonds for such financing. 56° The latter type of
bonds is subject to a state volume cap, thereby requiring the prioritiza-
tion of a limited amount of available bond financing in light of antici-
pated taxpayer benefits.561 Private activity bond financing also would
reduce the total amount of federal subsidization of professional sports
stadium construction.562
On June 14, 1996, New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
introduced the Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act.5 63 The
Moynihan proposal was propelled by the CRS report's conclusion that
553. See id. at 7-12, 17-18.
554. See id. at 10.
555. Id. at 5.
556. Id. at 12.
557. See id..
558. Id. at 19.
559. See id. at 19-20.
560. See id. at 20-22.
561. See id. at 21.
562. See id. at 22.
563. S. 1880, 104th Cong. (1996).
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new stadiums have little impact upon economic development, and
thus the traditional logic for tax exemption is absent.564 If enacted,
this bill would amend Section 141 of the Internal Revenue Code5 65 by
designating any bonds to provide "professional sports facilities" as a
"private activity bond" if the proceeds of the issue exceed the lesser of
five percent of such proceeds or $5 million.566 This bill effectively
would eliminate federal subsidization of stadium construction in most
instances.
Consistent with the findings of the above CRS report, the bill at-
tempts to remedy the loss of federal tax revenues from activity that
does not provide an economic benefit to federal taxpayers.5 6 7 By in-
creasing the cost of new playing facility construction, this bill also may
reduce the willingness of state and local officials and taxpayers to offer
necessarily higher multi-million dollar public subsidies to entice sports
franchise owners to relocate. This proposal further demonstrates that
market forces and private contract, combined with limited modifica-
tion of public law, are the best means of governing the relationship
between a professional sports franchise and its host city.
Despite receiving the benefits of millions of dollars of public sub-
sidization, a team owner is often reluctant to enter into a long-term
lease commitment with a city.5 68 Congress should condition the avail-
ability of tax-exempt local bond issues to finance sports playing facili-
ties on a franchise owner's agreement that the minimum duration of
its lease with a publicly owned playing facility will be at least as long as
the length of public debt service incurred to build or improve the
facility for the benefit of the franchise.569 This is necessary to ensure
that taxpayers' substantial investment in a local sports franchise is ade-
564. See supra notes 553-554 and accompanying text.
565. I.R.C. § 141 (1996).
566. S. 1880 §§ 2(c)(1), (2).
567. Id.
568. SeeJohnson, supra note 123, at 526; Ross, supra note 168, at 652; see also William M.
Welch, Federal Taxpayers Shut out of Stadium Payoff, USA TODAY, May 31, 1996, at Al, avail-
able in 1996 WL 2057083 (describing the tax-exempt financing as "little more than a public
housing program"); McGraw, supra note 24 ("And for the most part, citizens are buying the
deals.").
569. At least one team owner agrees this proposal is fair. Ted Turner, owner of the
Atlanta Braves baseball team and Atlanta Hawks basketball team, has stated: "What I per-
sonally think is that when a city is going to build a stadium that requires millions of dollars
of long-term funding and they do it for a team, they ought to make that team, at the time
they do the funding and build the stadium, sign a lease that it would at least cover the
amortization of the stadium." Baade & Dye, supra note 29, at 267. Alternatively, one com-
mentator has proposed that "the length of the lease should be at least as long as the time
required for the asset to depreciate to a net value of zero, assuming the use of generally
accepted accounting principles and no salvage value." Beisner, supra note 31, at 447 n.89.
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quately protected and that a host city receives the full benefit of its
bargain as the consumer of a franchise. Congress should provide fed-
eral courts with the express authority to enjoin a franchise from relo-
cating, prior to the expiration of its lease with a publicly owned or
subsidized playing facility financed with tax-exempt bonds, absent
clear and convincing evidence that the franchise is not financially via-
ble and is unable to field a competitive league team in its current
location. 570
A team owner should be required to provide notice of an intent
to relocate at least one year before a franchise's existing lease obliga-
tions will expire. This will provide time to allow city officials to ana-
lyze whether continued association with, or requested public
subsidization of, the team is desirable and to make an appropriate
cost-benefit analysis. It will also enable community and business lead-
ers to determine the feasibility of private financing of all or part of the
cost to build or improve a playing facility.
The franchise owner should negotiate exclusively and in good
faith5 7 1 for a given time period (for example, six months) and, after
providing the necessary notice, with local officials to keep the team in
570. A city should have the option of allowing a franchise to relocate prematurely if it
agrees to pay the full amount of outstanding public indebtedness incurred to build or
improve a playing facility in order to keep or attract the franchise. See Beisner, supra note
31, at 446. However, it should not be limited to a damages remedy because of the unique
nature of a major league professional sports franchise and the need to allow a city to reap
the intangible benefits of its bargain flowing from the team's presence during the agreed
upon term of the lease. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text. The Fan Freedom
and Community Protection Act of 1995 would require a franchise owner who relocates his
team in breach of a playing facility lease to pay, within thirty days after playing its first game
in a new location, an amount equal to the value of all publicly provided financial assistance
previously received to the appropriate government entities. Violation of this requirement
would subject the franchise owner to a penalty equal to three times the value of such
publicly provided financial assistance. See supra notes 486-495 and accompanying text.
The Team Relocation Taxpayer Protection Act of 1996 would prohibit an NFL franchise
that relocates before its current lease expires from benefiting from the use of any federal
funds or tax deductions in connection with its move. S. 1529, 104th Cong. § 2 (1996). The
Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1996 would require a relocating franchise
to pay its proportionate share, based on dates of facility usage, of the outstanding debt for
construction of, or improvements to, a publicly owned playing facility, apparently even if it
moves after its lease expires. S. 1625, 104th Cong. § 7(1)(1) (1996).
571. One court held that a contractual obligation merely to negotiate in "good faith" is
too vague and indefinite to be enforceable. See Candid Productions, Inc. v. International
Skating Union, 530 F. Supp. 1330, 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Therefore, it is advisable to list
the club's specific obligations. For example, team officials should be expressly required to
disclose certain information to their host city to enable them to submit a financial package
to keep the team, to exchange offers and counteroffers, and to participate in face-to-face
meetings with city officials and stadium officials.
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its host city. 572 This will provide a fair opportunity for a city to retain a
cherished local team and source of community pride, as well as pre-
vent a team owner from surreptitiously reaching a deal with another
city to relocate the franchise.573
CONCLUSION
Public law does not solve the problem of opportunistic behavior
by sports franchise owners who generate bidding wars and abandon
their host cities for other venues, often contrary to both league and
host-city interests. Present ordering of city-team arrangements by pri-
vate law mechanisms may be inadequate because of existing league
monopoly power that creates a disparity of bargaining power in favor
of team owners. The solution is to make narrow, tactical changes in
public law by congressional legislation so that the private ordering of
these relationships may be given fuller effect. Individual team owners
should not be allowed to harm a host city's fans and taxpayers or defy
a league's collective interests by opportunistic or exploitative conduct
designed primarily to enhance the economic value of the owner's
franchises.
572. See supra note 521 and accompanying text.
573. Cleveland Browns owner Art Modell engaged in a series of clandestine meetings
with Maryland and Baltimore officials before suddenly announcing a deal to move his NFL
franchise to Baltimore. See Ann Davis,Jones Day; Squire Sanders: Scrimmaging over the Browns,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 11, 1995, at A4; A Combination of Circumstances: Increasingly Discouraged by
the Situation in Cleveland, Owner Art Modell Saw a Narrow Window of Opportunity for Moving His
Browns Franchise to Baltimore, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 16, 1995, at A16, available in 1995
WL 11022081; Ken Rosenthal, It's Time for Cleveland and Browns to Work It Ou BALT. SUN,
Jan. 3, 1996, at D1, available in 1996 WL 6598573. Our proposal would prevent secret
negotiations with a competing city during the exclusive negotiation period with a team's
host city.
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